



CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

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WILLIAM C. BAGLEY

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CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

BY

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PREFACE

It is hoped that the material presented in this book will be helpful to teachers, supervisors, principals, and others who are interested in securing perspective with reference to the discipline or control of pupils in elementary schools. The problem of pupil control is in a state of theoretical and practical confusion, not exceeded perhaps by that of any other phase of current educational effort. There are those who commit themselves unreservedly for "order" through a rather rigid type of external direction. There are others who, with a certain apologetic hesitation, but not without some conviction, declare themselves for freedom and control through the children's own group enterprises. Paradoxical as it may seem, the whole question of control has attained a certain relative insignificance, both in theoretical and in practical discussion. Matters of method and curriculum organization engross the teacher, whose latent sensitivity to questions of discipline is aroused to proportions of resentment by the alleged neglect of this phase of the child's school life.

A real danger lurks in this situation. Whereas the diversity and apparent incompatibility of existing

attitudes makes proper orientation highly important, the submerged position of the whole subject in educational discussion invites hasty generalization and shortsighted interpretation. Any method of orientation which omits a consideration of the historical antecedents and theoretical connections of current attitudes is likely to result in an inadequate sense of values. To try to establish criteria of worth by a direct interpretation of the present situation is like trying to make a visual analysis of the structure or design of a tapestry while holding it too near the eye. Present conceptions and practices need to be viewed as the expressions of historical trends or movements if perspective and a genuine sense of values are to be attained.

The sequence of topics and the method of organization followed in this book adhere, therefore, to the order of events in pupil control since the rise of the present system of public elementary education in the United States. An attempt is made to state the dominant attitudes toward control held in connection with each of the outstanding educational movements and theories. Part Two is a statement of the situation during the establishment of the present system of schools and before religious authority as the basic assumption in control was extensively questioned. It deals also with efforts following the mid-century to find practical means of mitigating the severity of prevalent methods of control and to shift the basis of

morality from religion to a vague social authoritarianism. Part Three shows the bearings of the kindergarten movement, Herbartianism, and the moral-education movement upon control. Following the discussion of these newer movements is a statement of the changed status of authority in control. Part Four deals with the more recent scientific movement in education in relation to control. Following a statement of the reported bearings of recent child-study methods, an effort is made to interpret such critical attitudes as were an outgrowth of the spirit of inquiry, biological evolution, and social change. Part Five is an interpretation of the current social movement in education in relation to control. Two phases are treated. First, there is an effort to state the attitudes toward control that have been found in the more political conceptions of democracy. Second, there is an attempt to state the organic conception of control that has grown out of efforts to formulate the educational bearings of biological evolution and social change.

The book as a whole does not represent an attempt to set forth a program or consistent policy of control, though it is believed by the writer that most of the considerations treated are requisite to any adequate view. The book is intended rather to serve as a basis of orientation and should be especially helpful to students who wish to clarify the relation of the control and instructional functions. If the treatment of the more recent developments seems to reflect unduly a

particular point of view, it is not because the author has been unmindful of his obligation to consider all pertinent data. An earnest attempt has been made to present the more fundamental considerations that have been recognized as relevant to the larger problem, quite irrespective of their source. If the material seems weighted in favor of a particular theory or writer, it should be observed that the data examined seem to indicate that few really new considerations relative to control have been offered by most of the writers in this field. Much of that which is now urged in the name of sound theory is in reality a repetition of proposals made decades or even generations ago. These have been treated in the sequence of topics in approximately their proper chronological settings. If such views still persist, their presence may be accounted for at least in part on the basis of the force of customary belief and attitude.

The use of reasonable space prohibits separate acknowledgment of the numerous obligations incurred in connection with the study. For any insight revealed, I am indebted to Teachers College and especially to those with whom I have had the privilege, as Graduate Scholar and Research Fellow, to study in elementary education, philosophy, and psychology. In particular I wish to mention Professors Frederick G. Bonser and William H. Kilpatrick, who, from the date of my entrance in the institution, manifested a very personal interest in my advancement. I wish to thank those

leaders at Teachers College and elsewhere whose divergence of conception and whose obvious sincerity and devotion to educational progress have helped sharpen the issues and define the problem involved in the study. I am peculiarly indebted to Professors Milo B. Hillegas, Edward H. Reisner, and Lois C. Mossman, whose critical guidance and constant sympathy have been genuinely helpful. I wish also to acknowledge deep gratitude to my wife, Olive Oliphint Harris, whose unceasing encouragement and very substantial help have made possible the completion of the work.

I wish, finally, to express my indebtedness to the various periodicals and publishers for permission to use previously published material. Quotations from Dewey's *Experience and Nature* and Riley's *American Thought* are used by permission of and special arrangement with the respective publishers, The Open Court Publishing Company and Henry Holt and Company.

P. E. H.

NEW YORK,
June, 1927.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

IN so far as American education is concerned, there can be no doubt that the attitude of both the theorist and the practitioner toward the problem of school discipline has been almost revolutionized within the past generation. Thirty years ago the first law of the school was order, the first task of the teacher was to compel order, and the first duty of the pupil was to obey and "behave."

It is not too much to say that contemporary educational theory almost completely reverses these standards. In the older sense of silence and rigidity, "order" as an objective of school government has been thoroughly discredited. To compel anyone to do anything is about as far from the present-day ideals of good teaching as anything could well be. And obedience, once regarded as a virtue of the first order, is now looked upon in some quarters as far more nearly akin to a vice.

Throughout this period of change, practice has followed theory fairly faithfully. There are many schools, even in America, where authority still rules with an iron hand; but such schools constitute a much

smaller proportion of the total number than they did a decade or two decades ago. They are far less numerous in our country than elsewhere. Indeed, if we except Russia and the so-called "free" schools now found occasionally in Austria, Germany, and other countries of Europe, the overthrow of the authoritarian conception of school government is essentially an American achievement.

In the present volume, Dr. Harris sets forth the shifts and changes in educational theory that have brought about this transformation, together with an illuminating interpretation of what these changes mean in the light of present-day tendencies in the social and the psychological sciences. Of especial importance are the conclusions that he reaches with reference to the integration of the control and instructional functions. It cannot be denied that the regimen of school life is itself an educative force of far-reaching significance. The possibilities of directing this powerful agency with intelligent foresight are well worth the most thorough-going investigation. To harmonize the processes and outcomes of control with the broader aims of education is not an easy problem to solve, but our author has rendered an invaluable service in defining it clearly and in pointing out possible steps toward its solution.

That Dr. Harris's point of view differs in some respects from that of the editor is in no sense out of harmony with the traditions of the Modern Teachers' Series. The editor is very proud to present to the

educational public this first book of a vigorous young writer. It is a book distinguished by a scholarship that is meticulous but far from pedantic. Its treatment of moot questions is both exceptionally well informed and eminently fair. Every page and every line reveal the author as a sincere and earnest seeker after truth.

WILLIAM C. BAGLEY

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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

CHAPTER I

DIFFICULTIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CONTROL

THE material here offered is the result of an effort to determine the present dominant theoretical and practical attitudes regarding the discipline or moral control of pupils in elementary schools. This has been accomplished by showing historically the sequence and evolution of working conceptions together with some of the correlative social, religious, and educational factors which have in greater or less degree conditioned them since the rise of public elementary education in the United States. The problem which furnished the basis of the study was suggested by an existing practical situation which involves much diversity of conception. In the particular field of control or school discipline the striking contrasts of attitude are illustrated in the following quotations:

“You need discipline in the teaching of children just as much as you do in an army. They must be orderly and quiet before they can be taught.”¹

¹ O’Shea, William J., *The World*, New York, March 28, 1926.

"It seems to me that there are at least two contrasted positions: first, that of those who would stop the noise and are indifferent to the character effects of how they do it; and, second, that of those who seek primarily the character effect and are relatively indifferent as to whether noise continues or is stopped. Between these two are many intermediate positions."¹

The existence of these attitudes in comparison and in contrast with certain historical conceptions only increases the apparent difficulty of progress in the present situation. If net progress relative to control is a fact, it is in part obscured in the confusion caused by such apparently disparate views. The close similarity of the following views, separated by nearly a century but still present in much of educational thought and practice, reveals the aggravated nature of the problem:

"It is not a question of influencing the thinking of the pupil, nor the emotional reactions of the pupil, but solely of securing the desired behavior. . . . It is a necessary part of the business of education for the teacher and principal to insist upon and enforce obedience from the child — providing the child does not give it without forcing."²

"There must be authority. The pupils may not often feel it. But they must know it is always at hand, and the pupils must be taught to submit to it as to simple authority. The subjection of the governed to the will of one man [teaching was done quite altogether by men at that time] in such a way that the expression of his will must be the final decision of every question is the only form of government that will answer in home or in school."³

¹ Kilpatrick, William H., *Foundations of Method: Informal Talks on Teaching*, New York, 1925, p. 317.

² Rich, S. G., *Journal of Educational Method*, Vol. 4, 1924-1925, p. 296 ff.

³ Abbott, Jacob, address before American Institute of Instruction, 1831; see *First Annual Report*.

"The school must continue to resemble in many ways the older order in which a single individual imposed his will upon the group, and the conception of school discipline must continue to reflect some measure of arbitrary dominance and repression."¹

Thus it is, that individuals occupying positions of strategic significance for molding present and future practice and bound with grave obligations to society for the exercise of greatest wisdom in the employment of procedures consistent with latest scientific conclusions are holding tenaciously to working conceptions of widest divergence. So striking is the situation that one who wishes to be fair to present educational leadership is led to question the existence of any body of educational data of a really scientific character from which working hypotheses may be made. A more accurate analysis of the situation, however, seems to identify the difficulty in the rather natural human propensity to inconsistency. The problem seems to lie, in part at least, in the failure of many to harmonize practice or working conceptions with professed theory. Instances of educational practice widely different in character may be cited in which the respective leaders hold apparently the same theoretical positions, as indicated in published statements of actual practices and of theories held in justification of such practices. In still other situations closely similar practices are justified on apparently opposite grounds. In such cases there seems a

¹ Bagley, W. C., *School Discipline*, 1914, Ch. 1.

total lack of consciousness of the discrepancy. The situation seems in some instances to amount almost to an exploitation of certain supposedly "recent" or "advanced" theories as justifications of procedure, slightly modified on the surface but otherwise traditional, simply because the theories seem "popular." Or, putting the matter differently, the difficulty appears to be complicated by the absence of uniformly interpreted criteria of worth. Proposals based, presumably, on identical standards, usually the social, attain widest divergence both in theoretical exposition and practical implication.

Whatever the explanation, these extremes and inconsistencies of view and policy involve a very real problem now existing in educational thought and practice. On the one hand, it is held that the control or discipline of pupils is prerequisite to their proper educational growth or guidance. It is at present urged by some, as the foregoing quotations imply, that recourse must be made to the rather old-fashioned discipline of authority, with its prompt and unquestioned obedience to commands, not merely as providing conditions basic to proper educational procedure, but also as a means of improving the general social situation. Not infrequently is disparaging reference made, both in educational discussion and in popular literature, to the "sentimental" in educational control.

"The soft-pedagogists are hopeful and sentimental enough to believe that the child's own impulse will, if given sufficient free

play, cause the adoption of the necessary manners and modes of behavior."¹

"If the public and the educational profession are sincere in wanting moral education, they will clamor for the return of discipline to the schools. . . . The extant policy of not giving commands and of not enforcing them when they are given will be reversed. . . . Much stricter discipline is the needed means of moral education."²

On the other hand, it is urged with at least equal conviction that proper guidance of unrestrained human action constitutes within itself the essence of the educational process and provides the surest and most direct means of social reconstruction.

This study did not proceed, however, on the assumption that a solution of the problem was to be found in the attainment of identity of conception. On the contrary, even in the presence of these definitely opposed views with their correlative moral theories and corresponding practices, it appeared, as seems increasingly acknowledged in present life, that freedom in the holding and expressing of divergent opinions, convictions, and theories is essential if human progress be regarded, as in the biological world, a function in part at least of variation and selection. Moreover, it did not appear that thinking people could or should be expected to think exactly alike even when theorizing from supposedly identical materials or data gained under similar conditions and influences. Allowance had to be made, so it appeared, for differences in conclusion due to the

¹ Rich, S. G., *op. cit.*

² Rich, S. G., *The New York Times*, November 29, 1925.

facilitating or inhibiting influences of all prior experiences, including both the conscious and unconscious phases that are operative in determining the unique quality of each instance of present experiencing. And it seemed evident that the various experiences of any individuals selected for consideration could not be alike in their entirety, or even in isolated instances, if original or native potentialities be reckoned in their varied strengths.

It did appear, however, that some degree of unanimity should exist and be found desirable in order to promote understanding and thereby to make maximum progress possible. Though the mere fact of language attests to mutuality of meanings as the products of shared experiences, there seemed to be no guarantee of tolerance or sympathy among points of view so diverse as at present exist in the field of control. It seemed true also that some unanimity of idea should be expected in generalizations or hypotheses made from the same body of knowledge. In proportion as theoretical generalizations or proposals for practice are made from data similarly gained and of universal scientific validity, increased mutuality should exist. Some consensus of conclusion, belief, or conviction might reasonably be expected. If this does not exist, it may be inferred that the materials have not been adequately examined or that working hypotheses have not been formed from the same body of basic data. One generalization is reached from one set of materials; another from a quite different set, perhaps.

But to attain such agreement, there must be criteria for evaluating proposals. Could such criteria be found in points of agreement relative to the method of approach to a solution rather than in the attainment of a specific solution of the problem? With the elaboration of this suggestion and the further examination of materials, it appeared that all would agree upon the importance of taking into account present dominant attitudes toward control, both theoretical and practical, not as standards but as important considerations in proposals for improvement. In the absence of objective criteria of worth, it appeared that it was only on the basis of such a total view that new proposals could approach validity. Furthermore, it appeared that any attempt to interpret directly the present situation without offering at least some of the conditioning factors would, in being merely cross-sectional, fail to give the needed perspective. The historical method of interpreting the present situation was selected, therefore, in response to the need for revealing in guiding clearness both the diversity and relative significance of the elements regarded widely as pertinent to the problem of control. It appeared that this method should obviate the necessity, so far as this study is concerned, of more objective standards, which, however established, might prove questionable from one point of view or another. Particularly, the method should prevent a certain fallacy, namely, the assumption that, because earlier practices and attitudes have had a causal bearing upon

present practices, they are superior and should, therefore, set the standard of worth for present and future procedure.

No effort has been made to evaluate critically present practices further than to reveal through description the present dominant tendencies. More specifically, the purpose of the study was to answer the following question: If the history of elementary education in the United States reveals certain present trends or directions of movement, some more evident than others, relative to the function of moral control or school discipline, what are they?

PART TWO

REMOTE INFLUENCES AFFECTING RECENT CONCEPTIONS OF CONTROL

CHAPTER II

PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES RELATIVE TO CONTROL PRIOR TO 1850

A STUDY of the control of children in public elementary schools during the period of the establishment of the present system in the United States requires a consideration of traditional influences, a description of existing practices and working conceptions, and an interpretation of these in the light of the more fundamental life assumptions that may have influenced them. In the present chapter, therefore, effort will be made to indicate: (A) the character and bearings of the more obvious, traditional influences; (B) the meanings and methods of control in general use; and (C) the theoretical or general assumptions with which existing practices were correlated.

(A) TRADITIONAL FACTORS

In very early societies the conscious control of children consisted mainly in arbitrary methods of transmitting the system of beliefs, mores, and folkways which were prized by the adult group but which had little or no connection with practical pursuits or the related habits and skills learned by the young through participation. During these earlier stages of social de-

velopment the learning of skills and knowledge useful in life activities seems to have been incidental to objective pursuit, thus allowing interest and felt functional worth to the child ; whereas there persisted the assumption that the mores, liturgies, and superstitions of adults should be arbitrarily impressed.

There is evidence of this twofold division of pupil control, particularly during the period of ancient civilizations. Mild, humane treatment and an absence of rewards seem to have characterized intellectual education, while arbitrary methods were used in producing moral conformity. Before the rise of mass education, when the functions of acquisition and moral development were separately delegated to different teachers, it was quite generally believed among leaders that punishment was ineffective in promoting learning and was justified only in moral matters. Roger Ascham, English schoolmaster of the sixteenth century, insisting upon a clearer recognition of this separateness in the school methods of his own time, refers to the earlier methods as follows :

“This discipline was well known and diligently used among the Greeks and old Romans ; as doth appear in Aristophanes, Isocrates, and Plato, and also in the comedies of Plautus ; where we see that children were under the *rule* of three persons, *præceptore*, *pedagogo*, *parente*. The schoolmaster taught him learning with all gentleness ; the governor corrected his manners with all sharpness ; the father held the stern of his whole obedience. And so he that used to teach did not use to beat.”¹

¹ Ascham, Roger, *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 119.

The following from Plato indicates the earlier conception regarding learning :

"A free mind ought to learn nothing as a slave. The lesson that is made to enter the mind by force will not remain there. Then use no violence toward children; the rather, cause them to learn while playing." ¹

The following reported statement of Lady Jane Grey indicates English practice of the sixteenth century :

"One of the greatest benefits that ever God gave me is, that he sent me so sharp and severe parents, and so gentle a schoolmaster. For when I am in the presence either of father or mother; whether I speak, keep silence, sit, stand, or go, eat, drink, be merry, or sad, be sewing, playing, dancing, or doing anything else; I must do it as it were, in such weight, measure, and number, even so perfectly as God made the world; or else I am so sharply taunted, so cruelly threatened, yea presently sometimes with pinches, nips, and bobs, and other ways (which I will not name for the honor I bear them) so without measure misordered, that I think myself in hell, till time come that I must go to Mr. Elmer; who teacheth me so gently, so pleasantly, and with such fair allurements to learning, that I think all the while nothing while I am with him." ²

There were among the leaders of educational thought and practice many who, all along, had vigorously denounced severe means of promoting learning. - Among these were Anselm, Gerson, Vittorino da Feltre, Erasmus, Montaigne, Ratke, Commenius, St. Cyran, Locke, Hoole, Sir Richard Steele, Rousseau, and Pestalozzi.³

¹ Plato, "On Discipline," Book 7 of *Laws*, Compayré, *History of Pedagogy*, translated by Payne, p. 33.

² Lady Jane Grey, quoted by Ascham, *op. cit.*, p. 90 ff.

³ Kuehner, Q. A., *The Evolution of the Modern Concept of School Discipline*, University of Pennsylvania, 1913, pp. 13-35.

That there was a tendency to perpetuate the earlier differentiation¹ relative to the function of teaching and of forcing moral conformity is indicated in part by the development in connection with earlier mass teaching of the office of "discipline-master," one who was employed not to teach, but to keep order and particularly to punish.² But with the more general employment of mass education and the consequent combination in the same person of the functions of arbitrary moral control and the teaching of useful knowledge, the former function not only maintained its earlier primacy but came to be regarded as a condition of the latter. It was the common view, therefore, that children should be controlled before they were to be taught. "Being good" seems to have been given first emphasis, not because of any causal or inherent relation which conformity to adult standards bore to effective learning, but rather because, traditionally, it had been considered primary in importance.

Moreover, with the gradual confusion of these offices the methods of stimulating learning came generally to assume the main features of existing methods of producing moral conformity. It was merely the logic of

¹ NOTE: Referring to earlier methods of stimulating learning, particularly among primitive peoples, Goldenweiser says:

"It may be of interest to note here that the method of punishments and rewards, prevalent in later history, is almost uniformly unknown in earlier days . . . no punishments, no rewards, and efficient education." *Century Magazine*, August, 1925, p. 490 ff.

² See J. A. H. Murray's *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, "discipline-master."

practice, then, that teachers on whom rested the responsibility for the child's growth in these two directions should identify the means of stimulating acquisition with those of securing moral conformity and should resort to the same mechanical means of promoting book learning that were considered necessary in obtaining moral conformity. The identification was not a result of normal or rational development except as trial and error and the increased demands for learning in terms of symbolic materials and in larger classes constituted justification in practice. To this extent it was normal and rational. Then with the rise and spread in western civilization of the theological notion of the natural perversity of child nature and the later educational doctrine of formal discipline, the main educational function seems to have been to exercise an external control, extending even to the minutiae of overt conduct and involving methods avowedly repressive, restrictive, and abhorrent to children. That control in relation to learning continued to reveal the unpleasant effects of this earlier confusion and that the practice persisted well beyond the period of the establishment of the present system of public elementary education is indicated in the following criticism by Horace Mann :

"In all schools having any claim to respectability, imperfect lessons incur some unpleasant consequences. In some it is only a forfeiture of the teacher's approval; in some it is a record of failures; in some, after a fixed number of failures, it is corporal punish-

ment, the infliction of which cancels the old score and opens the books for a new account.”¹

(B) METHODS OF CONTROL DURING THE INITIAL STAGES OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

At the rise of our present system of education, therefore, control referred to authoritative and forceful methods of obtaining prompt and unquestioned obedience to requirements, whether to duty or right as conceived in the abstract, to the learning of concrete lesson assignments, or to any other detail of conduct, capricious or reasonable, exacted by teacher or other “superior.” In order to effect control as thus conceived, varied, ingenious, and cruel systems of punishment were employed, the most generally used method being that of corporal punishment, with practically no effort to fit the severity of the pain to the deed or to discriminate between moral or intellectual capacities of children. As illustrating the arbitrary character of the existing methods the following is quoted :

“The teacher told the whole class to write four lines. If, in looking around, he found anyone who had written his lines before the time was over, he thrashed him for writing too fast. If he had written none, he whipped him for laziness. When the copies were done, they all passed in procession with them through a narrow gangway, quite equivalent to running the gauntlet, as the teacher stood ready with a blow upon the utterance of a single word.”²

¹ *Report of the Secretary, State Board of Education, Massachusetts, 1845*, p. 100.

² *Historical Sketch of the Boston Latin Grammar School*, quoted in “The Boston Schools One Hundred Years Ago,” *The New England Magazine*, July, 1902, p. 636.

The prevalent use of force in matters of acquisition is illustrated by the following reported observation :

“‘Bangs, what is an active verb?’ Bangs hesitates and looks imploringly to his neighbors, who cannot or will not help him out of his difficulty. ‘Well, muttonhead, what does an active verb express? I’ll tell you what it expresses,’ bringing down the stick upon the boy with emphasis, ‘it expresses action and necessarily supposes an agent (cane descends again) and an object acted on, as *castigo te*, I chastise thee. Do you understand now?’”¹

There was, however, at the opening of the century a growing tendency to regard rewards with greater favor than in the past and to emphasize their use as the second main stimulus to learning. The following indicates the earlier universality :

“The principle of emulation was in high respect in those days [between 1785 and 1800]; we contended for places at every recitation; . . .”²

As showing the increased theoretical recognition of the inadequacy of force and fear alone in relation to learning and moral growth and the tendency toward wider use of emulation, the following is quoted :

“It is neither very natural nor very easy for a child to respect and love those from whom he is in the habit of receiving the discipline of the rod. The idea of rewards, as well as of punishments, in any rational view is necessary to the right influence of human conduct. . . . Let us then unite to devise some system of general school

¹ *Historical Sketch of the Boston Latin Grammar School*, p. 47 ff.

² Jackson, James, a letter quoted in *Historical Sketch of the Boston Latin Grammar School*; Jenks, H. F., *Catalogue*, Boston Public Latin School, 1886, p. 43.

instruction and government in which rewards shall constitute a predominant feature.”¹

That such a system became general and that, with few exceptions, the public attitude as well as that of the profession was favorable to its establishment is indicated in the following taken from the first *Prize Book* of the Boston Public Latin School in 1820:

“I am aware that there is a prejudice in the minds of some against emulation as a principle of incitement in education. They think it produces envy, hatred, and other evil passions; . . . These remarks seem almost superfluous at a time when this subject is so well understood generally, and they would not have been made but that contrary sentiments are known to exist in the minds of some. They have even been enforced with feeling and eloquence worthy of juster views from the sacred desk, within a short time, in the town of Boston.”²

The following indicates more explicitly the public attitude as reflected in the school regulations of the time:

“The several subcommittees shall visit their respective schools at least one week previous to the exhibitions, to select the candidates for the medals, and shall critically examine members of the first class for this purpose, and shall have power to award as many medals as they think proper, not however exceeding six for the boys and six for the girls in each school. . . . The Franklin medals shall be bestowed in public as rewards of merit on those boys and girls to whom they have been previously assigned, ‘general scholarship’ having been taken into consideration in the assignments.”³

¹ Payson, Thomas, address before Associated Instructors of Boston, 1816; see *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 15, 1865, p. 535.

² B. A. G., *The Prize Book*, No. 1, Public Latin School, Boston, 1820, pp. 11-13.

³ *Regulations of the School Committee*, Boston, 1823, p. 11 ff.

Though the background of the present system was thus characterized by some divergence of thought and practice relative to the use of force in stimulating acquisition, there was striking unanimity regarding its use in moral matters. The following from the fourth edition of a much used text on "moral science" indicates the point of view :

"It is the duty of the instructor to enforce obedience, and of the pupil to render it."¹

The unquestioned finality of the authoritative position of the teacher is indicated in the following words :

"The word of the teacher must be received and obeyed as law within his little realm."²

There was likewise a consensus of agreement regarding the more general relationships and requirements of the total teaching situation. It was held generally that the relation of parent (or instructor) to the pupil was that of superior to inferior.

"The equals in this relation are the parent and the instructor : to both of them is the pupil the inferior ; and to both is he under the obligation of obedience, respect and reverence."³

Furthermore, proper teaching, so it was held, required that the obedience of the child to the teacher's authority be prompt and unquestioned. Nothing in the literature thus far examined relative to practices

¹ Wayland, Francis, *Elements of Moral Science*, 1835, p. 331.

² Payson, Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 534 ff.

³ Wayland, Francis, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

prior to 1840 can be found which does not make this assumption. The only dissent was with regard to the use of force in stimulating learning. As representing the prevalent professional attitude of the period regarding the assumed monarchical character of control, the following is given :

"The first step which the teacher must take, I do not mean in his course in moral education, but before he is prepared to enter upon that course, is to obtain the entire, unqualified submission of his school to his authority. . . . The subjection of the governed to the will of one man, in such a way that the expression of his will must be the final decision of every question, is the only government that will answer in school or in family. A government not of persuasion, not of reasons assigned, not of the will of the majority, but of the will of the one who presides." ¹

The literature indicates little divergence from this view. And there is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that despotic control existed generally. Such statements as the following are found frequently in the literature relating to school management and discipline :

"Shall the government of a school be a monarchy or a republic? To this question, after much inquiry and many experiments, I answer, a monarchy — an absolute, unlimited monarchy; the teacher possessing exclusive power as far as the pupils are concerned, though strictly responsible to the committee, or to the trustees, under whom he holds his office." ²

¹ Abbott, Jacob, "School Government," *American Annals of Education*, Vol. 2, 1832, p. 90; see also American Institute of Instruction, *Report*, Vol. 2, 1832.

² Abbott, Jacob, *The Works of, "Essay on the Teacher,"* London, 1837, p. 631.

And since this unlimited power extended to the control of the minutest details of conduct, for all of which the teacher felt accountability, there was an inevitable lack of a sense of relative values in dealing with specific acts. The following lines from Coote's *English School Master*, a famous manual of the period, indicate the atomic character of control as well as the triviality of acts regarded as sinful and meriting punishment :

“If broken hos'd or shoe'd you go,
or slovenly in your array,
Without a girdle, or untrust,
then you and I must have a fray.

If that you cry or talk aloud,
or books do rend, or strike with knife ;
Or laugh, or play unlawfully,
then you and I must be at strife.

If that you curse, miscall, or swear,
if that you pick, filch, steal, or lye ;
If you forget a scholar's part,
then must you sure your points untye.”¹

That children felt keenly the despotic and tyrannical character of such arbitrary methods is indicated in the following :

“The older boys of the first two classes, impregnated with the cunning of this world, were remarkably proficient in the art of lying ; where twenty or thirty were severely punished each day for no greater crime than a glance at his neighbor or a cough louder than seemed proper to the presiding tyrant, it was not surprising, when

¹ Quoted in *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 1, 1856, p. 309.

a simple falsehood would avert the ferule, that the blunted moral sense of the boys would resort to it. . . . About three times a week a feruling was administered me 'for doing nothing.' . . . At regular intervals I was exhibited to the committee-man as one utterly lost. . . . At the close of each visit a score or more of the fellows were summoned to receive the reward due them for indulging in that propensity to grin. . . ."¹

As all conduct, normal or capricious, that was sufficiently obvious for external determination was subject to the teacher's censorship, control was dominantly restrictive or negative. As children were supposed to know the right from the wrong and as school duties and rules were explicit, usually in the form of a code posted conspicuously, the practical emphasis was not upon positive conformity, but rather upon punishment for non-conformity. Control was dominantly pathological, therefore, stress being laid upon the punishment of wrongdoing rather than upon the formation of habits of positive worth. Though the active principle was attention to wrongdoing and the forceful suppression of movement or expression till such time as was pleasing to the teacher — at which time it was, if necessary, forcefully exacted — control nevertheless required considerable time and alertness for failures to conform to rules and routine. It seems a conservative estimate to conclude that the major portion of the teacher's time was given to keeping order and inflicting punishment. Indeed, books, articles, and school committee regula-

¹ From an unsigned article, "A Boston Public School Twenty Years Ago," *Knickerbocker Magazine*, April, 1858, p. 396 ff.

tions concerning the management and discipline of the school specify that proper allowance and deduction from "hearing each lesson" must be made for "correcting faults" and "administering punishments." The actual work of instruction occupied only a secondary position in relation to the assumed importance of silence, order, physical posture, and the like. As indicating the evident time-consuming character of control as thus conceived and practiced and as showing the extreme difficulty of maintaining the desired standard of behavior, the following regarding silence is pertinent:

"A perfect stillness when there is power of life and motion is hardly possible, and when the buoyancy of youthful spirits and the irksomeness of long confinement are superadded, we must perforce be content to have our minimum at some distance from the absolute. Yet no faithful teacher will think he has done his duty if he does not make constant efforts toward the furtherest limits."¹

Control thus externally determined not only consumed much of the teacher's time and energy, but it also involved on the part of the children a certain rigid limitation of physical, emotional, and intellectual response. Because child conduct was limited to those responses which the teacher chose to allow or exact, an inevitable narrowness and simplicity, as well as a tendency toward barren uniformity, characterized procedure in general. These characteristics, particularly the paucity of overt physical response, are indicated in the following lines:

¹ *American Annals of Education*, Vol. 9, 1839, p. 223.

"Each child had about twenty minutes of instruction each half day — 'forty minutes' worth of instruction daily and three hundred and twenty minutes of sitting still." ¹

But as evidence of the rebellion of child nature against such restraint and external repression and of the equal persistence of teachers generally in their efforts to suppress completely all forms of overt activity, countless devices, borrowed from traditional methods or wrought out of personal experience and devotion to the cause of perfect external control, were employed. Great diligence and thought were used in contriving effective means. Ordinary methods are indicated in the following:

"... the frowning scheme, in which the teacher, lynx-eyed, was ever on the watch and by a frown or threat expressed his displeasure at every act of irregularity or disquiet; the system of specific penalties for described offences; additional lesson assignments or tasks for certain named offences, such as for whispering, an additional lesson or exercise; and frequent admonition on the subject of order and silence." ²

Because of the extreme difficulty, however, of effecting such control through devices and the more direct methods of the personal disapproval of the teacher, there was the tendency, long established, to adopt some form of group disapproval and to transfer responsibility to individuals for help in detecting "offences" in the

¹ From *Historical Sketch of the Boston Latin Grammar School*, cited by Martin, G. H., "The Boston Schools One Hundred Years Ago," *New England Magazine*, 1902, p. 633.

² *American Annals of Education*, Vol. 9, 1839, p. 223.

group. As an illustration of the latter, the following is an extreme, though prevalent, method:

"A pupil caught in the act of delinquency is made to take a place on the platform . . . and there to watch for other delinquents. When he detects anyone of his school mates in a violation of any of the rules of the school, he is expected to announce the name of the offender and the offence. If not contradicted or although contradicted, yet if confirmed, he is absolved and returns to his seat, and the new culprit succeeds to the post and to the office of sentinel. Here he is expected to remain until, in his turn, he can obtain his discharge by successfully inculpating another. Such a watchman is usually called a monitor, but his real office is that of a spy. . . . If the original culprit does not succeed in detecting a fellow pupil in some offence, he receives a punishment."¹

(C) ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE METHODS OF CONTROL

In addition to the more traditional and unreflective forces mentioned earlier, it appears that there were at least three possible explanations of the existing conditions of control. They were (1) the complete identification of religious authority and school morality, (2) verbalism and the disciplinary theory of learning, and (3) the psychology of punishment.

(1) *The Religious Factor*

The previous conditions were correlative with a situation involving an outlook on life which was dominantly religious and authoritative. Just as all humanity was subject to the fixed law of a superior Will, so

¹ Mann, Horace, *Report of the Secretary, State Board of Education, Massachusetts, 1845*, p. 116 ff.

were the young at home or in school also subject to adult control. Just as kings had, by divine sanction, directed the lives of men, so were the details of child life subject to direction from their "superiors."¹

It was only natural that such views of the proper relationships between the governed and the governing power, whether the heavenly or the worldly, should imply similar relationships in the education of the young. Hence the theory that the minutiae of child conduct were the necessary sphere of the teacher's direction. Again, just as all humanity was helpless to take care of itself, having fallen, and finding it necessary, therefore, to render unquestioned obedience to divine sanctions, so also were children as a lot depraved and, in order to be saved, must be made to obey.² Education at this stage was primarily a matter of salvation through mechanical obedience. Control was based on a morality which was purely authoritative and completely identified with religious belief and practice. As indicating these views, the following excerpts from literature considered appropriate for little children till well into the nineteenth century are quoted :

¹ NOTE: "The state advocates of divine right made the king high above his people and, at the same time, an autocrat who decided the smallest affairs in the utmost bounds of his kingdom. The church advocates of divine sovereignty were of the same temper and held that the Most High doth direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions and things from the greatest even to the least." Riley, Woodbridge, *American Thought*, 1923, pp. 2-7.

² Wayland, Francis, *Elements of Moral Science*, 1835, p. 47.

“There’s a dreadful hell,
And everlasting pains ;” etc.

“ ‘Tis dangerous to provoke a God !
His power and vengeance none can tell ;
One stroke of his mighty rod
Shall send us all to hell.

“Have you not heard what dreadful plagues
Are threatened by the Lord,
To him who breaks his father’s law,
Or mocks his mother’s word ?

“What heavy guilt upon him lies !
How cursed is his name !
The ravens shall pick out his eyes,
And eagles eat the same.”¹

Some of the following titles of stories, found in the *Poetic Primer, A Circlet of Little Rhymes for Little Readers*, by Clara Hall, are also suggestive :

- “Lines on a Young Lady Weeping”
- “The Step-Mother”
- “On Two Infants Dying at the Same Time with the Whooping Cough”
- “The Dying Negro”
- “To a Lady Weeping over Her Departed Child”
- “The Grave of a Pious Cottager”²

That all aspects of education were based on the religious motive was clearly evident in public utterances of statesmen and the reports of legislative commissions

¹ Watts, Isaac, *Divine and Moral Songs for Children*, cited by Ballard, P. B., *The Changing School*, London, 1925, pp. 16-19.

² Ballard, P. B., *ibid.*, p. 21 ff.

as well as in the stated aims and principles of the school societies and organizations of the period. The following extract shows this influence in the report of a commission of five appointed in 1811 by Governor Tompkins of New York to report a plan for the establishment of a system of common schools :

“To rescue man from that state of degradation to which he is doomed, unless redeemed by education; . . . and to fit him for those high duties which his Creator has prepared for him.”¹

A bill embodying this report was passed by the legislature in 1812 and remained in force till 1840.² And as showing the general situation at this time Cubberley has the following to say :

“The school remained religious in purpose, even though its control was beginning to pass from the church to the state.”³

The Public School Society of New York in its annual reports of this period indicate the attitude in the following :

“They [the trustees] wish not to be understood as regarding religious impressions in early youth as unimportant; on the contrary, they wish to do all which with propriety may be done, to give a right direction to the minds of the children entrusted to their care. Their schools are uniformly opened with the reading of the scriptures, and the class books are such as recognize and enforce the great and generally acknowledged principles of Christianity.”⁴

¹ Hall, A. J., *Religious Education in the Public Schools of the State of New York*, Chicago, 1914.

² Hall, A. J., *ibid.*

³ Cubberley, Ellwood P., *The History of Education*, 1920, p. 548.

⁴ *Annual Report*, 1838, p. 7.

Regarding the Institute of the Brethren of the Christian Schools as established in nearly all Protestant and Catholic countries and extending well into the nineteenth century, the following is indicative of the attitude:

"The conception of education as well as the control exercised is thoroughly religious. Both in the control of the order and the conduct of the schools the spirit of asceticism is very marked. The most emphasized rule of the schools for both teacher and pupils was that of keeping silence. . . . Punishment was to be used instead of reprimands, signals instead of commands, written work was emphasized, and so far as possible restrictive and repressive measures were to be brought to bear upon the child. . . . Corporal punishment was resorted to freely."¹

That these more deeply rooted conceptions persisted during the rise of public education is shown by the presence of the notions of rewards and punishments in those educational formulations which attempted to harmonize the previously assumed disparity between heavenly forces and the natural relations of the world. Among the intermixture of assumptions regarding the nature of the moral law of the universe, the following represents a common view of the period:

"Every event is preceded by its regular antecedents, and is followed by its regular consequents; and hence is formed that endless chain of cause and effect which binds together the innumerable changes which are taking place everywhere around us. The term *law*, in the higher sense, is applied to beings endowed with conscience and will, and then there is attached to it the idea of rewards and punishments."²

¹ Monroe, Paul, *Textbook in the History of Education*, pp. 461-485.

² Wayland, Francis, paper presented before American Institute of Instruction at its first meeting, 1830, *Report*, Vol. 1, pp. 4-6.

Though all natural phenomena and human relations were thus subject to a fixed law under the direction of a superior Will, the individual was capable of rendering obedience either to the moral faculty, conscience, which was identical with obedience to God, or to one or more of the lower faculties, such as appetite, self-love, and the like. Consequently either punishment or reward was necessarily consequent upon any particular course taken. Such was the common interpretation.¹ But this faculty of conscience, the dictator from God, did not appear in the child till toward the end of the period of pupilage. Therefore, the minutiae of conduct, in order to avoid perpetual yielding to appetite, passion, or other lower faculties, must be subject to the parent's or the teacher's direction. Prior to the appearance of this faculty, the authority of the teacher (or parent) was absolute; afterward, it was only limited.² The basis of such authority is indicated in the following:

"The parent (or teacher) is superior, and the child inferior, by virtue of the relation which God himself has established. The child is bound to show deference to the parent (or teacher) whenever it is possible to evince that he considers him his superior."³

That it was not merely because of the dependent condition of the child that obedience was regarded as essential, but rather because of a value which it was

¹ Wayland, Francis, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-9; see also *Elements of Moral Science*, pp. 49-54.

² Wayland, Francis, *Elements of Moral Science*, p. 330.

³ Wayland, Francis, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

supposed to have in view of its bearing on future obedience to higher authority, is indicated in the following:

"From the habit of early subordination, acquired under the guardian care of education, when rightly conducted in the sphere of home and school life, the self-intelligent mind in its maturity of Christian growth learns to recognize the paramount claims of Divine authority to unhesitating obedience and cheerful submission, even when patient resignation to ordination not understood is the duty of the moment, and the utterance of the trusting spirit to its Author can only be, 'Not as I will, but as Thou wilt.'"¹

But it was not uniformly held that such conformity was for the child's present or future satisfaction or even for the worldly good of the individuals concerned. It was regarded as necessary because it was assumed to be the arbitrary will of the Creator. It was, therefore, good within itself to obey blindly and promptly the commands of "superiors."

"Obedience or love to God, from any more ultimate motive than that this affection is due to him because he is God, and our God, is not piety. Thus, if a child say, I will obey my father (or teacher) because it is for the happiness of the family (or school) . . . the action would not be filial obedience."²

This rigid identification of the moral with conformity to an arbitrary and static religious authority implied the restrictive and negative control so widely prevalent. Because of the lack of a directing conscience on the part of the child, external direction was necessary in

¹ Russell, William, "Moral Education," *Lectures to Young Teachers*, republished in *American Pedagogy*, 1876, pp. 182 ff.

² Wayland, Francis, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

order that conduct might be kept in conformity with the system of order imposed upon the universe from above. Hence, the maintenance of order, silence, and system came to be regarded as virtues or goods within themselves, possessing heavenly sanction. "Order is heaven's first law" was a statement frequently quoted in the educational literature of the time. Since children's normal actions were rarely, if ever, in harmony with the adult conception of law and order and because of the assumed waywardness and perversity of children in general, a repressive government and the habitual use of severe corporal inflictions were inevitable. It is not surprising, therefore, to find evidence of such an utter lack of appreciation of the worth of children as is indicated in the following:

"I took them to be young knaves at the very opening of school and made laws accordingly; and what I took them to be, many of them slowly became. They constantly watched their opportunity to evade my laws, and I watched my opportunity to detect them and enforce the penalty."¹

(2) *Theories of Knowledge in Relation to Control*

At least two theoretical factors, distinguishable but not disparate or separately operative, seem to have been in large part responsible for the working conceptions regarding control during the period under consideration. They were the continued influence of

¹ "Reminiscences of a School Master," *Annals of Education*, Vol. 5, 1835, p. 28.

earlier forms of individualism and the theory of formal discipline.

According to the instructional implications of the former, knowledge was to be achieved wholly through individual effort. It was to be a private affair quite altogether and without reference to the world of persons in which the child moved and had his being. "Each individual's mind was complete in isolation from everything else." Such an extreme view had arisen previously in the first attempts to gain freedom of personal belief, but it had become so formalized as to set intelligence or mind over against objective phenomena rather than finding its normal laws of growth in an application of these materials to personal ends. This assumed separation of the child's mind from the world, together with efforts to impose objects of knowledge which were in harmony only with adult standards of worth and which therefore lacked congeniality to childish inclination, soon brought the notion of inherent antagonism between the child's mind and the necessary subject matter of his education. It was regarded, accordingly, as necessary that the child be forced to partake of materials naturally incompatible with his deeper cravings. Hence arose the separation commonly made in later history between study and government or control.

The theory of formal discipline was quite as emphatic in its insistence upon rigid external control. Under eighteenth-century influences education had become

primarily a matter of cultivating or disciplining certain faculties possessed at the outset by the child. From this point of view the aim was only a variant of the individualistic conception of knowledge already mentioned. The purpose of education was to be accomplished by the exercise of these faculties upon materials presented. All that was necessary was to provide for sufficient exercise of each of the faculties in repeated acts of attending, observing, memorizing, and the like, in proper graded sequence and without reference to present disposition or interests of the child. It was frequently true that in practice the effectiveness of instruction was supposed to be in inverse proportion to its congeniality to the learner. This was not without theoretical justification, as is indicated in the following :

“As the strength of the Body lies chiefly in being able to endure Hardships, so also does that of the Mind. And the great Principle and Foundation of all Virtue and Worth lies in this, that a Man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what Reason directs as best, though the appetite lean the other way. . . . If, therefore, I might be heard, I would advise that, contrary to the ordinary way, children should be used to submit their desires and go without their longings, even from their very cradles.”¹

This conception, which was perhaps the most influential of the modern factors determining practice during the rise of public elementary education in

¹ Locke, John, “Thoughts concerning Education,” *Report, American Institute of Instruction*, Vol. 3, p. 18.

America, became in this baser form the excuse for all sorts of brutalities, typified in the famous dictum of the Hoosier Schoolmaster that "lickin' an' larnin' go together." But in practice this theory usually amounted to mere verbalism, the rote memorization of textual material quite apart from thought of the relationships involved. This is brought out forcefully by the first American educational survey made of the Boston schools in 1845. The following is quoted :

"The careful observer will learn from looking over our tables the general system of instruction pursued in our schools; namely, that of verbal or book knowledge. . . . They [the pupils] could bound states . . . but questioned as to the drainage of the countries, their capacity for commerce, the causes which direct streams and determine the force of water, their want of comprehension of these and other similar subjects showed plainly in almost every school that they had learned geography as if it were only a catalogue of names."¹

The mechanical character of the procedure, in the case of younger pupils, is indicated in the following :

"Eleven-twelfths of all the children in the reading classes of the public schools did not understand the meaning of the words they read,— did not master the sense of the reading lessons,— the ideas and feelings conveyed, or intended by the author to be conveyed and excited in their minds, never having reached the place of their destination."²

¹ *Report of the Annual Visiting Committee, Boston Public Schools, 1845*, p. 11 ff.

² Mann, Horace, *Reply to the Thirty-One Boston School Masters, 1844*, p. 16.

With reference to methods of instruction observed in connection with an examination of the district schools of New England, the following was reported :

"I was much struck with the heavy, dull, vacant countenances of the pupils, the cause of which quickly appeared. For when the reading classes took their places, it was easy to perceive that the mind was no further engaged in the exercise than attention to the pronunciation of the words required. As to comprehension of the meaning, the language might almost as well have been Greek."¹

The distasteful character of required learning and the implied necessity for the employment of violent means of securing attention to assignments is further indicated in the following :

"Whoever will go into our schools at any hour of the day will find a large portion of the scholars unoccupied with any study ; they have a book before them, but as its contents are insipid, or perhaps incomprehensible, but nevertheless to be committed to memory, and as there is no master immediately over them, they do not study."²

That this situation was conducive to the use of violent means of inducing acquisition needs no further demonstration. Rigid means of securing application had to be employed in order to carry out existing conceptions of the educational purpose.

(3) *The Psychological Factor*

The accepted frequency with which force was employed in control, though nominally the correlate of an

¹ Palmer, T. H., address before American Institute of Instruction, *Report*, 1837, p. 216.

² *Report of the Annual Visiting Committee*, Boston Public Schools, 1845, p. 45.

authoritative morality, was more exactly the product of factors of which religion was only one. Though the literature of the period does not seek rational justification for methods employed beyond the religious sanction, it indicates clearly that the logic of authoritative morality did not exhaust the elements operative in much of reported practice and that a more adequate explanation, not yet explicit in logical formulations, was to be found in the psychology of thwarted impulse and habit. The control of force was a product of custom and primitive impulse.¹ In practice the divinely sanctioned and assumed necessity of force amounted often to blind, impulsive response of the teacher to opposed or thwarted personal domination. Religious belief and attitude had but lent authoritative justification to practices personally satisfying to teachers in mode of execution because of their closer relation to primitive impulse. Nature provided the basis of satisfaction at personal domination, while customary practices and conceptions gave direction and context to the impulse.

Consequently, control, having its stimulus and embodiment in custom and its dynamic character in the more deeply rooted modes of impulsive response, often attained in practice the proportions of beastly cruelty. The following indicates in bold form the personal satisfyingness and emotional character of methods,

¹ Faris, Ellsworth, "Origin of Punishment," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 25, 1914-15, pp. 54-67.

stripped, as they were, of conscious moral guidance or prerogative :

"There are, most unfortunately, some pedagogues who appear never more gratified than in recounting the frequent instances and severity with which they inflict corporal punishment. To hear them one is reduced to the dreadful dilemma of discrediting either their humanity or their veracity."¹

Because in its earlier significance the will was the exact correlate of human relations characterized principally by the pursuit of that which was in harmony with the wishes of someone else, whether deity or worldly representative (whether parent or teacher in the case of children), it took the place of any need for using the personally worth-while actions of individuals, whether adults or children. The agency was invoked as a personal aid to persistence in the face of the disagreeable. Just as the source of all human values was not to be found within life itself, but in conformity to heavenly sanctions, to the requirements of an externally imposed will, and in the hope of future reward, so likewise the source and drive of individual persistence in these

¹ Payson, Thomas, paper presented to the Associated Instructors of Boston, 1816, *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 15, 1865, p. 535.

NOTE: A more recent interpretation of the vindictive character of such modes of punishment has been noted since writing the above. In reference to the teacher's deeper reason for violent methods, the following is quoted : "The secret pleasure he feels in chastising, although really the satisfaction of an unconscious impulse to inflict pain, seems to him the reward of a conscious carrying out of duty." See Ballard, P. B., *The Changing School*, London, 1925, p. 33.

imposed purposes was to be obtained from a personal will, either as a phase of some universally pervasive power or as a monopolistic possession. Hence, the duty devolved upon the teacher to see that this power, loath as it appeared to be to exercise itself upon the disagreeable, received sufficient exercise.

SUMMARY

In this chapter it has been shown that at the rise of the present system of elementary education, control and educative growth were regarded as separate processes, the former being not only primary but also a condition of the latter. Moreover, methods of instruction were similitive of existing methods of arbitrary control in moral matters. There was, therefore, a general practice of rewards and punishments in obtaining conformity to all requirements, reasonable or capricious, relative to acquisition or moral matters. The system was based on traditional practices and an existing morality which was identified with religious authority and which presumed to control, in the interest of heavenly sanctions, the total range of the child's responses.

CHAPTER III

DIFFICULTIES AND EFFORTS TO MODIFY PRACTICES

IN the preceding chapter we have described the general situation in control at the rise of the present system of schools much as if the attitudes and practices found were static and unshaken by the stress of changing social conditions. The data examined warrant no such conclusion, however. In the present chapter, therefore, we are concerned primarily with the tendencies toward readjustment due to the changed effectiveness of customary methods of control and the presence of new factors, either social or theoretical. Effort will be made to show (A) any changes in the effectiveness of customary practices ; (B) the nature of any new social conditions with which the changed status of control was correlated ; and (C) the theoretical and practical response made by the schools to the presence of such factors.

(A) DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

Whether from overemphasis upon the suppression of the little things in behavior or from other existing influences, there were numerous problems, difficult to solve, in the control of pupils. The following, reported

under the title of "Nuisances," is indicative of the prevalence of acts regarded as crimes and of the importance attached to the maintenance of a perfect standard of order:

"Whittling, writing, and marking images, words, initials, and hieroglyphics about the school-house walls, desks and fences are all undisguised nuisances, and ought to be stopped at once and thoroughly. But how to accomplish this very desirable preventive is the question which at once occurs to everyone to ask. This we know: that you are not a completely successful teacher if you do not stop it effectually. . . . We know some schools where, if the boys did not learn a lesson for six months to come, and in that time should be broken of this evil habit, there would have been in that time more good done than if the boys could be fitted for college."¹

The following reveals the reckless violations of school regulations and the increasingly flagrant character of offenses committed, as well as the attitudes of boards of education on the general subject:

"Instructors can and ought to use their influence and authority to preserve the buildings from injuries, such as cutting tables, loosening and splitting the seats, breaking the doors and windows, by which most houses of this class are shamefully mutilated. . . . It may arise from a mixture of causes; — thoughtlessness, idleness, a restless disposition, or real intent to injury."²

Offenses were regarded as a matter of course. There is no indication of the prevalence of the thought that the school might be controlled without perpetual use of corporal inflictions and other forms of punishment. Attitudes among leaders in thought and practice indi-

¹ *The Rhode Island School Master*, Vol. 2, p. 213.

² Mann, Horace, *Report of the Secretary, State Board of Education, Massachusetts, Supplement to the First Annual Report*, p. 37 ff.

cate that the situation was very difficult. The following is perhaps the best theoretical view of the time:

"Two things he [the teacher] must always do at once; he must govern and instruct. It is this double attention which makes his life a weary one. He might govern with comparative ease, if his duty ended there. The instruction would be delightful if that could be pursued alone. But they must go together. With respect to the one not a mistake must pass unnoticed. Every error in matter or manner must be set right;— and at the same time, the stolen whisper must be heard, the clandestine plaything must be captured, the incipient plot must be discovered, the arch trick must be anticipated, the idler must be watched, the wayward reproved and set right, and the stubborn and the impudent, the coarse and the turbulent must be subdued."¹

Moreover, this inherent difficulty of control as conceived at the time was aggravated by what was regarded as an increased spirit of insubordination. Leaders in education adhering to customary practices of despotic control were alarmed at the rather sudden prevalence of community sentiment against the use of force and fear. The following indicates the attitude:

"... We observe with pain an increasing spirit of insubordination in some of our schools, cherished, as we believe, by many parents who advocate the doctrine that corporal punishment ought to be wholly discarded. This doctrine, at variance as it is with the opinions of legislators, successful educators, judicious parents, and what is still higher authority, the word of God, is an injurious doctrine. We cannot doubt that to 'spare the rod' is in many instances to 'spoil the child.'"²

¹ Page, David, paper read before the American Institute of Instruction, *Report*, 1838, pp. 18-20.

² "Report of a Committee of the Essex County Association of Teachers," *American Annals of Education*, Vol. 6, 1836, p. 131.

Objective evidence of a widespread lapse of customary methods and of an approaching demand for readjustment is found in the fact that effort to perpetuate the use of forceful subordination as the main principle of control was beginning to meet with violent consequences. In Massachusetts alone nearly four hundred schools were broken up in 1837 from what was regarded as "incompetency of teachers or insubordination of pupils ('incompetency' here meaning mainly the inability to govern by force or otherwise)."¹ And it was only with the later change in principles of control that this situation was relieved. With the introduction of other methods, obedience was more generally secured and the number of schools broken up was reduced to one fourth of that of the previous decade.²

(B) SOCIAL CHANGE

It does not seem necessary for purposes of this study to attempt to show any exact causal relationships between social conditions and the changed effectiveness of control, but rather merely to point out the dominant social phenomena with which the disturbances in control were correlated and then to indicate the trend of readjustment. If, then, periodic recurrence of conspicuous readjustments in control seems to follow any constant relation to the successive life conditions respectively, a

¹ Mann, Horace, *Report of the Secretary, State Board of Education, Massachusetts, 1847*, pp. 70-79.

² Mann, Horace, *ibid.*, pp. 79-81.

fairly adequate basis for predicting present needs and methods of readjustment in the light of contemporary conditions of life will have been established.

From the standpoint of control in the education of the period under consideration, it seems necessary to indicate only those phenomena that relate more immediately to freedom and authority in adult relations. Basic in determining the status of these factors was the new impulse toward an examination of existing beliefs, practices, and institutional forms, which had accompanied the general social change. Out of the increasing impulse toward greater freedom, only recently accompanied by revolutionary convulsion, humanity was emerging with a reconstructed outlook on life.¹ In process of formation was a new attitude — half suppressed, half conscious — resulting from new insights, newly seen possibilities in life. It was the first echo in ordinary adult affairs of science as a method applied to material phenomena in meeting human needs. There was the tendency of men everywhere to assume a greater share in the direction of their own lives and to allow others to do the same.

Politically it was the period of stress created by the persistence of external regulative machinery in conflict with an increased spirit of freedom in personal matters brought about by increased interchange and communi-

¹The French and American revolutions are meant. The social change had been taking place all along. But the point of importance here is that it was now finding explicit expression in the lives of people generally.

cation. Already older institutional organizations were being questioned and discarded. Newer ones, political democracy in particular, were being tried. It was the period in which swift changes were taking place relative to religious authoritarianism. However, such changes of attitude, though interwoven with the views and practices already indicated, could at best be only incipiently operative in determining working conceptions of education. But that the same attitude that had been both cause and effect in the general social change was soon to express itself more explicitly in regard to educational matters is indicated by the condition of stress created by the increased parental opposition to customary methods of control. As reflecting the presence of the spirit of freedom in conscious conflict with the more prevalent position, the following, partly in sarcastic vein, is of importance:

“ . . . That implicit obedience to rightful authority must be inculcated and enforced upon children, as the very germ of all good order in future society, no one who thinks soundly and follows out principles to their necessary results will presume to deny. Yet, it is quite offensive now-a-days to ears polite to talk of authority, and command, and injunction. We must persuade, and invite, and win.”¹

(C) THE STRUGGLE TOWARD READJUSTMENT

The response of the school to the weakened conditions of control and to other factors in the situation seems

¹ *Remarks of a Committee of Boston School Masters on the Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary, State Board of Education, Massachusetts, 1844.*

to have involved (1) a temporary reaction in favor of stern methods of control, (2) attempts to understand control as a function of social phenomena, (3) a controversial struggle between conservative and liberal opinion, and (4) specific achieved modifications of practice and attitude relative to force, emulation, and obedience. These stages will be considered in the order indicated.

(1) A Temporary Reaction

In attempts to meet the demands for better control, both the conservative and liberal groups were equally certain that their respective proposals constituted the only solution to the problem. As indicating the situation, Horace Mann in 1839 said :

"I find one party strenuously maintaining that improvement in our schools can advance only so far and so fast as bodily chastisement recedes, while the other party regard a teacher or parent, divested of his instruments of pain, as a discrowned monarch."¹

And though the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that the older notions found at first a temporary renewal of emphasis in practice. Instead of an abatement in the employment of violent means of external control, the increasing attention to their abuse, as indicated in the literature, could in the absence of statistics be interpreted either as evidence of their increased employment or as an expression of the general change of attitude. It seems not too extravagant to interpret

¹ *Lectures on Education*, 1840, p. 306.

the situation as involving a widespread change of public attitude accompanied by a temporary reaction in favor of a more consistent employment of traditional methods. As has already been indicated in part in connection with the statement of difficulties encountered, the increasing ineffectiveness of customary methods of control was at first regarded as a result of the wave of "insubordination" rather than of forces operating within the total social situation and demanding revision in the basis of control. This is shown through the enactment of permissive legislation modifying existing regulations regarding the length of the school term, in order that school committees might at their will close their schools in case teachers were unable to maintain the usual standard of order and silence.¹ Accordingly, the records of school committees refer to frequent complaints by parents of excessive punishments. These complaints were considered as signs that the "spirit of innovation" was becoming dangerously active.²

(2) Control as a Function of Social Change

But the swiftly recurring clash of antagonistic forces involved in these renewed efforts to make customary methods more efficacious was accompanied by more serious attempts at readjustment through a modifica-

¹ Mann, Horace, *Seventh Annual Report*.

² Martin, G. H., "The Boston Schools One Hundred Years Ago," *New England Magazine*, 1902, p. 637 ff.

tion of conception in the light of the total social situation. This meant that a new basis of control was in process of evolution. The validity of those factors which, because of their longer historical duration, were more generally operative in determining practices and conceptions was soon to meet with violent attack and systematic refutation. The need for change first arose to conscious recognition and logical formulation through the writings and efforts of Horace Mann. As indicating his general insight and his ability to analyze the total situation in terms of the needs of school control, the following is pertinent :

"The spirit of inquiry which, within the last forty years, has done so much to improve the useful arts and sciences, has entered the field of education also. It would be strange indeed if the doctrines and practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in regard to the training of children, should need no modification in the nineteenth."¹

And as showing that he recognized the futility of current attempts to return to older methods of stern discipline and also as showing that best thought could not yet conceive the results of control except in terms of strict conformity to adult requirements, he said :

"The discipline of former times was inexorably stern and severe, and even if it were wished, it is impossible now to return to it. The question is, what can be substituted which, without its severity, shall have its efficiency?"²

¹ *Reply to the Thirty-One Boston School Masters*, 1844, p. 4.

² *Fourth Annual Report*, 1841, p. 55 ff.

Referring to the demand for a change in the basis of control, he contended that :

"There is not a government in Christendom which is not growing weaker every day, so far as its strength lies in an appeal to physical force."¹

He said further :

"In the history of the world, that period which opened with the war of the American Revolution and with the adoption of the Constitution of the United States forms a new era. Those events, it is true, did not change human nature, but they placed that nature in circumstances so different from any it had ever before occupied that we must expect a new series of developments in human character and conduct. . . . The question now arises . . . whether some more powerful agency can not now be put in requisition to impart a higher moral tone to the public mind. . . . Specific directions and practical aids in regard to the training of children in those everyday, domestic, and social duties, on which their own welfare and the happiness of society depend, are comparatively unknown."²

Though lacking a systematic psychology of control, he discerned more keenly perhaps than any other educator of his time the practical demands upon education brought about by this situation. He fully recognized that efforts were being made to perpetuate a system of control ill-adapted to the newer demands of life. The irony of the situation he expressed in the following words :

"Our civil and social condition holds out splendid rewards for the competitions of talent rather than motives for the practice of virtue."³

¹ *Ninth Annual Report*, 1846, p. 67.

² Mann, Horace, *ibid.*, pp. 65-69.

³ Mann, Horace, *ibid.*, p. 75.

In Mann's practical leadership of what has frequently been called the common school revival, however, he could not effect change through confining his appeals to the realm of such abstract and theoretical considerations. He began, therefore, by pointing out the evil effects of practices generally regarded among teachers as without question. His forceful and clear enunciation of the specific physical and character effects of existing practices helped to sharpen the issues and awaken a consciousness of the possibilities of change. The indiscriminate use of corporal punishment and the gross cruelties to children were his first objects of attack. Among the hundreds of his utterances bearing on the problem is the following:

"Blows should never be inflicted on the head. . . . To whack a child over the head because he does not get his lesson is about as wise as it would be to rap a watch with a hammer because it does not keep good time. I have no doubt that the intellects of thousands of children have been impaired for life by the blows which some angry parent or teacher has inflicted upon the head."¹

(3) Liberal and Conservative Opinion in Controversy

The changing attitude of professional leadership toward certain aspects of control had its focus in a phase of what was known as the common school controversy. The advanced attitude in violent conflict with the prevalent working conceptions and practices is most clearly revealed in Horace Mann's

¹ *Lectures on Education*, p. 322 ff.

controversy with a portion of the members of the Boston Association of School Masters relative to certain statements and attitudes expressed in his *Seventh Annual Report* while Secretary of the Board of Education of Massachusetts. His terrible scoring of these thirty-one masters for their chronic habit of punishment at once precipitated a reform by which every teacher who inflicted corporal punishment was compelled to make a record of it, with reasons therefor, always open to public inspection.¹ He accomplished this by making known to the public such conditions as are revealed in the following :

"In one of the schools of those to whom I ascribe the motto, Force, Fear, Pain — consisting of about two hundred and fifty scholars — there were 328 separate floggings in one week of five days, or an average of 65 $\frac{1}{2}$ each day. In another, eighteen boys were flogged in two hours in the presence of a stranger. In another, twelve or fifteen in one hour."²

His chief concern, however, was with the moral effects of the methods of force and fear. In reference to the results of their employment, he said :

"The most pitiless part of this doctrine of absolute 'authority' and unconditional 'subordination,' and of force, of fear, and pain as the means of securing them, is that it makes no exception of sex, or age, or disposition. Everyone knows that there are children, especially females, in all refined communities, who go to school with

¹ *Answer to the Rejoinder of Twenty-Nine Boston School Masters*, who published the *Remarks on the Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary, State Board of Education, Massachusetts*, 1844, p. 26.

² *Reply to H. M. Smith, Sequel to the So-called Correspondence between H. M. Smith and Horace Mann*, 1847, p. 24.

hearts overflowing with respect and trust, and a feeling that borders almost upon reverence, for their teacher. Their good will and obedience are salient, and they leap forth, unbidden, to meet the demands even of a harsh and unsympathizing master.”¹

He proceeded then to an interpretation of the conservative position as reflected in the *Remarks* of these teachers :

“But this spontaneous obedience is not enough. The doctrine of the *Remarks* is that a case is to be made with such children. ‘True obedience,’ say they, ‘does not voluntarily comply with a request, but implicitly yields to a command.’ ‘When the mandate has gone forth, obedience does not obtain till the will of the subject is completely merged in the will of the ruler.’ ‘Care should be taken not to confound . . . voluntary consent with unconditional surrender.’”²

In opposition to the general procedure of basing punishment on overt acts with a total and arbitrary disregard for children’s intentions, he urged that the amount of punishment should be graduated by a regard for the motive from which the offense proceeded and not the consequence which may have been produced by it. This Kantian insistence upon motive as a standard for determining the moral significance of an act is indicated in the following :

“The true rule in meting out punishment is to disregard the external consequences, to look to the intention, or motive from which the offence emanated, and to apportion the penalty to the wickedness of the intent, whether it took effect or failed. It is the condi-

¹ *Reply to the Thirty-One Boston School Masters*, 1844, p. 132.

² Mann, Horace, *ibid.*, p. 133.

tion of the mind that is to be regarded. . . . The association of pain should always be with the wrong done and never with the duty omitted.”¹

The glaring criminality of existing practices revealed by Mann gave impetus to the increasing social demand for moderation. However, many of the changes were ill-conceived substitutes for the change of spirit and method so forcefully urged by leaders. Blundering cruelties were heaped upon children in the name of improvement, largely because the pressure of public opinion was causing change before any intelligent grasp of new principles could be perfected. The following indicates some of the substitutes for corporal punishment:

“To imprison children in a dark and solitary place; to brace open the jaws with a piece of wood; to torture the muscles and bones by the strain of an unnatural position, or of holding an enormous weight; to inflict a wound upon the instinctive feelings of modesty and delicacy, by making a girl sit with the boys, or go out with them at recess; to bring a whole class around a fellow pupil, to ridicule and shame him; to break down the spirit of self-respect, by enforcing some ignominious compliance; to give a nick-name — these, and such as these, are the gentle appliances by which some teachers, who profess to disregard corporal punishment, maintain the empire of the school room; as though the muscles and bones were less corporeal than the skin; as though a wound of the spirit were of

¹ *Lectures on Education*, pp. 325, 335.

NOTE: The swing to complete disregard of the child's act and the new emphasis on the motive as the sole criterion of moral quality and standard of judgment in meting out punishment is to be explained by the desire to relieve the extreme oppression of the time. As in other instances of history, one extreme was followed by a reaction in favor of the opposite extreme.

less moment than one in the flesh ; and the body's blood more sacred than the soul's purity.”¹

It was because of such pathological implications of an authoritative morality based on force, fear, and pain that Mann seems at times to have been led almost to a complete renunciation of the total-depravity conception of human nature. Of this he was accused in what may be regarded as the last stand of the total-depravity view in American education. The following indicates the religious view of the time and shows the tense conflict of attitudes :

“You do allow the use of the rod from necessity. But it is not the necessity that springs from the nature of the child, but from the incompetency of the master. . . . You assume the native purity of children in opposition to the Bible, which asserts that our race are ‘by nature children of wrath.’ You also settle one of the gravest questions of theology when you affirm that punishment is simply for the good of the punished. That it has this in view to some extent, I admit. That it fails of its purpose when the refractory are reformed, I deny.”²

Such interpretations as these were in part based on views expressed in the *Common School Journal*, the official educational organ of the time, of which Mann was editor. Such a view was as follows :

“Almost all children are as pure as Eve was ; but the tempting apples are left hanging so thickly around that it would be a marvel if they did not eat.”³

¹ Mann, Horace, *Reply to the Thirty-One Boston School Masters*, 1844, p. 120.

² Smith, M. H., *The Bible, the Rod, and Religion in the Common Schools, Reply to Horace Mann*, pp. 40–43.

³ Howe, S. G., in *The Common School Journal*, 1846, p. 316.

In opposing this interpretation of child nature the following was immediately published in the *New England Puritan*, a widely read religious organ of the time :

“What right has the *Common School Journal*, which goes indiscriminately into Unitarian and orthodox families, of all denominations, in the state, to put forth a theological dogma which the editor must know is rejected by the great body of Christians in Massachusetts; or, indeed to introduce any controverted theological point at all? . . . Suppose that we, who believe in the entire corruption of human nature since the fall, had the command of the *Common School Journal* and were to introduce an article asserting, among other things, that children were all born in sin, and depraved from birth; would not the Unitarians complain, and have right to complain, of the offensive obtrusion?”¹

But of Mann’s own statements the following is representative :

“Were children born with perfect natures, we might expect that they would gradually purify themselves from the vices and corruptions which are now almost enforced upon them by the examples of the world. But the same nature by which the parents sunk into error and sin preadapts the children to follow in the course of ancestral degeneracy.”²

(4) *Changes of Practice and Attitudes*

Force. Simultaneous with these published controversies and in part as a result of them, pupil control, especially in regard to the employment of force, became the dominant topic of discussion. As indicating the situation, the following is pertinent :

¹ *Common School Journal*, 1847, p. 21, quoted from *New England Puritan*, October, 1846.

² *Ninth Annual Report*, 1846, p. 65.

"At the fireside, in school district meetings, in conversations of teachers and the friends of education, and in the public press, the necessity or non-necessity of corporal punishment has been a standing theme for discussion."¹

At the same time the successful operation of certain schools without the use of any corporal punishment, together with the report that in such schools insubordination was reduced and the control was superior, was attracting wide attention. The evident influence of the normal-school movement in this connection should be noted :

"The Model School connected with the Normal School at Lexington has been kept for five years. During all this time, there has been no place-taking in the classes, no prize-giving, and not a blow has been struck."²

The almost immediate result of these influences was a remarkable reduction in the employment of corporal punishment. The following is indicative of the change :

"Not less than five hundred schools (out of about 3000) in the state were taught last year without the infliction of a blow — a far greater proportion than has ever existed before. And it is almost uniform testimony of the committees that the schools so kept have stood in the foremost rank for regularity, diligence and good order."³

As further showing the reaction against punishment the following is of importance :

¹ Mann, Horace, *Tenth Annual Report*, 1847, p. 81 ff.

² Mann, Horace, *Reply to the Thirty-One Boston School Masters*, 1844, p. 36.

³ Mann, Horace, *Tenth Annual Report*, 1847, p. 81.

"There are now [1845] at least ten to one of our teachers, as compared with the number in 1839 [when this lecture was written], who keep school without corporal punishment. And in ninety-nine towns in every hundred in the state the flogging of girls, even where it exists at all, is an exceedingly rare event."¹

Emulation. It should now be noted that, paralleling this movement against fear and pain in maintaining obedience to authority, there was a growing opposition to rewards and emulation in connection with study and acquisition. In the earlier stages only a mild opposition was expressed, the dominant attitude being favorable to its use. One argument favoring its use is indicated in the following quotation :

"In the parable of the talents we find that those who had made the best improvement were raised to the highest reward. . . . If a boy comes to school with twice the abilities of any other and twice the industry, he has a right to all the fruits of these powers. He has a right to take the standing which his master has given him. If he can spell better than any one in the class, he has a right to the head of the class. . . . In a word there ought to be justice in the schools ; and justice implies property ; but in school the only property is the tenements of the mind. Perhaps it is the best moral discipline to which a school can be subjected, to find the master dealing out reputation according to merit, and teaching his scholars to do the same."²

The earlier opposition, though likewise based on the religious conception, assumed the ascetic attitude that emulation caused the child to think more highly of

¹ Mann, Horace, footnote in *Lectures on Education*, 1845, p. 319.

² Whittington, Leonard, address before American Institute of Instruction ; *Report*, Vol. 3, 1833, pp. 138-145.

himself than he should think. Rewards, being customary, were, therefore, to be granted for excellence rather than for an amount of knowledge gained in a given length of time.¹ Later opposition, however, recognized the undesirable social attitudes and other character and physical effects.

"The teacher who uses it arouses envy, hatred, . . ." ²

Referring to the physical effects of competition for prizes, the mayor of Boston later said in an address to the city government :

"The opinion of wise men and that of the public, as expressed by the action of the city council, have strengthened the desire that each school hold a high rank in the scale of intellectual progress by the offer of rewards and medals for success; and the anxiety of parents for the progress of their children has added strength to a passion, implanted by nature in the breasts of all of us with quite sufficient power, till, under the hotbed cultivation of our public and private schools, the children have been stimulated far beyond their strength; and their pale faces and slender frames bear witness to the debilitating influence of an overexcited brain. I have looked with pain upon the faded color and the shadowy figures of the more delicate sex, at the very moment when I have been listening to a brilliant recitation; and I have seen the proofs of their ambitious devotion to their studies and the eager pursuit of a medal or of rank in the class."³

Referring to the moral effects of the practice, Mann said :

¹ Hall, S. R., *Lectures on School Keeping*, 1829, pp. 72-106.

² "Effects of Emulation" (a book review), *American Annals of Education*, Vol. 4, 1834, p. 349.

³ Quoted from the *Common School Journal*, 1844, p. 224.

" It tends to excite and foster a class of passions and feelings which are already quite too active, and are producing much unhappiness in the world. It is based on selfishness and makes a scholar put himself in direct comparison with his fellow."¹

And with reference to its bearings on the quality of study, as well as other moral effects, he said :

" This motive power is incorporated into the system in which they [the teachers] work, and all they can do is to mitigate its evils, by their administration of it. Yet we believe it to be one of the causes of the average low character of the schools. Not only the reason and the philosophy of the thing, but actual experiment, in a vast number of cases, has demonstrated that the average standing of a school, even in an intellectual point of view, will be degraded by the use of emulation, that is, by mating the children against each other to study for a prize. If one or a few children make greater progress under its sharp goadings, many will be discouraged and make less. . . ." ²

School committees and boards of education in various parts of the country were now seeking frankly and freely the opinion and advice of the influential Secretary of the Board of Education of Massachusetts on these matters. Representing the changing policies of such groups toward emulation as a factor in control, the following shows the trend :

" If emulation must, even more than it now does, produce envyings and jealousies and strife, and the contented indolence of the many who early find that they can not succeed; again, we say, rather give back the rod."³

¹ *Common School Journal*, Vol. 6, 1844, p. 243.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 7, 1845, p. 351.

³ *Report of the Annual Visiting Committee*, Boston, 1845, p. 48.

So definite was the reaction that the teachers as a body were beginning to refuse grants to be used in providing medals. The result of the newer attitude was a general decline in the employment of this factor:

"Throughout the state the best and most successful teachers — when they are not controlled by positive regulations of the committees — are more and more generally discarding its use. Their reasons are that the decisions founded upon it are always difficult and often unjust; that it tends to withdraw the mind from a love of knowledge for its own sake to a desire of conspicuous position and ostentatious display; that knowledge acquired under this stimulus will be less thorough and less permanent than if pursued and obtained for the intrinsic pleasure which its acquisition for its own sake always imparts; that, after a sufficient time has elapsed for forming comparisons and to foresee the chance to success, the number of competitors is reduced to a few, the incentive ceasing, through hopelessness, to operate on the many; that its tendency is to engender envy among rivals; . . ."¹

The new attitude toward obedience. Some effort had already been made to replace forced conformity by what was regarded as rational obedience. Control, in theory at least, was to assume what purported to be an intellectual quality. Though it had been generally assumed that children knew the right already and were prone to do wrong from natural perversity, there had been some insistence that "reason" should be exercised both in the teacher's requirements and in the pupil's response. In opposition to the arbitrary requirements and blind obedience maintained by force, such conceptions as the following were unusual:

¹ Mann, Horace, *Fifth Annual Report*, 1842, p. 58.

"Consider your scholars as reasonable and intelligent beings. . . . They may easily be brought to know that they are happier when they do right than when they do wrong. And when right and wrong are both placed distinctly before them, they will rarely call the wrong object the right, or the reverse. This appeal will usually exert a far better influence in leading the child to duty than any that can be effected by the infliction of stripes. . . . Explain to them why you consider one thing right and another wrong, and they will understand you, and they will be governed more easily than by the whip or ferrule."¹

Regarding any necessary punishment, effort was also made to provide a mental quality.

"As far as possible strive to have it a punishment that will affect the mind rather than the body. To require the delinquent to ask forgiveness of the master or the school, sometimes to require him to read a written confession to the school, will have the desired effect."²

But a slightly different basis of control was being urged by Mann, who, though also assuming the strength of an idea alone to produce an act, regarded love as an essential factor in obedience.

"Primary and essential is the idea that there is one sacred, all-pervading law, to which teacher and pupil alike are subject, the law of duty and affection. . . . Self-government, self-control, a voluntary compliance with the laws of reason and duty have been justly considered as the highest point of excellence attainable by a human being. No one, however, can consciously obey the laws of reason and duty until he understands them. Hence the preliminary necessity of their being clearly explained. . . . The first step toward rational obedience is a knowledge of the rule to be obeyed,

¹ Hall, S. R., *Lectures on School Keeping*, 1829, pp. 58-62.

² Hall, S. R., *ibid.*, p. 70.

and of the reasons on which it is founded. . . . There is a great variety of duties to be performed in a class room, as well as offences to be avoided. . . . Go into a detail of these duties . . . the advantages and pleasures of knowledge; the connections between present conduct and future respectability; the different emotions which arise in the mind after the performance of a good and of an evil action; and the inherent tendencies both of virtuous and of vicious habits to accelerate their course toward happiness or misery.”¹

The social necessity for the change he offered in the following:

“If we are to govern by virtue of a law which embraces all, which includes the governor as well as the governed, then the lessons of obedience should be inculcated in childhood, in reference to that sacred law. If there are no two things wider asunder than freedom and slavery, then must the course of training which fits the child for these two opposite conditions of life be as diverse as the points to which they lead. Now, for the high purpose of training an American citizen is it not obvious that the law by which he is to be bound should be made intelligible to him; and, as soon as his capacity will permit, that the response on which it is founded should be made as intelligible as the law itself?”²

But the fact that the teacher and the pupil alike were subject to the “one sacred, all-pervading law of duty and affection” did not modify the existing assumption regarding order and conformity in the classroom. The assumed dualism of the moral and the intellectual and the existing theory of knowledge as passive receptivity had been unchanged. Order was one thing; learning, another; the former, a condition of the latter. Be-

¹ Mann, Horace, *Ninth Annual Report*, 1846, pp. 87-94.

² Mann, Horace, *ibid.*, p. 96.

cause certain things had to be done in order to carry on school activities as conceived at the time, it was inevitable that the newer theory of control should be at best an inconsistent compromise between the notions of duty, affection, reason, and appeal to good intentions on the one hand and the immediate, arbitrary, even capricious requirements of the teacher for order, silence, and prompt obedience on the other hand. Therefore, Mann states in his *Ninth Annual Report* that:

“Order must be maintained, but it must be maintained from reverence and regard for the teacher, and not through fear.”

And in another place he justifies punishment in order to secure it because of the demands inherent in the teaching situation or because certain “lower” elements in the natures of some children would yield to the “higher” in no other way.

“Order is emphatically the first law of the school room. Order must be preserved, because it is a prerequisite to everything else that is desirable. If a school cannot be continued with order, it should not be continued without it, but discontinued. After all motives of duty, of affection, of love, of knowledge and good repute have been faithfully tried and tried in vain, I see not why this strange work [punishment] may not be permitted into the human as well as into the divine government. Nor will it do to prohibit the use of this power altogether because it is sometimes abused. This, however, is certain, that when a teacher preserves order and secures progress, the minimum of punishment shows the maximum of qualifications.”¹

His chief concern was that there be a recognition of the order of worth among motives.

¹ *Fifth Annual Report*, 1842, p. 57 ff.

"Order must be maintained. This is the primal law. The superiority of the heart; the superiority of the head; the superiority of the arm — this is the order of the means to secure it."¹

Because the teacher and pupil were alike subject to the "all-pervading" law, whereas, earlier, it had been assumed that the teacher was both superior to the child and enforcing agent of the law, it was now most important that arbitrary methods of securing compliance be recognized as barren of moral value.

"This view of the subject does not trench one hair's breadth upon the doctrine of order and subordination. It contests the claim to arbitrary power, on the one side, and its correlative, blind submission, on the other. The great question is, to whom, to what, the obedience or subordination is due. It is primarily due to law, to the law written upon the heart — to the law of God. The teacher is representative and interpreter of the law. . . . As far as possible he is to prevent violation of it. As a moral act, blind obedience is without value, as is obedience through fear."²

Moreover, the attempt to maintain a uniform and exact order of the pindrop type was now regarded, in view of its recognized moral effects and the active character of the child, as unnecessarily suppressive.

"The attempt to maintain exact and uniform order and silence in opposition to the active character of children resulted in trickery, deception and fraud, cultivated by clandestine acts stimulated by restraint. . . . To entrap on the one side and to elude on the other becomes a matter of rivalry and competition between the teacher and pupils. . . . After the close of the school terms both teacher and pupils have been heard to boast — the one, how many he had ensnared, the other, how often he had escaped."³

¹ *Ninjh Annual Report*, 1846, p. 88.

² Mann, Horace, *ibid.*, p. 96.

³ Mann, Horace, *Third Annual Report*, 1840, p. 27 ff.

The physical effects of constraint and the demand for activity he emphasized in the following words :

"This object [perfect stillness] is sometimes attained by a degree of constraint and unnatural pressure upon the faculties which are too great a price for any good they can ever secure. Children, especially young children, if they have any vivacity or hopefulness in them, cannot endure a long enforced inactivity of all the muscular powers without serious injury to health and even to character. The muscles of a healthy, vigorous child, during its waking hours, come nearer to perpetual motion than anything ever yet invented. Sleep and food wind them up like a watch and they must go or break."¹

Regarding the evil effects of the effort to suppress all communication among children, he said :

"Whatever may be thought of the general expediency or necessity of an interdict of all whispering, it is obvious that it presents great temptations to disobedience. It probably gives occasion to more secret evasion, deception and trickery in schools than all other causes combined."²

SUMMARY

Accompanying the change in social life, particularly the growth of a spirit of freedom and increased inter-communication, there was what was regarded as a wave of insubordination in the schools and a correlative decrease in the effectiveness of customary methods of control. Attempts to solve the problems of more effective control by a renewal of emphasis upon traditional methods of stern discipline met with failure. Conservative and liberal thinkers were equally certain that

¹ *Common School Journal*, Vol. 6, 1844, p. 201 ff.

² *Ibid.*

their respective theories of more rigid control and increased freedom should improve the situation. The introduction of milder methods was attained at the expense of considerable discussion of a controversial character and great persistence of older views and methods of control. With the gradual adoption of milder methods a more tolerable situation was achieved. But because the formulation of a new conception of control was neither widely prevalent nor explicit, the change was mainly a negative achievement, being a mitigation of the evils of existing practices rather than a positive reconstruction of procedure. The principal change seems to have been in the methods by which the usual results of prompt obedience and conformity were to be attained rather than in the results themselves. This deeper change was to occur later.

CHAPTER IV

BEGINNINGS OF CONTROL THROUGH METHODS OF INSTRUCTION AND NEW SUBJECTS

It has been shown in the previous chapters that at the rise of elementary education, pupil control, though largely arbitrary, was based on a system of rewards and punishments and a school morality identified with religious authority. Though the control of children was supposed to emanate directly from the teacher as trustee and enforcing agent of the moral law, certain newer conditions in education and in the general social situation militated against success and produced numerous and difficult problems in connection with the methods of control in general use. So serious was the situation during the first two decades of public elementary education that the topic of pupil control became dominant in discussion and thought among educational leaders and many laymen, who were aroused because of the clash with their own personal interests in the welfare of their children or by the publicity and wide attention given to controversies on one or another aspect of the problem. It has also been shown that the principal response of the school to the changed effectiveness of customary practices and to

the new social conditions was the effort to substitute milder means of achieving a control based essentially on the same authoritative conceptions of life as had previously existed, while seeking the same results of prompt conformity to the demands of adults. Where a more rational control was attempted at all, it was usually through giving the child some reason, based on adult values, for the system of imposed requirements. The development shows thus far, then, a general decline in the theoretical supremacy of rewards and punishments and only a beginning of their decrease in practice, without any positive reconstruction of conception.

At this point, however, there can be discerned certain general tendencies, which, though of some prior theoretical significance, became practically effective in elementary education only during the next few decades. Accordingly, following the mid-century, the practical outworkings of newer conceptions of subject matter and teaching method became increasingly connected with the control of pupils. This tendency seems to have been connected particularly with the teachings of Pestalozzi. But quite aside from this newer movement there persisted many attitudes and practices of the earlier period. Exactly as before, the period was characterized by conflict between the (now) less forceful view of control and a relatively less authoritarian conception.

In the present chapter, therefore, effort will be made to indicate the principal changes of attitude and prac-

tice that took place relative to control following the period of the active educational service of Horace Mann, or the general establishment of the present system of elementary education. More specifically, the survey will include (A) a brief descriptive and explanatory account of the general situation as regards control following the mid-century; (B) a statement of the tendencies to employ teaching devices and new subjects as factors in control; and (C) a discussion of the bearings of object teaching upon control.

(A) THE GENERAL SITUATION FOLLOWING THE COMMON SCHOOL REVIVAL

The two decades following the more general reception of public elementary schools, culminating at the mid-century, involved the inevitable struggle between older attitudes and methods of control and the newer conceptions and possibilities only recently made explicit. The general situation included in the main the following: (1) a persistence of earlier practices and assumptions and (2) some indication of greater public concern regarding the quality of treatment accorded the young in schools and a correlative conciliatory attitude on the part of teachers. These conditions will be discussed in the order stated.

(1) The Persistence of Earlier Methods

It must be noted that the newer conceptions and movements described in the last section of the preceding

chapter concerned only a small portion of existing teaching ideals and practice. The more deeply rooted practices discussed earlier were still widely prevalent. Many leaders and teachers held firmly to the force theory, and much of their practice was cruelly vindictive or punitive rather than reformatory or preventive. Though the literature of the period shows a rapid decline in the amount of space given to such topics as "Corporal Punishment," "How to Prevent Whispering," "Stillness in the Schoolroom," and the like, it is necessary to note that these and similar topics were given considerable attention. The editorial comment of Horace Mann in his *Common School Journal*, in 1849, indicates the situation on the eve of the new period.

"We have rarely attended a teachers' institute, or teachers' convention, at which 'The Best Means of Preventing Whispering in School' was not brought forward for discussion."¹

The character of practices as implied in theoretical treatises indicates the mere ripple of influence which the educational leadership of Mann and the pressure of public opinion had been able to produce on the placid sea of traditional authoritarianism. The situation, though tragic, is an excellent example of the persistence of habit and custom after a theoretical acceptance of change in response to rational demands based on changed conditions and new knowledge. However, it

¹ Vol. 11, p. 177.

was not even largely true that the newer insight had been gained by all reputable teachers. The following on "Stillness in the Schoolroom," reported in 1855, shows the presence of the older view in a state of refined and perfected viciousness:

"'I could have heard a pin drop in any part of the room at any time during the last hour,' said a committee-man. Upon being asked how it was achieved, the teacher said, 'I oblige my scholars in the first place to study without moving their lips; then I forbid all whispering, and actually, I think, enforce my prohibition. Then all must move on tip-toe, and most of my scholars have procured slippers or cloth shoes, which they put on in place of their boots or thick shoes when they come into the school room. I think if a school can not be kept still, it is of no use to go on with any of its exercises.'"¹

As one indication of the prevalence of the older attitude toward corporal punishment, the following relative to the unpopularity of a publication on the *Evil Tendencies of Corporal Punishment in Families and Schools* is of significance:

"The book contained many facts and suggestions worthy of consideration, but it was on the unpopular side of the question, and but little has been seen or heard of it in this region."²

In opposition to the newer "moral suasion" notion, force was strongly advocated, not as a last resort merely, but as an important principle. It was contended that "moral motives" would not always reach the "moral

¹ *Rhode Island School Master*, Vol. 2, 1855, p. 284.

² Editorial, *Common School Journal*, Vol. 11, 1849, p. 197.

feelings" and that the only other method was to reach them through the body.

"The conscience which enables us to feel that there is *a right* and *a wrong* must be so enlightened and influenced by proper training as that its dictates may be safely followed. . . . If neither precept nor example will make the child do right, he must be forced to it. This is a prerogative and a duty of the teacher. God in the order of His providence and by divine commission has made the parent and the teacher the dispensers of punishment when necessary."¹

The frank avowal of the theory of force, fear, and pain, as reflected in the older theological dogma, is plainly indicated in the following :

"Unless the body is insensible to pain, the remembrance of the pain will remind the pupil of his sin. The fear or dread of the repetition of this pain will restrain him from repetition of his fault. This course may be followed until doing right becomes a habit, and thus reformation be effected."²

It is hardly necessary to point out that, if such an attitude toward efficient habit formation found its way into educational literature as representative of a defensible theoretical position, its presence as a prevalent working attitude could be unquestioned. The general attitude toward the use of force is in part indicated further in the same paper as follows :

¹ Richards, Z., "Moral and Mental Discipline" (paper read before the American Association for the Advancement of Education, fourth session), *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 1, 1856, pp. 108 ff.

² Richards, Z., *ibid.*

"Ask what is meant by a good disciplinarian in school and the general reply will be, 'the teacher who knows how to inflict a successful whipping; one who knows how to make boys learn to be wise and good, by a liberal use of the rod.'" ¹

The persistence of this view was doubtless due in part to notions derived from the extreme authoritarianism of certain foreign conceptions and practices. That there was a definite trend toward the Prussianizing of elementary school control is indicated by the numerous published translations of German contributions in moral philosophy and school discipline, practically all of which were in harmony with the most extremely authoritative theories on this side. Such foreign articles far outnumber those from any other country during this period. As indicating the influence, frequent reference is made to the dominant German view in support of extreme methods.

"Very few children if any can be fully trusted. . . . What the Germans call untamed self-hood, is a two-fold element manifesting itself in hatred . . . and in lying. Too much confidence is reposed in children. Bridles must be put in their mouths. Even then, they will drive, if they are not driven. . . . Let parents accustom their children to obedience, to stern accountability, to the idea of certain and just retribution at home, and the teacher will have no trouble. Instruments of punishment will then be used in the school as seldom as they now are in the home." ²

Supplementing these more direct and personal means of control, there persisted in slightly modified form the

¹ Richards, Z., *ibid.*, p. 108.

² *Annual Report*, School Committee, Winchester, Massachusetts, quoted in the *Rhode Island School Master*, Vol. 4, 1858, p. 88.

traditional assumptions and practices relative to externally presented precepts as factors in moral growth. The notion existed that there were certain materials, by nature moral, which it was the business of education to have the children acquire. Consequently, direct instruction, the general method for intellectual values, was emphasized, a correlative assumption being that, while the child was learning these, he would at least be kept out of mischief.

The ultimate basis of these views and practices was still the conscious identification of school morality with religious authority. The literature thus far examined indicates that there was a general agreement on this point, at least among leaders most closely associated with actual procedure. This required the implanting of rigid and authoritative notions of right and wrong through the exercise of the conscience or some other assumed moral faculty. Every method that would produce response of these unique powers was regarded by a number of adherents as legitimate. The principal changes of conception and attitude had taken place with reference to the means of attaining this result rather than in the quality of the result itself. That the latter needed revision was as yet unquestioned. In attempts to modify the method without affecting the result, it was argued that authority itself, without reference to force or fear, was the true source of effective control. Authority thus came to be regarded as an essence, a superior power of the teacher to control

without resorting to the fear of pain or other undesirable consequences on the part of the child. It could not be seen that the child's dread of loss of the teacher's approval was only another expression of fear. The power was described as follows:

"It is not mere legal form, nor the instrumentalities for executing it, that constitutes authority. It is a power in the individual himself, independent of all circumstances, and arising in its own majesty above all mere conventionalities. It is a power difficult to describe, but which sends out its streams of influence along the teacher's pathway. It enlightens, it warms, it vivifies as it continually radiates from him while he silently occupies his position in the school room. It shows every pupil his place and keeps him quietly in it."¹

Though some application of the conception came to be a prevalent method of producing conformity, the range of interpretations of its method of functioning was wide. Authority backed by physical force; the unqualified authority vested in the teacher's position and expressed in the force of his personality; and the appeal to an assumed sense of duty, or right and wrong in general, were more usually emphasized. Recognition of order of worth among motives (as had been urged by Mann); the employment of the teacher's affection and an assumed correlative response of love from the child; appeal to abstract reasons for right action in general; and the determination of response on the basis of individual incidents were just as insist-

¹ Hamil, S. M., paper read before the American Association for the Advancement of Education, *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 1, 1856, pp. 124 ff.

ently, though less frequently, urged. As showing some of these variations, the following, taken at random from texts and other literature of the period, are pertinent:

"My main propositions are these three :

1. That there is an educative power issuing from the teacher, not by voice nor by immediate design, but silent and involuntary, as indispensable to his true function as any element in it.
2. That this unconscious tuition is yet no product of caprice, nor accident, but takes its quality from the undermost substance of the teacher's character.
3. That as it is an emanation flowing from the spirit of his own life, so it is also an influence acting insensibly to form the character of the scholar."¹

"It is not so much the occasional expression of anger, pleasure, or interest in the countenance of the teacher that permanently improves his pupils as it is that silent influence tinged by his constant habits of thought. . . . The ruler must have the title to the power which he assumes plainly attested in his bearing and language. . . . No teacher can mark out a definite course of action in reference to the government of his school. . . . But this must be established in his own mind, that order he will have, cost what it may."²

"So far as the pupil subject is concerned, the teacher is, in the better sense of the term, a true autocrat, and may both take his stand and carry himself as such. . . . From that authority, as the sole originating source, springs the entire law of the school. . . . His requirements and decisions, in whatever form presented, whether that of request, demand or mandate, must be unargued . . . and should be promptly and fully accepted by the pupil as right, on the ground that the teacher as such is governor."³

¹ Huntington, F. D., in *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 1, 1856, p. 142.

² *The Rhode Island Teacher*, Vol. 1, 1860, pp. 33, 202.

³ Jewell, F. S., *School Government*, 1866, pp. 50 ff.

"Obedience is doing a thing because another, having competent authority, has enjoined it. The motive necessary to constitute any act of obedience is reference to the will and authority of another. The child receives as true what his parents say, because they say it; so he does as right what they command, because they command it. . . . This faith and obedience rendered to my earthly father . . . has the further end of training me for that unqualified faith and obedience which I am to render to my Heavenly Father."¹

"The pupil must be taught and made to believe that all school regulations and laws are based upon authority — authority vested in the office of the teacher, which is his not to withhold, but to execute. . . . Nor is severe punishment to be regarded as the last resort. When it may be inflicted at all, it is the first resort and the true remedy."²

In addition to the assumptions and practices relative to authority and obedience, the general situation also revealed in connection with the stimulation of learning the continued employment of emulation and rewards. Just as authority, force, and punishment in relation to obedience had persisted, so the use of rewards and emulation still received, though to a lesser extent, both a theoretical justification and a general practical emphasis.

(2) *Public Interest in Pupil Control*

Further examination of the literature shows it to be too much to conclude that the persistence of these older attitudes and practices constituted the only characterizing feature of the period under consideration.

¹ Hart, J. S., *In the School Room*, 1868, pp. 104 ff.

² Orcutt, Hiram, *Hints to Teachers*, 1859, pp. 51 ff.; *The Teacher's Manual*, 1871, pp. 22 ff.

The general situation seems by this time to have involved another factor, henceforth to be regarded with increasing consideration. This was the tendency of the public to insist upon the privilege of a voice in matters relating to the more direct and personal methods involved in the teacher-pupil relationship. The development was expressed in at least two distinguishable ways: (i) parental efforts to mitigate the severity of control and (ii) attitudes, reports, and transactions of legislative and school committees relative to the more severe forms of control, corporal inflictions in particular.

(i) It has been the general assumption that the stimulation of interest on the part of parents in educational matters has uniformly proceeded from the efforts of teachers or other public-spirited leaders. This is evident as regards the technical or scientific improvement of instruction and the general support of the educational enterprise. But there is evidence both of a rebellion against the internal despotism of the school and of a growing desire for participation, at first harshly resisted by teachers, in the more direct and personal matters of child treatment. The earlier centralization in control had prevented parental participation in any feature of the more intimate aspects of the educative function. Parents were expected to be loyal to the school in certain very substantial ways, and the frequency of failure to evince such objective interest was deplored as being associated in part at least with an assumed natural tendency toward worldly closeness, narrowness, and

perversity. But with reference to matters in which parents felt a very real concern, particularly in questions of control, there was both a theoretical and a practical opposition approaching blunt denial of privilege. There was little if any disposition in professional circles to approach problems of control through the avenues of more genuine parental interest.

Hence, earlier efforts of parents to bring about conditions more tolerable to themselves in relation to the treatment accorded their young were at first timid, then furtive or surreptitious, and later blindly antagonistic or openly and dangerously rebellious. The silence of the literature on this point, except as regards the contention that the prevalent "insubordination" was due to parental interference, indicates the absence of the parental voice in school affairs. In what was regarded as "social obstacles to control," this fundamental lack of harmony of purpose between the home and school is manifested.¹ The following indicates the theoretical attitude and the extreme despotic view of the period in implied conflict with a negatively expressed interest on the part of parents in the proper treatment of their children:

"Parents indulge their children at home, nay, indirectly train them to utter lawlessness . . . and set themselves against good government in the schools. . . . The social countercurrent is the surface manifestation of a deep underlying principle of insubordination in the human soul. . . . The human will is in incipient

¹ Jewell, F. S., *School Government*, 1866, pp. 28-35.

rebellion against moral restraint and authoritative control. . . . The constraining influence of acknowledged government serves to correct this 'false nature.'"¹

The first efforts, therefore, at overt participation on the part of parents in matters of control were initiated in expressed opposition to the wishes of teachers and other leaders in places of responsibility. In opposition to the tendency on the part of some to think the parents' wishes deserved consideration in connection with serious problems of control, the following excerpt from an editorial by a state commissioner of schools, taken from a widely read educational magazine of the time, offers a typical argument:

"A mode used by one [parent] would be disapproved by another parent, and amid such a contrariety of notions upon this topic, which one shall the teacher select? Shall he accord with the wishes of the one parent and stop the exercise of the whole school, while he occupies their time? . . . Or shall he, with another parent, believe it more beneficial to send home the pupil for the parents to correct according to their judgment, which may not, however, be the better way for his future good conduct in school? How knows the teacher what is their favorite mode of securing prompt obedience? He, therefore, follows the fashion endorsed by long usage as taking the least time, as well as obtaining the desired results with but short detention from the pupil's studies — he flogs at once, and, according to the maxim of many school teachers, he makes his blows felt."²

It appears that it was only with the spread of Pestalozzianism that participation in these more intimate

¹ Jewell, F. S., *op. cit.*, pp. 31-50.

² Potter, E. R., in *Rhode Island Educational Magazine*, Vol. 1, 1852-53, p. 367.

matters became even a remote possibility. With the favorable reception and recognition of the principle of the educative bearings of home influences and the implied demand for a coöperative determination of the child's educational environment, discussions began to reveal a conciliatory attitude. The practical effects of the newer emphasis seem not to have been felt generally, therefore, till the latter part of the period under consideration. These will be discussed in their proper setting in a later section.

(ii) The attitudes, reports, and transactions of legislative and school committees relative to control also reveal in limited degree tendencies other than the more traditional that existed in the general situation. Developments during the period in Massachusetts, particularly in the city of Boston, though regarded as extreme on the side of conservatism, revealed a struggle for freedom in control that was steadily gaining recognition. As indicating the growing tendency toward leniency, the educational committee of the legislature, in refusing to propose action on a bill for abolishing corporal punishment, returned both a minority and a majority report, the former urging insistently a favorable consideration of the measure.¹ However, the most active expression of public desire to improve matters came from the organized efforts of school committees to regulate practices. The reports of the

¹ See *Minority Report of Committee of Education*, House Document No. 335, Massachusetts, pp. 11-36.

Boston Committee, for the interval 1864 to 1889, reveal at least six separate attempts to secure regulation, usually abolition, of corporal punishment. Though the majority reports were unfavorable, except as regards rather rigorous limitation of the amount of such punishment, the minority reports show an obvious increase of strength relative to milder methods of control.

A wave of school-committee regulations, abolishing outright the use of force or very rigidly determining the conditions of its employment, shows unmistakably the trend of public desire to participate in this aspect of education. A summary of school regulations of thirty-three of the larger cities of the country, compiled in 1869, shows practical unanimity as regards the use of punishment. The following are typical :

"Teachers must preserve good order without the use of corporal punishment."¹

"Teachers are to maintain kind and faithful discipline, avoiding harsh punishments and provoking and improper language."²

"It shall be the duty of teachers to govern by moral suasion and discourage all infliction of corporal punishment, resorting to it only in extreme cases."³

"So far as possible teachers are to govern their pupils by the moral influence of kindness, and by appeals to noble principles of their nature."⁴

¹ *Rules and Regulations*, Syracuse, New York, 1867.

² *School Regulations*, Worcester, Massachusetts, 1867, p. 13.

³ *Rules and Regulations*, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1867, p. 7.

⁴ *Rules and Regulations*, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1867, p. 141, quoted in *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 19, 1869, p. 435.

In concluding this section it should be noted that the first reaction to the régime of force in control in the earlier stage of elementary education was a general tendency toward its complete abandonment. The revulsion from extreme authoritarianism and restraint led to an unqualified abandonment on the part of many teachers of corporal punishment as the correct alternative. "Not a blow has been struck during the past year," "There has not been an instance of corporal punishment in the school for five years," and the like were not infrequent expressions in the literature of the period following the common school revival. In the main, however, it seems that the most insistent opposition came from the public, especially those interested in education at a distance, and their representatives charged with determining school regulations. That actual friction was developed between teachers and the public because of the extremes to which the latter wished to go in the discontinuance of force is in part indicated in the following :

"None but teachers are competent to decide whether physical coercion can be wholly dispensed with in the schools. Many teachers very much regretted to hear some higher in our state councils say that in their opinion the time had come for the abolition of corporal punishment in our schools."¹

In the next section will be reported influences for change resulting from recognized control possibilities in subjects and instruction.

¹ Lincoln, H. H., lecture before American Institute of Instruction, *Report*, 1867, pp. 118 ff.

(B) EFFORTS TO PROVIDE CONTROL THROUGH INSTRUCTIONAL PROCEDURE BEFORE THE MORE GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF PESTALOZZIANISM

Though the agitation noted in the previous section was apparently a reflection of demands made articulate through the Pestalozzian influence, the literature examined does not indicate that these initial manifestations were universally derived from Pestalozzi's teachings. In response to the demand for something to replace force, fear, and emulation in control, certain substitutes had been proposed before the Pestalozzian movement became explicit in practical formulations. Teachers who had been most sensitive to the earlier demands for change had indicated their helplessness in finding other methods that were effective in producing conformity and application in study. This is best shown in certain forced admissions in connection with the common school controversy, in which it was asserted that teachers were being deprived of force and emulation but were being given nothing to take their place. With no change in the fundamental conception of learning and with the retention of the notion of a separate moral faculty, it was natural that the usual conception of order as a condition of learning conceived as an individualistic affair should persist.

"Among the elements of character there is none more fraught with mischief, more insidious in its advances, more generally prevalent, and more difficult to suppress than the practice of whispering.

. . . There is certainly no excuse for the practice, as the proper business of scholars is not with each other, but with their books and with their teachers." ¹

It was likewise inevitable that, in order to maintain the desired quality of order, a variety of milder stimuli should be substituted for the harsh monotony of force and emulation. Consequently numerous disciplinary devices came into being.

"The methods of school discipline are numberless. After a quarter of a century's experience upon different plans and methods, I feel myself a learner still. I am always adding to my magazine of expedients." ²

But the most significant change was in a recognition of the possibility of utilizing certain features and modifications of the general teacher-pupil relationship in moral control. Mann presented in his *Ninth Annual Report* what he regarded as the first detailed discussion of this problem. While attention had been directed more vigorously to the moral bearings and defects of the suppressive and regulative factors which were assumed to condition proper learning, there was now for the first time some recognition of the character effects of the general system of instruction itself. Mann first pointed out certain negative character effects of the system as a whole and then proceeded to indicate possibilities of moral control in the improve-

¹ School Committee Report, Dracut, Massachusetts, *Common School Journal*, Vol. 6, 1844, pp. 217 ff.

² Lincoln, H. H., lecture before American Institute of Instruction, *Report*, 1867, p. 114.

ment of methods of teaching. After showing that the methods of conducting examinations tended to subordinate moral growth to mere literary attainment, he pointed out the fallacy and moral evils of holding all pupils to uniform standards in acquisition.

"In the first place, the teacher can ensure any number of imperfect recitations by giving too long or too difficult lessons . . . and thus a mere mistake on the part of the teacher may lead to discouragement or fraud on the part of the pupils."¹

That he discerned the close relation of method of learning and character formation is indicated by his insistence that the feeling of success during the recitation had an important bearing on self-confidence and other important traits. This was a practical recognition of what is at present interpreted as the marginal or simultaneous learnings that proceed during any specific act of conscious response to a situation. He, therefore, urged as the necessary teaching correlative ample provision for successful achievement by the assignment of lessons properly graduated to the varying abilities of the pupils of the class, "unless in cases of remarkable dullness." His insight is indicated in the following :

"Habitually to break down at a recitation has a most disastrous influence on the character of the child. It depresses the spirits, takes away all animation and strength derived from hope, and utterly destroys the ideal of intellectual accuracy — on which, indeed, moral accuracy often depends. . . . Common deficiency at the recitation begets a mingled feeling of contempt for the study

¹ *Ninth Annual Report*, 1846, p. 101.

and a recklessness of reputation, which is fatal to all advancement. It may begin by disheartening the pupil, but it will soon become disgust toward the study.”¹

To prevent the temptation on the part of pupils to deal treacherously by the “device of getting one part of the lesson better than the rest, under the expectation of being questioned on that part,” or by “presenting the work performed by another as the product of one’s own labor,” he said :

“It is to be forestalled and excluded by the method of putting each question to the whole class, waiting a sufficient time for each pupil to think out the answer, and then calling upon someone by name to answer it. The naming of the scholar to give the answer should be in no set order, but promiscuous.”²

With reference to the general tendency to regard the shirking of the lesson “in no other light than as a clog upon the progress of the pupil or as an abatement from success of the coming examination,” he indicated his attitude in the following :

“The knowledge that is lost is an insignificant matter compared with the trickish habit that is gained . . . The means by which the lesson was avoided have given exercise and strength to motives of deception and fraud.”³

Though mutual assistance among pupils was to be treated as wrong, Mann recognized that it was not so regarded by the children themselves or even by adults in ordinary social relationships.

¹ *Ninth Annual Report*, 1846, p. 101.

² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

"It is commonly regarded as an act of kindness — as a social pleasure if not a social duty — to give to one who wants what we, without any loss, can spare. Shall a pupil who has neglected his lesson until the hour of recitation approaches be subjected to punishment, when we can supply his deficiencies in ten minutes and save him from harm?"¹

But the unconscious dualism of the system which opposed the child to the teacher, the moral to the intellectual, and the intellectual to the practical — and hence made acquisition disagreeable — tended to subordinate the child to the recitation, the latter being treated by both pupil and teacher as an end in itself and leading to various forms of trickery and evasiveness.²

Mann's contribution at this point was not so much in urging positive measures and a constructive program of control as in pointing out ways of offsetting or ameliorating the extremely negative character effects of a system which was to be left essentially intact so far as its guiding conceptions were concerned. While the continuous employment of the child was urged, it was regarded rather as a preventive device than as a positive force in his control.

Among these earliest attempts to improve the situation through modification of instructional procedure must be noted that of the introduction of additional subjects. There was a growing recognition of the importance of occupation on the part of the child as a

¹ *Ninth Annual Report*, 1846, p. 107.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 109 ff.

means of producing orderliness. Previously there was the notion that, if children were prevented from whispering or moving, the only possible alternative would be to study. The following shows the existence of this attitude:

"Abolish it [whispering] then, and as the minds of the pupils must needs have employment, they will naturally turn their attention to their books, from which they will not fail to derive profitable instruction."¹

But it was now beginning to be recognized that industry was not necessarily obtained through forced silence and rigid bodily inaction. In a series of fifteen articles in the *Common School Journal* of 1849, the change of attitude is indicated as follows:

"One-half as much time as is now spent in preventing whispering, if spent in promoting industry, would effect the end in view, and be a thousand times more useful. We maintain that it is impossible to prevent children from communicating with each other if they are inclined to do so. . . . We run no risk of contradiction when we assert that about nine-tenths of all the corporal punishment inflicted in our schools arises from this attempt on the part of teachers to produce, and then to maintain, perfect silence and immobility."²

In this same series of articles it was insisted that effective control was possible only through the proper form of subject matter. And though some recognition was given to other subjects in this connection, particular

¹ School Committee Report, *Common School Journal*, Vol. 6, 1844, p. 217.

² P. 177.

emphasis was placed upon the introduction of drawing. The purpose was avowedly to aid in maintaining orderliness.

"In our last number we recommended drawing as one of the best exercises to prevent idleness and the evils resulting from it, and, of course, as one of the best aids to discipline ; for we hold it to be an axiom of teaching, that industry is the best cure for ninety-nine hundredths of those cases for which the common prescription is the rod." ¹

The nature of the newly proposed subject matter and its method are indicated in the following :

"The first exercise should consist in the drawing of straight lines, first horizontal, then inclined, then vertical." ²

(C) CONTROL IN RELATION TO PESTALOZZIANISM AND OBJECT TEACHING

The previous section has indicated the presence of a new angle of approach to the problem of control through, first, a changing attitude toward methods of instruction and, second, a recognition of certain control possibilities in new forms of subject matter. It was following this situation that Pestalozzianism received wide acceptance.³ The literature examined does not

¹ School Committee Report, *Common School Journal*, Vol. 6, 1844, p. 241.

² *Ibid.*, p. 194.

³ This treatment should not be construed as implying that the influence of Pestalozzianism was not operative in American education before this time. The literature shows, however, that it was now becoming more explicitly articulated as an important phase of theory.

allow a generalization regarding the relative amounts of influence from the various factors which caused the rapid introduction of the movement at this time rather than at a time more closely following the forceful enunciation of its principal doctrines some thirty years previously.¹ But it is certain that the newer demands and the more recent proposals regarding control were not incompatible with its central teachings and practices, though not apparently influenced directly by them. Object teaching tended, therefore, to reënforce certain aspects of change that were already in progress.

The introduction of new subject matter in the form of objective materials meant opportunity for a large part of the child's normal environment to influence his conduct. Certain characteristics of the child which the theory emphasized tended also to make control positive rather than restrictive. The following indicates the attitude :

"Among the more prominent characteristics of the child which should not be lost sight of are activity, love of sympathy, and a desire for constant variety."²

One tendency toward modification in control, then, was an increased tolerance of bodily movement on the part of pupils and an effort to provide a variety of materials sufficiently novel to childish curiosity to

¹ See articles by Russel and Woodbridge, Barnard's *American Pedagogy*, pp. 182 ff.

² Sheldon, E. A., in *Barnard's American Journal of Education*, Vol. 14, 1864, p. 93.

maintain agreeable employment. The earlier school despotism and emulation were subordinated, theoretically at least, to a control based on the delights of knowledge pursued in interesting activity. Mutual affection of teacher and pupil and the satisfaction derived from consciousness of duties well performed completed the theoretical means of control. But the weakness of the theory itself, together with gross misinterpretations of its exact assumptions,¹ resulted in an early formalization of practices and led, therefore, to a subversion of the promised control effects. What had been considered as normal child activity turned out to be mere sense activity subordinated to acquisition and cut off from overt action or the use of materials in the attainment of purpose. In describing the requirements of an object lesson, it was said :

“It is under the guidance of the teacher. She should hold the children to a point determined by herself; only thus will she be able to make her work methodical.”²

What had promised to develop into an active knowledge became passive absorption with its implication of silence, attentiveness to barren materials, and prompt conformity to requirements. What had become a most important consideration regarding the congenial development of the child’s faculties, in opposition to the earlier disciplinary view, resulted in isolated sense activity and rigid discipline of the faculties treated as

¹ Sheldon, E. A., *op. cit.*, p. 94.

² Lathrop, D. A., *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1870, p. 50.

ends in themselves. What had begun as a reaction against verbalism or the passive learning of words became formalized into the absorption of sense impressions in childhood as the material assumed to be employed in thought in later life.¹ The result was often an exaggerated use of restrictive control. It was inevitable that it should be so when the inconsistencies between Pestalozzi's principles and his own practice frequently led him to an abuse of mechanical regulation. Compayré said of him :

"It is not without surprise that we find an apostle of nature, by an involuntary deviation from his principles, using artificial methods of constraint and regulation pushed to extremes."²

The insipid character of the new, but thoroughly formalized, instruction was soon apparent in this country, and hence we find the following :

"It is the constant peril of the system that it becomes utterly powerless without moral enthusiasm in the teacher. Of all the dry and dusty performances in the school room the most deplorable is an object lesson given by a teacher who has no profound conception of childhood, no moral inspiration, no power to group her knowledge around a vital principle. And such will be every lesson until she is filled with the thought of God at the center of nature and the soul. . . . Our new method of object and moral teaching is still on trial. Unless we can place in our schools a class of teachers with a higher grade of mental vitality, moral enthusiasm, and mature comprehension of the needs of childhood, it will drag down our

¹ Smith, Mary Howe, "Education, or a Plan for Human Development through Instruction," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1867, pp. 95-107.

² Compayré, G., *Pestalozzi and Elementary Education*, p. 88.

little ones to a generation of human earthworms instead of exalting them to living souls.”¹

With the increased formalization of instruction is found a growing dissatisfaction with methods in general.² The rigid methodizing effects of object teaching, the theoretical assumption that intellectual instruction was possible separate from character formation, and the general controversial attitudes and movements relative to the secularization of all work of the common schools had tended to decrease emphasis upon the conscious direction of the child's moral growth in the school. There existed the view that the school was not responsible for the development of the child's character, the assumption being that the home and church should serve this function. Where character building had been regarded at all as a function of the school during this era of methods, there was a tendency to assume that it was incidental to method and therefore not to be emphasized directly.³ Hence, the extreme intellectual character of methods became a general criticism of the schools.

“The assumption that intellectual training was the sole duty of the school became a criticism of the system.”⁴

¹ Mayo, A. D., “Methods of Moral Instruction in the Common Schools,” *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1872, p. 17.

² See Buckham, H. B., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1873, pp. 196–197; Soldan, F. L., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1874, pp. 245–253.

³ Wickersham, J. P., *School Economy*, 1872, pp. 232–234; Johonnot, James, *Principles and Practice of Teaching*, 1878, p. 252; Ogden, John, *The Art of Teaching*, 1879, p. 208.

⁴ White, E. E., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1886, pp. 128–138.

Aside from the formal reading of selected books, the memorizing of written precepts, and instances of "incessant preaching from the teacher's pulpit," there was little attention to character development.¹ There arose the conviction, therefore, that the reaction against all forms of religious and moral training was causing the rod to be "again taken up in dead earnest" as a means merely to the ends of intellectual training.² And when a new cry for more effective moral influence from the schools became insistent, it was proposed that "some general catechism of good morals should be drawn up, made acceptable to all parties, and introduced as a special branch of study."³ But there was now arising with renewed insistence and apparent increase of emphasis the older conception that the discipline of the school should be looked upon as the fundamental source of moral development.⁴ To the systematic development of this and other attitudes we now turn.

SUMMARY

Moral control, based quite generally on religious authority, remained direct and despotic during the first part of the period following the public adoption of elementary education. The effects of immediate parental interest in a more humane treatment of children and

¹ Mayo, A. D., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1880, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, 1872, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*

of public opinion, as expressed in committee regulations and attempted legislation, combined with the theoretical influence of Pestalozzi's teachings, seem to have hastened efforts toward a general revision of conception and practice. Already practical efforts were being made to find substitutes for the harsh discipline of the past in new forms of subject matter and to some extent in methods of teaching. Object teaching, because of its theoretical emphasis upon activity and the use of a variety of objective materials, promised at first a positive control through congenial occupation. But its rapid formalization, in view, first, of the assumption that intellectual and moral development were separate and, second, of the increasing secularization in all work of the common schools, tended to perpetuate the more direct control of the past.

CHAPTER V

THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW BASIS OF MORALITY

THE struggle for control as a function of teaching methods and new content, as discussed in the preceding chapter, is to be explained as a response to the growing demand for a substitute for religious authority in school morality. This effort to discover a new basis of morality was expressed in a variety of proposals, more or less effective in education, many of which were closely related to the problem of discipline. Correlative with the movements in methods of instruction was a growing dissatisfaction with the usual narrow conception of school discipline. In a discussion of "Motives and Means in Discipline" before the National Education Association in 1870 we find the following:

"What is ordinarily called a good school is not necessarily a good place for good discipline. A school should be a place where pupils can live, and live well, cheerfully, happily, profitably; and till we make our schools such, we are not in the highest sense educators. We want a broader platform on which to work in our system of school discipline. I can not see why a school can not be considered as a small society and governed upon the principles that obtain in society."¹

¹ Hoose, J. H., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1870, p. 147.

As indicating the formal, external character of control and the changing attitude, it was asserted that, if pupils failed to conform to the requirements of "sitting still with folded hands, and not whispering, nor moving feet, the very appropriate penalty" was "staying after school to sit still awhile"; whereas it was proposed "to give these children something to amuse them and at the same time to instruct them, so that they shall have an opportunity to talk and to do."¹ Evidence of discontent and an implied tendency toward a positive control are indicated in the following:

"The teacher disapproves of what the child is doing when legitimately exercising his powers. If a child, for instance, is seen drawing lines, the teacher asks what he is doing and scolds or perhaps punishes him, instead of encouraging him to do better. . . . If a child does wrong, the teacher can not forget it. . . . To give something new and better is the best method of correcting wickedness in children."²

But, as has been indicated in the previous chapter, there was no general employment of the child's work as a factor in his moral control, and there is little additional evidence that an attitude favorable to such procedure was widespread. In view, first, of the reaction against arbitrary force as shown in various school regulations relative to corporal punishment and particularly as shown in the applause which greeted the contention that it was "no longer necessary to break the will of the

¹ Lathrop, D. A., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1870, pp. 52 ff.

² Discussion, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1870, p. 144.

child in the orthodox way";¹ in view, second, of the growing demand for functional continuity between the motives employed and character results obtained in school, and the requirements of life; there developed, principally between 1870 and 1890, a variety of attitudes and proposals to meet the situation, some more avowedly religious than others. For convenience of reference, these may be classified as (*A*) proposals based on conceptions of the direct relations between the teacher and child; (*B*) proposals for "educating" the motives through formal discipline; (*C*) proposals based on avowedly authoritative conceptions; (*D*) proposals concerning control in relation to new subjects; and (*E*) proposals based on efforts to provide a non-authoritative morality. In order, however, to trace these views in their proper relations, no effort will be made in the present chapter to adhere consistently to this logical classification.

(A) CONTROL AS A FUNCTION OF DIRECT RELATIONS OF TEACHER AND CHILD

The Pestalozzian emphasis upon the mutual affection of teacher and pupil was responsible in part at least for the assumption that this factor was all-powerful in the production of order and moral growth. But just as the theory of instruction had become formalized, so this notion was likewise formalized into a mere means of order. The affection of the child for the teacher was

¹ Discussion, *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1870, pp. 144, 149 ff.

not to be gained for any value within itself or the moral values of the relationship, but in order that the child might thereby be more easily bent to the teacher's will.

"The ardent love which scholars sometimes give to their teacher is a high gratification, and something to be greatly prized for the mere pleasure it gives. And yet, this is not its main value. The fact that children love their teacher gives to the teacher almost unbounded influence over them. . . . By this silken cord they can be drawn whithersoever the teacher wills. To please the teacher they will attend regularly, will come punctually, will be quiet and orderly, will learn their lessons, and will be attentive to instructions."¹

The method of gaining this love and, therefore, the obedience and industry of the school was by loving the pupils. It was an arbitrary requirement that teachers were to love their pupils.

"Love only is the price of love. If you wish your scholars to love you, you must first love them, not pretend to do it — children are quick to see through such pretences — but really and truly love them."²

Closely related to this notion was that of the teacher as the source of the child's moral growth. Various "personal-influence" plans and conceptions of control existed.³ Before this time there had been great emphasis upon the teacher's morality as the source of the child's moral growth. Example and precept had been

¹ Hart, J. S., *In the School Room*, 1868, pp. 99 ff.; see also Lincoln, H. H., *Report*, American Institute of Instruction, 1867, p. 115.

² Hart, J. S., *ibid.*, p. 101.

³ Holbrook, Alfred, *School Management*, 1871, pp. 27-29, 35 ff., 103-107.

unquestioned forces for moral guidance.¹ Hence, with the emphasis upon the higher affections as factors in control, we find the extreme contention that all methods of promoting moral growth in the child reside in the teacher and radiate constantly and silently from her. The child, as recipient, is supposed to imbibe intuitively the effects of the teacher's presence.

"All discipline has its spring in the character of the teacher."²

A later expression of the same assumption of the teacher's sufficiency is indicated in the following:

"The center of the method of moral instruction is the teacher. . . . A cultivated Christian teacher is a perpetual object lesson. . . . In the manhood or womanhood of the teacher lies the very soul of the true method of moral instruction."³

But with the evident lack of teachers who possessed the requisite moral influences, it was necessary that working conceptions be formulated on the basis of existing practices. There was an increasing tendency, therefore, to regard the general regulations and restrictions employed by the teacher as the chief source of moral growth and control.

"In her ideal of discipline, her estimate of child nature, the class of rules established, her effort to head off transgression, her modes

¹ See Hall, A. J., *Religious Education in the Public Schools of the State of New York*; see also *Report of the State Superintendent*, New York, 1849, pp. 221 ff.

² DeGraff, E. V., *The School Room Guide to Methods of Teaching and School Management*, first edition, 1877, seventieth edition, 1890, p. 306.

³ Mayo, A. D., "Object Teaching in Relation to Moral Instruction," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1880, pp. 12 ff.

of punishment, her endeavor to create the sense of moral obligation, especially in her resolve to be herself just in all things, the teacher covers the whole ground of moral and religious instruction.”¹

The same assumption and that of the complete separateness of moral and intellectual growth, as conceived still later, are indicated in the following :

“The whole discipline of the school (by which we mean everything save the study and recitation of lessons) is the foundation of the school life. All of this is in the realm of moral instruction and without it no reliable mental progress is possible.”²

Though these functions were regarded as external to each other, they were theoretically related as cause and effect. The following indicates the conception of the psychological relationship involved :

“The presentation of natural objects, or the gathering of the facts of natural science, solicits and secures the mind’s notice ; but the exercise of the principle of volition as a motive power, enabling it to arrive at its knowledge by its own action, is a moral effort and subserves a moral purpose.”³

It was the increasing recognition of the necessity of personal, subjective willing as the fundamental factor in moral behavior, together with the current opposition to the use of force and the demand for continuity between school influences and life, that stimulated an interest in cultivating children’s motives as an important factor in their moral control. To the systematic development of this attitude we now turn.

¹ Mayo, A. D., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1872, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, 1880, pp. 10 ff.

³ Kirk, Alfred, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1871, p. 71.

(B) EDUCATING THE MOTIVES THROUGH FORMAL DISCIPLINE

The literature indicates dissatisfaction with the "system of incentives which, when the pupil has passed out of school, never meet him."¹ "Educating the motives," or proper emphasis upon the kind and quality of motives to be employed in study and discipline, came rapidly to be regarded as the greatest problem of education.² It was contended that the discipline of the school should no longer be confined to the development of a single "faculty or power," but should be broad enough to "sweep through the whole range of the soul's powers, developing them systematically."³ It is of interest to note at this point that this is the first theoretical recognition of the possibility of unifying the discipline and instructional phases of school procedure. What came of the conception remains to be seen. The emphasis upon the kind and quality of motives to be employed led to various proposals for grading and classifying systems of appeal. The following indicates one such effort:

"Fear may be appealed to, but it is the lowest motive. The hope of reward may be appealed to and is a good motive if properly used. Love for parent and teacher is still higher. Love of country is a higher motive than love of parent or teacher. And love of God is highest of all."⁴

¹ White, E. E., discussion, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1870, p. 145.

² Tappen, E. T., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1870, p. 147.

³ White, E. E., *op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁴ Tappan, E. T., *op. cit.*, p. 148.

But the evident pressure of demands for more normal means of moral control which would produce self-governing citizens and which would be entirely consistent with prevailing religious sentiment brought forth a discriminative formulation of "natural" and "artificial" motives.¹ These were then graded; and later a systematic pedagogy, purported to be based on the "inner" voluntary element of behavior, was worked out, involving a careful analogy between these motives and a graded list of religious sanctions on which the whole system was based.² This first formulation of "natural motives" and their religious correlates, stated in inverse order of importance, was as follows:

- "A desire for God's approval
- A desire for approbation
 - A desire for the power of an endless life
- A desire for activity and power
 - A desire to know God and his will
- A desire for knowledge
 - The hope of a blessed immortality
- The hope of future good
 - The desire to honor one's Creator
- A sense of honor
 - A sense of obligation to do God's will
- A sense of duty"³

With the notion of the "freedom of the soul in willing" in response to an "impelling" feeling (the "innate

¹ White, E. E., *op. cit.*, p. 146.

² White, E. E., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1886, pp. 128-138; see also *Education*, Vol. 7, 1886, pp. 223-233, and *Elements of Pedagogy*, 1886, pp. 313-334.

³ White, E. E., *Elements of Pedagogy*, p. 323.

sense of duty") aroused by the promptings of these externally received religious sanctions, the function of control was now regarded as the central art of education. To provide the practice of "virtuous" acts in the face of the will's freedom to choose less "virtuous" responses was the method of will training and the essence of moral education.

"Moral training is primarily will training — the training of the will to act habitually in free obedience to the sense of duty."¹

This could be effectively achieved only through an appeal to these religious motives and their correlates.

"The most efficient training of the will involves an appeal to the religious motives, and this inference is strongly supported by the fact that the religious motives quicken and energize all the lower motives to which they are related."²

Every act of obedience, conformity, or application in study, if performed from the exercise of this inner faculty or power, the "sense of duty," operating as a spur to will action in view of known sanction, was a moral act, a preparation for obedience in the most generalized sense, to social regulations, and finally to heavenly sanctions. All such acts were of coördinate moral worth. Mere performance of outward act, however, did not necessarily constitute an act of the will nor a moral act.

"It is not enough that the teacher secures diligence in study, good order and proper behavior in school. The vital question is, To what motives does he appeal in gaining these ends?"³

¹ White, E. E., *School Management*, 1894, p. 109.

² White, E. E., *Elements of Pedagogy*, p. 324.

³ White, E. E., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1886, p. 131.

Hence, the problem of control was complicated by the demand for producing response by resorting to appeals of decreasing inherent worth, but of increasing practical effectiveness viewed from the standpoint of the child's actual inclinations. If the child's "sense of duty" was not yet strong enough to prompt obedience and application in study, then lower and lower appeals, even those of force, sarcasm, and ridicule, were justified in order to bring the child through practice up the scale of voluntary choice of action from higher motives. The accepted "artificial motives," such as prizes, rewards, and immunities, occupied an intermediate position in the scale.

The work of the school was to be transformed into a multitude of opportunities for moral growth. The usual requirements of order, system, regularity, and the like were no longer means to intellectual attainment; neither were intellectual attainments to be regarded as ends in themselves; but all alike were henceforth to be the context in which the various civic and social virtues were to be developed. The highest function of the school was to be achieved in well-rounded character education. The whole was to be accomplished by the working up of special forms of feeling and the production of response quite regardless of the presence of rational or convincing insight into the processes involved. It should be noted by way of criticism that, though the system was false at the core, being based on a psychology which projected into child

nature certain postulated powers, it nevertheless was a step in the direction of a control based on personal choice. Though it made the usual mistake of methods based on the psychology of faculties, in that it projected into the child certain assumed religious feelings or motives and then attempted to run the school on the basis of their hypostatized presence, it led the way to later efforts to base control on actual child inclination. As indicating the prevalence of the view it is worth while to note that leading educators from various states were in substantial agreement with its central doctrines.¹

(C) AUTHORITARIAN SOCIAL MORALITY AND THE CIVIC VIRTUES

While this system of pedagogy, based completely on the psychology of the faculties and religious authority, was being worked out and received as the guide for much actual practice, there was another and complementary approach to the problem of moral education, based quite largely on the assumed demands of citizenship. The natural response of the school was to utilize factors already operative in the existing system. Since the discipline of the school (in contradistinction to its instruction) had been regarded previously as the context in which to develop those moral and religious traits demanded in a system based completely and avowedly on religious authority, so now the needs of citizenship

¹ See Peaslee, J. P.; Baker, William; Keeling, H. F.; Boyden, A. C., *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1886, pp. 138-149.

were to be both interpreted in terms of the accepted factors of discipline and sought through a more conscious effort to employ these elements in the development of personal, civic, and social morality.

Consequently, we find the character needs of a properly trained citizen expressed in terms of those factors of discipline that were regarded as essential to the efficient working of schools as conceived and organized at the time. This approach came to a focus in the ideas and influence of William T. Harris, whose working conceptions of control, based on the demands of citizenship, were very largely affected by the Hegelian theory of morality. He saw in the discipline of the school what he regarded as the natural and efficient means of moral growth. His analysis of discipline revealed five main factors: obedience, punctuality, regularity, silence, and industry. These were to become "virtues" of permanent social and moral value to the child. This view, partly indicated in the following quotation, was incorporated in the report of the Committee on Moral Education to the National Council of Education in 1883 :

"The so-called discipline of the school is its primordial condition, and is itself a training in habits essential to life in a social whole, and hence is itself moral training. . . . The first requisite of the school is order; each pupil must be taught to conform his behavior to the general standard. . . . Therefore, a whole family of virtues are taught the pupil and taught him so thoroughly that they become fixed in his character . . . obedience, punctuality, regularity, silence, and industry. . . . Moral education must begin in merely mechani-

cal obedience and develop gradually out of this stage toward that of individual responsibility.”¹

The findings of this committee were supposed to involve the best thought of the time relative to the subjects which it investigated.² The report indicated that the committee had “difficulty at every stage of progress both in classifying the several orders of moral virtues and in finding an exhaustive enumeration of the different species. . . . It distinguishes moral habits or duties into three classes: mechanical, social, and religious.”³ These were to be developed in the order stated. In the elementary school, therefore, it was through these mechanical responses — the formation of habits of implicit obedience, punctuality, regularity, silence, and industry — that the child was to be prepared for participation in the various forms of social life. As regards the value of obedience, it was contended that:

“The discipline of obedience in its strict form, such as is found in the schoolroom, has four other applications which remain valid under all conditions of society: (a) obedience toward parents; (b) toward employers, overseers, and supervisors as regards the details of work; (c) toward the government in its legally constituted authority, civil or military; (d) toward the divine will, however revealed.”⁴

¹ “Report of Committee on Moral Education to the National Council of Education” (Mowry, William A., Chairman; Harris, W. T.; Hoose, J. H.; Hall, G. S.), *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1884, pp. 1-14; see also Harris, W. T., “Moral Education in the Common Schools,” *Report*, American Institute of Instruction, 1884, pp. 29-46.

² *Education*, Vol. 3, 1882, pp. 100 ff.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Harris, W. T., *op. cit.*, N. E. A., 1884.

Little if any emphasis was placed upon any theory of motives at this stage of the child's growth. The main object was the production of the mechanical habits quite irrespective of thought or desire on the part of the child.

"In the mechanical duties, habit is everything and theory little or nothing."¹

The authoritative inculcation of these "virtues" was assumed to be essential. The practical attitude is indicated in the following selected quotations :

"The pupil must have his lessons ready at the appointed time, must rise from his seat at the tap of the bell, move to line, return; in short he must go through all the evolutions with this observance of rhythm."

"Regularity is punctuality reduced to system. . . . Combination in school rests on these two virtues. . . . There is one general training needed to prepare men who are to act as directors of machinery and managers of business; this training is in habits of punctuality and regularity."

"Silence is the third of these semi-mechanical virtues. It is the soil in which thought grows. . . . All ascent above his animal nature arises through ability to hold back the mind from utterance of the immediate impulse. . . . It is necessary in order that there may be no distraction of the attention of others from their work; it is a direct discipline in the art of combining the diffused and feeble efforts of the pupil himself."²

¹ Harris, W. T., "Moral Education in the Common Schools," *Report, American Institute of Instruction*, 1884, p. 34.

² Harris, W. T., *ibid.*, pp. 34 ff.; see also Prince, J. T., "Discipline as a Means of Moral Growth," *Education*, Vol. 5, 1884, pp. 113-126; *School Management and Method in Theory and Practice*, 1889, pp. 38-64.

The assumptions underlying such a theory of control were based in part on certain hypostatized implications of the changed relation of the state and church. It was assumed that their separation represented a stage in the evolution of the institutions of the former whereby morality could subsist without constant support from religious authority, the institutions becoming themselves the incarnation of some heavenly virtue or principle on which they were henceforth based.

"An institution attains its majority when it has become thoroughly grounded on some divine principle."¹

According to this view, then, the school became an institution based on certain divine principles, order and obedience being foremost.

"Order is the first law, even of Heaven. . . . The school must strictly enforce a code of laws. . . . In school we note first the moral effect of the requirement of implicit obedience — a requirement necessary within the school (as an institution) for its successful administration."²

An assumed inviolability of the school system as it was, that is, as an institution isolated from other aspects of life, made these habits morally necessary in order to preserve the school intact. As principles, such factors constituted the embodied system of working forces of the school as an institution. They were therefore their own explanation for being. Consequently, moral

¹ Harris, W. T., *op. cit.*; see also *Circulars of Information*, Bureau of Education, No. 6, 1888, pp. 81-100.

² Harris, W. T., "Moral Education in the Common Schools," pp. 31-33.

growth or will training, in this view, meant the enforcement of moral maxims by the discipline of external authority.

Though such proposals were based on what has been regarded as the first great philosophical system in American education,¹ it is of interest to note at this point that the basic conceptions involved did not persist as the most influential factors in determining the nature of control in elementary education. And while it is not the province of this study to determine the exact cause of their negative effects, it seems probable that the explanation is to be found, in part at least, in the parallel existence of the newly stated pedagogy of control, with its simpler conceptions and its practical emphasis upon the employment of motives of varying worth. The increasing pressure for a system of appeals in harmony with the newer demands of moral growth seems to have diverted attention from this rigid authoritative conception to the more congenial religious view with its "hope of reward" and its emphasis upon the "training of the will," that "inner, voluntary element of behavior." The fact that the latter proved to be a defective theory was no reason for its not being the more acceptable alternative at the time.

However, there were many proposals which placed practical emphasis upon much the same sort of control as was implied in the Hegelian theory of morality. The responsiveness of the school to public criticism

¹ See Monroe, Paul, *A Cyclopedia of Education*, Vol. 3, p. 220.

doubtless had some bearing here. The latter part of the decade 1880 to 1890 was characterized by an increasing sensitivity on the part of leaders to the pressure of criticism relative to the negative moral effects of existing practices. We find the following:

"The charge is freely made that the public school is utterly failing to discharge its duty to society in moral matters. Statistics demonstrate that in forty years the ratio of criminals has risen from one in 3500 to one in 850. The prisons are found to be filled with men who in some way have acquired at least the rudiments of an intellectual education. Their number is so great as to lead some of our most eminent experts to assert that the case is made against the schools."¹

Further examination of the literature of this period indicates a growing interest in citizenship needs and a responsiveness on the part of educational leaders relative to the function of the school in meeting the demands.² To improve the situation, various recommendations were made. And it is of interest to note that school discipline was regarded generally as the means of improvement. We find a wave of discussion relative to the kind of discipline most valuable to this end. There were those who thought the solution was

¹ N. E. A. theme, "Current Criticisms of the Public Schools, and What Answer?" Cook, J. W., "The Schools Fail to Teach Morality," *Proceedings*, 1888, pp. 128-165; see also *Education*, Vol. 7, 1886, pp. 283 ff.; Vol. 8, 1887, pp. 124 ff.; DeGarmo, Charles, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1891, pp. 170-179.

² Atkinson, George H., "The Culture Most Valuable for Preparing Law-Abiding Citizens, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1888; Baldwin, Joseph, same topic, *ibid.*

to be found in more faithful attention to the "virtues" through the discipline of authority as ordinarily conceived. The writers of this group were about equally insistent that the discipline should be authoritative, involving the "will to be obeyed," "submission to what is required because it is required," "sacrifice of the present for the future," and the like.¹

Proceeding a step farther in the struggle toward release from a morality based on religious authority was the view, closely related to the preceding, that out of the racial experience there had grown up certain social sanctions which were based "not upon authority, but upon the hopes of human life as society is now organized."² Regularity, obedience, and the like were virtues which needed no higher sanction than their worth socially in order to provide them with moral value. But the method of obtaining these through a school discipline based on a strict interpretation of the faculty psychology amounted to rigid authoritarianism, often bordering on harshness and force and harmonizing with the prevalent view. The following indicates the attitude:

"The demand that the pupil be on hand every day and at the appointed time has a higher purpose than mere convenience. It

¹ Brown, Duncan, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1888, pp. 102-110; Tweed, B. F., and Jones, H. S., *ibid.*, pp. 122-126; Stratton, C. C., *ibid.*, p. 126; see also *Journal of Education*, Vol. 27, 1888, p. 360; Jones, L. H., "The School and the Criminal," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1892, pp. 208-217; Lowery, C. E., *Education*, Vol. 9, 1888, pp. 103-109.

² Stearns, J. W., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1885, pp. 81-90; 1886, pp. 148 ff.

imposes self-control. . . . The habit of applying himself to tasks, though disinclined, subdues vagrant impulses and develops his efficiency as a worker in any field.”¹

There were others who saw the solution in a careful formulation of the “moral virtues,” which, as supplementary aids to the requirements of the discipline of authority and obedience, were to be taught directly to the child in separate lessons at regular intervals, like other subjects of instruction.

“An appropriate manual or text-book of morals, based upon the foregoing or some similar system of moral virtues, should be introduced into every elementary school at least, and be judiciously used with as much regularity as any text-book on the secular studies. . . . It is a latter-day notion that pure morality is to be ruled out of our free elementary schools.”²

A variant belief, apparently of no significance before this time, and of little strength even now, was that the intellectual activities of the child should contribute to moral control. This newer view is indicated in the following :

“Not only should the ordinary requirements of regularity, promptness, courtesy, neatness, industry, self-control, and personal responsibility eventuate in moral habits, but every intellectual act of the child should have the same uniform outcome.”³

This was in direct contrast with the current view as indicated in the following :

¹ Stearns, J. W., *op. cit.*, 1881, p. 84.

² Richards, Z., “Moral Training in the Elementary Schools,” *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1892, pp. 317-323.

³ Cook, J. W., *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1888, pp. 128-165; see also Banton, Eugene, in *Education*, Vol. 8, 1888, pp. 411-421.

"Very few studies awaken moral ideas or feelings, and none of them put the moral will into activity. . . . The intellectual nature brings into action but a single part of our spiritual being — the power of thought and knowledge."¹

But perhaps the most prevalent tendency among teachers and leaders most closely associated with actual practice, if they thought at all about the child's moral growth, was the effort to apply the graded system of motives based on religious sanctions described earlier in this section.

"One of the commonest rules which we hear in regard to the conduct of the moral education of children is this: Always try to make the children act from the highest possible motives."²

Further evidence of the tendency among teachers to try to apply this system of motives is to be found in the reception and rather general adoption in teacher training institutions of texts on school management and discipline written from this point of view.³

(D) MORAL CONTROL IN RELATION TO NEW SUBJECTS

Manual training. It is not within the scope of this study to trace the origin of new materials in the grades, except as their introduction and justification appear to have been related to moral control. The range of influences, social and educational, which resulted practically in accretions to the curriculum appear to have

¹ Brooks, Edward, "Moral Education in the Common Schools," *Circulars of Information*, Bureau of Education, No. 6, 1888, pp. 93-98.

² Dunton, Larkin, in *Education*, Vol. 9, 1889, pp. 521-524.

³ See especially White, E. E., *School Management*, 1894.

had as their counterparts, after the subjects were added, an even greater variety of justifications. Extending upward from the kindergarten to meet a corresponding extension downward from the high school, were influences which, together with the more direct effects of Pestalozzianism, brought a tendency to employ a variety of forms of "manual training." The presence by 1889 of this new form of subject matter in the grades is indicated in a report of the results of an inquiry made of forty elementary-school principals and superintendents for the purpose of determining the "influence" of the new additions.¹ Just at this time it was introduced into the grades of the New York City schools.² The importance attached to the subject prior to 1890 is in part reflected in the following:

"Manual training at this time occupies the most prominent place among the subjects claiming the attention of educators."³

That the additions were extensions of the kindergarten and at the same time an effect of Pestalozzianism is shown in both the discussions and reported plans of the work.

"Manual training seems to be the natural outcome or extension of Froebel's kindergarten methods, and is essentially objective teaching."⁴

¹ James, H. M., "Influence of Manual Training in the Elementary Schools," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1890, pp. 850-858.

² Calkins, N. A., "Course of Manual Training in Primary Classes," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1890, pp. 828-836.

³ Wise, Henry A., "Manual Training in Primary and Grammar Grades," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1889, pp. 104-110.

⁴ Wise, Henry A., *ibid.*; James, H. M., *op. cit.*

Some of the earliest "experiments" indicate both the Pestalozzian and Froebelian sources.

"The salient feature of the new experiment is that it introduces what may be called the creative method into school education. The system of teaching by object lessons has long been familiar to educators. It is proposed to improve upon this system by giving lessons in the production of objects. . . . Froebel began to apply the principle of the creative method in the kindergarten. But the kindergarten covers only three years of the child's life, while for the school age proper no valuable and tangible formulation of the creative principle has yet been given."¹

The object-teaching influence, in its rigidly formal state, is particularly obvious in the following:

"The general plan of the primary course is to develop conceptions of form through seeing objects, handling objects, clay modeling, stick-laying, etc., and to represent conceptions of objects by clay modeling, paper folding, cutting, and drawing. . . .

"Pieces of paper are distributed to a primary class, and each pupil told to fold one piece from end to end, then to observe the line at the folded edge. Next, they are directed to fold the same paper from side to side; then to open it and notice that one line crosses the other so as to form right angles. . . ."²

That the work was also an extension downward is in part shown by the fact that in the beginning the manual training high schools established "preparatory departments, to which pupils from the sixth and seventh grades are admitted."³ This is further shown

¹ Adler, Felix, "A New Experiment in Education," *Princeton Review*, March, 1883, pp. 143-157.

² Calkins, N. A., *op. cit.*

³ Wise, Henry A., *op. cit.*; see also "Report of the Industrial Department," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1887, pp. 543 ff.

in both the similarity of content and in the justification of the work, as will be indicated subsequently.

From the beginning manual training was theoretically justified on the assumption that it was essential to the child's proper moral growth; and with the variety of influences operating to establish the work, there was a corresponding diversity of conception relative to its more exact use. The variety of "values" claimed for the work is shown in the following quotations:

"The devil never goes where he hears the anvil ring. . . . The bearing of industry upon morals is that the boy trained in industry will be less likely to fall into immoral habits."

"The hand is a potential moral agent, for it is able to show to the mind in things the beauty of truth and the hideousness of falsehood."¹

"It is a fact of some importance that the introduction of workshop instruction . . . has the effect of lessening the necessity for punishment. . . . It is a school exercise which is not only interesting in itself, but quickens a child's interest in many of his other lessons, and the desire to take part in the workshop instruction is a wholesome inducement to attention and general good behavior."²

The emphasis upon the work as a means of "motivating" other school work is further indicated in the following:

"There seems to be strong evidence of the fact that, if manual work of the right kind could be engaged in by the pupils in connection

¹ Ham, Charles H., "The Educational Value of Manual Training," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1885, pp. 259-261.

² Mangus, P., cited from "Hygiene," in *Educational Review*, Vol. 3, January, 1892, pp. 78-84.

with literary work, better results would ensue than if the curriculum were limited to the same amount of literary work. . . . It may be accounted for on psychological principles, for the pleasure and interest occasioned by the manual work greatly increases the attention, and consequently the impressions are much more firmly fixed in the mind.”¹

Again, among the rather ambitious attempts to synthesize the implications of the kindergarten and object teaching in the formulation of moral values, we find the following :

“The child’s work is devoid of any pecuniary value. . . . Its worth consists in being true and beautiful. And a habit is thus formed of judging things in general according to their intrinsic rather than their superficial qualities.”²

But aside from such diverse views as the foregoing, the claims for the more prevalent practices were closely simulative of the “formative” values adhered to generally in connection with other subjects. These were more central in the “experiment” to which reference has just been made than were the more ideal considerations, for we note the following :

“He [the pupil] undergoes protracted toil and meets perhaps with many failures and disappointments in order to be rewarded at last — by what? Simply by realizing in some measure that perfectness of the object which he aimed at from the beginning. . . . In the school the severe discipline of the shop is combined with the refining influence of the study and creation of the beautiful.”³

¹ Wise, Henry A., *op. cit.*

² Adler, Felix, *op. cit.*

³ Adler, Felix, *op. cit.*

The alleged moral potency of the work is indicated in the following typical views cited in the results of the inquiry of 1889 :

"It cultivates patience, observation, neatness and order; . . . It arouses interest in other studies; . . . and . . . since it is an industrial employment, it has moral value."¹

Possibly the most striking examples of the disciplinary view of manual training were in connection with practices based more completely upon the Swedish sloyd method of handwork. The supposed effect upon the will and character in general is indicated in the following :

"In the shop work the child attacks a block of wood. It is to be reduced in size and cut to given dimensions. . . . He is never weary, he is never restless, while at this work. Bad thoughts, bad images, bad behavior leave him while he is here. . . . Character makes very fast under such circumstances. Will follows such an effort as here may be witnessed . . . [It] affects favorably the health and disposition . . . [and] tends to make a self-reliant man."²

But perhaps the most explicit statement of the general claims, from the point of view of formal discipline, is found in later reports. The following seems representative of the conception which dominated practice generally at the opening of the new century :

"The aim of manual training, expressed in a concise form, is the development of useful habits of a general nature. It is true that every subject has in the same sense a disciplinary value, but as this is the characteristic feature of manual training, it should be

¹ James, H. M., *op. cit.*

² Carroll, G. F., "Manual Training and the Course of Study," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1896, pp. 778-786.

particularly emphasized in connection with this subject. . . . In every good manual training lesson the following processes are repeated . . . exercises implying order and neatness. . . . Repetition of these . . . lead to . . . habits of order and neatness . . . habits of accuracy or truth . . . habits of perseverance, and habits of confidence or self-reliance.”¹

Nature study and physical education. Though nature study in some form received wide attention in connection with object teaching, the more theoretical statements regarding its exact function as a separate subject came late in the century. In 1895 new departments were organized in the National Education Association to be devoted to nature study and physical training.² While there was sharp disagreement concerning the value of nature study, some regarded it as the principal means of moral control.

“The essence of character building lies in action. . . . The habit of finding out the best thing to do next and then doing it is the basis of character. Nature study, if it is genuine, is essentially doing. This is the basis of its effectiveness as a moral agent. . . . To know truth precedes all sound morality. . . . There is greater morality in the study of magnets than in the distinction between *shall* and *will*, in the study of birds or rocks than in that of diacritical marks or postage stamps, in the development of a frog than in the longer or shorter catechism, in the study of things than in the study of abstractions. . . .

“The chief value of nature study in character building is that like life itself, it deals with realities. The rocks and shells tell the absolute truth. Association with these, under right direction, will

¹ Trybom, J. H., “A Report on Manual Training in the Detroit Elementary Schools, with a Discussion of the Disciplinary Value of Manual Training,” *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1901, pp. 250-257.

² See *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1895, pp. 946-950, 951-958.

build up a habit of truthfulness which the lying story of the cherry tree is powerless to effect. If history is to be an agency of moral training, it must become a nature study. . . .”¹

The contrary view, associated with the traditional conception of separateness of motive and deed, is illustrated in the following:

“There must be something more than action to develop character. . . . The essence of character building is in motive which finds expression in action. . . . The impulse to virtuous action is not in the mere intellectual power of knowing . . . [We] must influence the child’s motive first, then his action through the motive.”²

The following quotations indicate concisely some of the attitudes held in connection with the moral effects of physical training:

“The first effect is the better discipline, prompter obedience, and consequently the greater ease with which the teacher obtains perfect mass control of large bodies of children. Going from the class to the individual, we soon find a self-reliance and self-control which comes from a knowledge of his bodily powers and the assurance that he can use them at will.”³

“It is extremely difficult to develop ethical character without proper physical training.”⁴

(E) EARLY EFFORTS TO PROVIDE A NON-AUTHORITARIAN MORALITY

The decade 1880 to 1890 was characterized by another attitude of increasing strength and significance.

¹ Jordan, David Starr, “Nature Study and Moral Culture,” *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1896, pp. 130–139.

² Harvey, L. D., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1896, pp. 151–153.

³ Morris, R. Anna, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1896, pp. 946–950.

⁴ Parker, F. W., *ibid.*

At the opening of the decade we find a feeling of dissatisfaction with the various forms of authoritative control. Just as opposition to the arbitrary "breaking of the will" had in due time followed the general employment of brute force, so now we find a gradual development of opposition to the unrestricted reign of authority and implicit obedience. The literature indicates that, as early as 1880, there was some opposition to the use of authority in the management of pupils. The following is the first significant expression of the new view that the literature has thus far revealed :

"The reign of authority in our public schools is the great hindrance to the development of character. . . . It can oblige certain forms of physical activity It can not influence thought, or feeling, or belief in the child. The atmosphere of our schools to-day is an atmosphere of authority. . . . There is no balancing of motives, no calling up of the child's lower nature before the tribunal of conscience and reason; it is the ruling of the child's physical activity by the will of another. The most plausible argument for it is that it gives children habits of order. It would appear to do so. It does give them an automatic regularity."¹

A similar note of discontent was a little later expressed by Francis W. Parker in his *Notes of Talks on Teaching*, in which he insisted upon "making the will of the teacher a secondary and subordinate element in school government."² As showing a general tendency toward a relaxation of authority during the years following these complaints, this statement is pertinent :

¹ Hyde, Ellen, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1880, pp. 213-221.

² 1883, pp. 161 ff.

"The most important change which these later years have brought about has been the coming of more sympathetic relations between teacher and pupil; in less show of authority and more real power."¹

That such a change of attitude toward discipline was regarded as significant, even at this time, is indicated by the opposition which was voiced against its presence.

"There is a vague and vicious tendency to belittle the virtue of obedience."²

Following such moderate indications of discontent and change, we note the development of a more serious questioning of the claims of authority and obedience. As proof that the schools were not developing such positive virtues as self-control, honesty, and the like, there was pointed out the commonly observed lack of self-control on the part of pupils just leaving school and the apparent extremes to which they would go during school life when temporarily freed from authority. It was further noted that thoughtful teachers were sadly distressed by the evident growth in many pupils of vice, weakness, and dishonesty, notwithstanding the frequent employment of precept and punishment.³ It was contended that the failure of discipline to develop character was due to its severity, rather than to an intelligent mildness, and to the lack of a single standard

¹ Howland, George, *Report*, U. S. Commissioner of Education, 1887, p. 228; see also editorial, *Journal of Education*, Vol. 26, 1887, p. 8.

² *Journal of Education*, Vol. 27, 1888, p. 360.

³ Gilbert, C. B., "The Ethics of School Management," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1888, pp. 528-542.

of conduct for school and life. Evidence corroborative of an inverse ratio between severity of control and ease or effectiveness in securing the desired orderliness had been appearing for some time in the form of reports of school committees relative to the salutary effects of a reduction of corporal punishment. For example :

“The best record [on tardiness] is in those schools where, without the use of the rod, the teachers have inculcated in the hearts of their pupils a sincere love and loyalty for the school.”¹

The rapidly rising opposition to both the externality of control and the double standard of conduct is again indicated in the following :

“The aim of discipline is not to secure order — not to compel obedience or attention — for this may be done through those external means which the strong use in their intercourse with the weak — but to produce what is aptly characterized as a ‘self-governing being,’ one whose moral consciousness has not been blunted by the display of needless authority.”²

In opposing obedience as the assumed foundation of all other virtues and the basis of the general system of discipline, it was insistently urged that :

“Obedience is not only not the highest virtue — it is not a virtue at all. . . . It may be and often is a vice. It is the foe of progress, the secret of persecution, the bulwark of priestcraft and imperialism. . . . Out of unwise obedience to human authority, and its unwise enforcement, have grown more evils than the disobedience of all the rebels of history have caused. . . . Society must have it;

¹ *Rules and Regulations*, Boston School Board, 1889, p. 13.

² Dutton, Bettie A., “Discipline in the Elementary Schools,” *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1889, pp. 487-492.

schools must exact it, not because it is virtuous, but because it is expedient. When necessary it should be enforced, but it should be seldom necessary.”¹

As a means of improvement it was urged that teachers seek the virtue of self-control through allowing the child to subordinate his actions, “not to the will of another, but to his own,” in the attainment of “good ends clearly understood.” It was contended that this involved “two elements, wisdom and power, the former to be gained somewhat by precept, but more by experience, the latter to be acquired wholly by exercise.”² Further opposition to the authoritarian régime and the suggestion of a method of securing a greater degree of liberty and self-control are indicated in the following:

“A child that grows up under subjection to authority, doing from day to day simply what is required because it is required, judging himself and being judged by others by the standard of conformity to statute law, obedience to authority, is not a free being, does not enjoy liberty, and fails utterly of preparation for citizenship in a free state. . . . The only discipline that fits for freedom is liberty. . . . It is a serious misconception of human nature to suppose that the child is not fit for freedom till he arrives at maturity. . . . The day of submission to authority is fast passing away.”³

In this connection it is of interest to note the rising opposition to the various restrictions of liberty of

¹ Gilbert, C. B., *op. cit.*, pp. 528–530.

² Gilbert, C. B., *op. cit.*, p. 531.

³ Morgan, T. J., “Education and Freedom,” *Education*, Vol. 8, pp. 571–577; see also Cook, J. W., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1888, pp. 128–165.

movement on the part of children. We find at this time definite opposition to the conventional "military processions" regularly practiced in the schools. Such matters as the tendency toward mutual helpfulness among children, "which are granted only upon request or denied on the basis of an assumed claim for order," were deprecated as not being regarded from the stand-point of an "intelligent conviction of the purpose for which a reasonable degree of order must be maintained."¹ The undue emphasis upon restraint in regard to communication was denounced as based on "prejudice and enslavement to false views" rather than on recognition of the demands of a "normal human trait."²

The status of control at this time is most subtly revealed by implication in the opposing expressions of view relative to the function of the school in developing certain traits of historic importance. By some, control was regarded as in an extreme state of neglect because the "bow" and "courtsey," the "sir" and "madam," the "ready obedience" and "subordination to superiors," "which were met in every cultivated family in the days of the distinguished Dr. Edwards," had given way to "rudeness and insubordination."³

In violent opposition to this attitude it was insisted

¹ Dutton, Bettie A., *op. cit.*, p. 490.

² Gilbert, C. B., *op. cit.*, pp. 528-530.

³ Orcutt, Hiram, *School Discipline*, cited in *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1888, p. 541.

that "such a state of things could not exist in the present ideal school," the implication being that such extreme docility and submissiveness were out of place.¹

In concluding this section it must be noted that these views of freedom were based on the assumption of the child as primarily a rational being and of growth as based on a *status quo* in adult life. That such were the theoretical foundations is in part indicated in the required standard of conduct and the implied position of the teacher in determining it.

"... quiet attention to business when business is at hand; at other times, such courteous conduct as should prevail among ladies and gentlemen in all gatherings."²

During the same period, however, and particularly because of the influence of the kindergarten upon elementary education, there may be noted the beginnings of a more fundamental modification of attitude relative to the nature of freedom in control. These will be considered in the next chapter.

SUMMARY

During the two decades prior to 1890, the issue was forced between religious authority and the demands for a social morality based on the implications of political democracy and the separation of the church and state. A sharp struggle to perpetuate religious authoritarianism ensued. Theoretical discussion became increasingly animated in view of an insistent public demand

¹ Gilbert, C. B., *op. cit.*, pp. 541 ff. ² Gilbert, C. B., *op. cit.*, p. 534.

for a school morality which would check the staggering increase of crime. The period as a whole, therefore, was characterized by a variety of efforts to discover a more adequate conception of control than existed and to formulate working conceptions for the execution of the theory.

Aside from certain partial influences of Pestalozzi, such as the notion that the teacher's character was self-sufficient in molding the child's character and the insistence that love be bestowed upon pupils as a means both of producing conditions of learning and of promoting growth in character, there was a tendency to seek within school discipline, as distinguished from instruction, a more adequate view of control than had previously existed. In the attempt to perpetuate religious authority as the basis of morality in schools, there was finally perfected a "pedagogy" of discipline based on certain postulated "religious motives" and involving a theory of knowledge identified with formal discipline and the psychology of the faculties. To train the child's will to respond to a graded list of "motives" assumed to be the correlates of certain religious sanctions was not only both means and end of the child's moral control, but also the unifying principle of all educational experience and endeavor.

Another conception, somewhat removed from the more prevalent religious view, but emphasizing the same separation between moral and intellectual growth and giving less attention to the use of motive, arose in

connection with the attempt to effect a social morality. In this view, the discipline of the lower grades supplied habits of order, punctuality, obedience, silence, and industry, which were of permanent social value. Since these habits were the "primordial" conditions of the school as a social institution, they were likewise the "virtues" demanded for efficient participation in adult life. This practical reemphasis upon habits of conformity was the outgrowth of an effort to state the educational bearings of the changed relations of state and church.

Institutional idealism, or Hegelianism, found within social institutions the complete principle of individual moral development. The fact that institutions were gradually separated from the church meant that they were incarnating "divine principles" by which they were capable of their own moral subsistence. The school, as such an institution, involved principles identical with those of adult life. Hence, the factors of discipline, being requisite to the success of the school, were the means of preparation for wider social participation. By their very nature and connections in the school, the habits were generalized for adult usage. As the habits were simply the manifestations of the mechanical workings of the school, they were their own excuse for being. They were, therefore, to be sought directly and quite without regard for "motivation" or the use of intelligence. Though the conception amounted in practice to the usual emphasis

upon blind conformity to external requirements, it was an expression of the struggle toward continuity between school control and the demands of society.

The latter part of the period revealed a growing recognition of the possibilities of moral control through intellectual activities. Newly added subjects found their principal justification in their improvement of control or in the development of desired character traits. The emphasis, however, was usually upon the formation of habits which were supposed to have a general value. In the mixture of justifications of new curriculum materials can be discerned the influence of Pestalozzi and Froebel, but more especially the theory of formal discipline. Consequently, in practice, the moral bearings of the new studies were usually conceived in terms of habits of blind conformity to imposed requirements.

Opposition arose at the close of the period to the unrestricted use of authority in control. Just as there had developed earlier the general notion that authority supplemented by kindness should be sufficient to secure conformity, without the arbitrary "breaking of the will," so there now existed the notion that authority itself should be restricted. What had previously been taken for granted was now questioned because, as it was pointed out, there was proof in the increase in crime that the existing authoritarian methods were not securing self-control, honesty, and the like. The attitude appears, however, to have given more attention

NEW BASIS OF MORALITY

to the defects of existing methods than to offering a positive substitute for them.

Taking the period as a whole, the following factors appear in relation to control:

1. An effort to discover the social basis of moral control
2. Theoretical beginnings of emphasis upon the active character of the child
3. Recognition of the possibility of using instructional materials as a means of securing conformity and of producing "moral" habits.
4. Demand for a broader interpretation of school discipline
5. Recognition that authoritative control failed to secure the needed civic virtues and thus to check the increase of crime
6. Recognition of an increased efficacy of control based on less show of authority and an increased sympathy between teacher and pupil
7. A tendency, by reaction to the harsh discipline of conformity, to emphasize freedom as mere physical unconstraint

PART THREE

NEW INFLUENCES AND ATTITUDES IN CONTROL AT THE END OF THE LAST CENTURY

CHAPTER VI

CONTROL IN RELATION TO FROEBEL'S PRINCIPLES AND THE KINDERGARTEN MOVEMENT

ACCOUNT must now be taken of the bearings upon control of certain relatively new movements in elementary education which took place during the last decade of the past century. The first of these, in point of time and perhaps of importance, was the effect of Froebel's doctrines and the spirit of the kindergarten. While the movement began early in the period discussed in the preceding chapters, it appears to have had only limited connection with control in the elementary school before the latter part of the century. The spread of the kindergarten, having its origin in the influences of Froebel, began as a private enterprise for selected and limited groups of young children almost simultaneously with the more general acceptance of Pestalozzianism. This "private" stage was continued for more than two decades, during which the increasing struggle for public adoption was accompanied by "widespread opposition" from school principals and teachers, who "relentlessly denounced its principles." After certain outstanding regional successes and demonstrations of its efficacy, the movement became by 1890 a

widely accepted prefix to the elementary school. With the acceptance of the new function and with efforts to harmonize it with the work of the grades, there was a growing recognition of the implications of Froebel's ideas for revision of procedure throughout the elementary school. In the first part of the present chapter, therefore, the practical relations between the kindergarten and the elementary school will be considered in their earlier bearings upon control. A statement will then be made of the reported bearings of the general theory of Froebel, as interpreted by his disciples, and of the spirit of the kindergarten upon attitudes toward control in the elementary school.

(A) EARLIER RELATIONS BETWEEN KINDERGARTEN AND ELEMENTARY-SCHOOL CONTROL

Inevitable modification of attitude and practice relative to control was promised when the kindergarten became a part of the school, in view of the contrasted methods of discipline employed.¹ The general situation involved an initial dissatisfaction among elementary-grade teachers with the control tolerated or fostered by kindergarten practices. A tense relation appears to have existed between teachers of the kindergarten and primary grades. At any rate, the adoption of the kindergarten as a part of the public school was strongly opposed on the basis of "the argument that

¹ Blow, Susan E., "Kindergarten Education," cited in *Education in the United States*, Butler, Nicholas M., editor, 1900, p. 38.

kindergartens would fill the primary rooms with intractable pupils.”¹ This indicated an existing clash of standards and a demand for readjustment. In one of a series of educational monographs prepared for the United States exhibit at the Paris Exposition of 1900, Susan E. Blow, writing on “Kindergarten Education,” said :

“It is natural that children promoted from the kindergarten should not at first understand the law of silence imposed by the character of the work in the elementary grades, and hence that, without any bad motives on their part, they should prove troublesome pupils during the first few weeks of school life. The failure to understand this fact has caused some unjust criticism of kindergarten children.”²

Statistics demonstrating superior progress on the part of children who had received kindergarten training had been collected by W. T. Harris.³ Moreover, the combined influence of Froebelian and Hegelian idealism as represented in the educational views of outstanding leaders was changing the previous attitude of indifference and hostility into one of respectful inquiry into the possibilities of the kindergarten idea.⁴ In a later attempt, apparently to ascertain the status of the general attitude toward the success of the kindergarten,

¹ Blow, Susan E., “History of the Kindergarten Movement in the United States,” *The Outlook*, April, 1897, pp. 934 ff.

² P. 11; see also Butler, Nicholas M., *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³ See *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1879, pp. 142–158; 1891, pp. 531 ff.; see also Hughes, J. L., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1894, pp. 483–489; see also Blow, Susan E., *op. cit.*, 1897, pp. 932–938.

⁴ Blow, Susan E., *op. cit.*, 1897.

but ostensibly to determine the comparative difficulty of controlling kindergarten and other children, Miss Blow found that of 127 replies to a letter of inquiry addressed to first-grade teachers only 25 were unfavorable. In reference to the latter she said :

"The most frequent criticisms are that kindergarten children are talkative and not easily amenable to school discipline."¹

The following quotations from the report represent the trend of unfavorable criticism in these twenty-five letters and reveal the existing clash of standards in control :

"I find the kindergarten children are less inclined to obey quickly. They have acquired the habit of whispering over their work."

"I have found by looking the matter up that children who have passed through the kindergarten are among the worst behaved and most troublesome in the entire room. I also notice a habit of watching each other's work."

These typical criticisms quoted by Miss Blow are interesting as revealing, on the one hand, the tendency toward mutual helpfulness and a type of discipline in the kindergarten that was relative to the ends of coöperative enterprise and, on the other hand, the individualistic, repressive control of the primary grades.

With reference to the 102 favorable replies, Miss Blow's conclusion regarding control was as follows :

"A large proportion of the letters make no direct reference to this question [discipline], while the account given of the moral characteristics of kindergarten children precludes the thought that they have been found difficult to control."²

¹ "Kindergarten Education," p. 13.

² *Ibid.*

As regards moral traits, such as industry, perseverance, self-reliance, independence, helpfulness, enthusiasm, alertness, confidence, both in their teacher and in themselves, and interest in others, the report concluded that the kindergarten product was superior.¹

(B) ATTITUDES TOWARD CONTROL BASED ON FROEBEL'S VIEWS AND KINDERGARTEN DEVELOPMENTS

(1) *Assumptions Underlying the Practical View of Control*

Before stating the more practical attitudes toward control as reflected in the kindergarten influence, some of the theoretical assumptions of Froebel and his American disciples will be indicated. Briefly, the "dignity of man," "the worth of the individual life," and the operation of the universe on the basis of a "spiritual principle" were some of the basic ideas which should rule in all education, according to Froebel. There were then "two fundamental educational norms" in his system of thought:

"... the idea, on the one hand, of the development of the individual life as an organic unity, endowed with activity; and the idea, on the other hand, of its development through its dependence upon and participation in the larger organism of Reality."²

The educational process, as a phase of the social process, was an evolutionary affair. But formal educa-

¹ "Kindergarten Education," pp. 17-19.

² McVannel, John Angus, "The Philosophy of Froebel," *Teachers College Record*, Vol. 4, 1903, pp. 335-376.

tion was to be "controlled" development. In opposition to Rousseau's proposed isolation of the child in order that "natural" development might proceed, Froebel contended that it was "only through participation in the wider life that the child can become an individual." The following explanation of the function of games and play in the "revelation of that spiritual solidarity of which living organisms are but the lower analogue" shows the dependence of the child's development upon a pervasive spiritual ideal:

"Mind is not a possession of the individual, but a universal energy in which all individuals participate. Each man has a particular self through which he is isolated from other men and a generic self through which he is identified with them. The generic self immanent in all individuals is the divine self. It is the creator of institutions, art, and literature. To make it explicit is the goal of ethics and religion. . . . Only in and through relationship with the social whole can the individual learn the difference between his particular and universal selfhood."¹

Because each individual was dependent for his development upon a universal "principle," which determined the organic unity of all life, he had his own "peculiar and definite nature." The child was by nature "creative activity." The central problem of education was the "presentation" of the child's life in its more perfect unfoldment through participation in the wider "spiritual life." The process required "free self-activity" on the part of the child.

¹ Blow, Susan E., *What is Froebel's Generative Thought?* no date, p. 9.

"For the living thought, the eternal divine principle as such, demands and requires free self-activity and self-determination on the part of man, the being created for freedom in the image of God."¹

"It must not be confounded with the activity of the child in performing operations in response to the command or suggestion of its teacher or any other person. It is the spontaneous effort of the child to make manifest to itself and others the inner conceptions and operations of its own mind. In true self-activity the motive or impulse that causes the action originates with the child itself."²

Though the "spirit" was working itself out in the positive activities of the child and though this meant a maximum of emphasis upon and respect for spontaneity, the previous interpretation indicates the presence of the extreme view that such activity proceeded from a self-enclosed source of response, having no connection with the directive function of the environment. But Froebel's own practical formulations based on his theoretical views involved, in spite of his great emphasis upon spontaneity, a rigid control of the child's activity. Since the ideal "principle" was not sufficiently tangible for specific guidance of present activity, it was necessary to assume that the actualities of experience were themselves the symbolic manifestations of the ideal. These, properly ordered, were necessary, therefore, to facilitate the harmonious development of the child. Because the child must in any case live in association with others and because the life of which he is inevi-

¹ Froebel, *Education of Man*, translated by Hailman, W. N., 1887, p. 11.

² Hughes, James L., *Froebel's Educational Laws for All Teachers*, 1897, p. 7.

tably a part exerts specific directive influence, it is necessary in education that such direction be merely intelligent.

Consequently, Froebel would make a conscious selection, in advance, of the materials best fitted "to supply the needs and furnish a medium for the fullest expression of the individual at each stage of his development." By a conscious directing of the child's activities, Froebel would save the child from "needless experiment." By participating in experiences of this world, properly limited and graded, the child's inner nature could unfold in accordance with the transcendental ideal and thus perfect its own spiritual unity — the end of all education. Moreover, the child's curriculum, though based on the various occupations and other forms of social participation, was not only to be selected in advance, but its specific elements were to be determined in accordance with *a priori* connections between elements of actual experience and the ideal. Since the ideal was *ideal*, and not subject, therefore, to the scrutiny of mere human experience, its worldly counterparts must necessarily be chosen somewhat arbitrarily.

But aside from the implications of the philosophy for a working theory of education and a technique of instruction, the conception of unity and particularly the emphasis upon respect for the child's interests appear to have greatly influenced many phases of elementary school procedure. This seems especially true as regards control.

"Froebel's educational reforms have been grasped more generally in the department of discipline than in any other department of school work."¹

Possibly the most representative statement of the general theoretical attitude toward control based on idealism as embodied in Froebel's views was in the *Philosophy of School Management*, by Arnold Tompkins.² Here the central thought seems to have been that "the school is an organic spiritual unity." The "law of the school" was to arise from within, and "the real school, from which the law emanates, is mind in effort to unfold mind." The school reduced itself finally to the spiritual unity of the child himself.

"This is the unity of the child's real and ideal self, or rather the school is the tension between the two."³

Control in this view was a function of the "unity of the organism," which could be broken by either pupil or teacher. From the point of view of the child, harmony was disturbed when the child failed to proceed voluntarily on the basis of the inner purposes of the organism, that is, of the school as a whole.

"The school is never stable unless it rests in the pupil's adoption of it as his law."⁴

Improper use of authority on the part of the teacher could quite as easily disturb the unity. Here the idea

¹ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1897, pp. 18-24; see also Hughes, J. L., "Influence of the Kindergarten Spirit in Higher Education," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1896, pp. 478-490.

² Boston, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

of spiritual unity found in a directive curriculum of activities was extended to the use of authority as a phase of the "law of opposites."

"In good education, then, in genuine instruction, in true training, necessity should call forth freedom; law, self-determination; external compulsion, inner free-will; external hate, inner love."¹

Though the "living thought" or the spiritual ideal was by its nature "mandatory in its manifestations," it was such only in the presence of reasoned acquiescence in any requirements that were imposed upon the child. Where authoritative prescription did not provoke rational submission, unity was broken and moral growth disturbed. Unity was not necessarily restored when the child submitted arbitrarily to the will of the teacher; he must submit to his own will.

"This means that school administration should be entirely democratic; that is, no arbitrary will must displace the pupil's obedience to himself as objectified in the school."²

When the child had as his own purpose that of the school, he was in "spiritual unity" with the school as an organism. When he chose to do that which was out of harmony with the purpose of the school, he thereby broke the unity. The restoration was not by external means: it was by the child's own undoing of the purpose which broke the unity.

¹ Froebel, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

² Tompkins, Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

"The pupil who breaks the unity must, by his own act of mind, restore it. . . . Punishment is not application of external means; it is the struggle the pupil has with himself in order to subordinate himself to the purpose of the school."¹

It was by thus placing the child in conflict with himself that moral discipline was to be attained.

"The pupil cannot be helped except by self-conflict. . . . It must be fixed so that the pupil wrestle with his own deed."²

We find emerging here an element of the doctrine of "catharsis," or the assumption that by present evil acts the child is made immune from similar deviltry in later life.

"Is there not some reason for rejoicing in finding evil manifested? Suppose the boy desire to cut the desk, should not the teacher be pleased that the symptom should appear? If the cut is in the boy, let it come out, that he may be helped to face his deed now, and escape being a vandal when grown up. . . . If the boy desires to write his autograph on the floor in ink, the teacher should be pleased to have him do so; the problem of rubbing it off can be made so purifying and tonic to his blood."³

(2) *Practical Attitudes toward Control Resulting from the Kindergarten Movement*

We turn now to the practical attitudes regarding control, which were reported to have been the results of kindergarten developments. The general effect on the change of the child's position in education was reported as follows:

¹ Tompkins, Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 179 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 180 ff.

"The kindergartens undoubtedly deserve the credit for arousing the general and earnest study of the child. They made the child the center of emphasis. . . . The kindergartens respected the child's self-hood; they aimed to deal with its divinity rather than with its depravity."¹

The main pedagogical maxims of the kindergarten, "self-activity" as the agency of growth, the impossibility of this self-activity under restraint, the desire of the child to do the "right" rather than the "wrong," to be constructive and creative rather than destructive, and the possibility of shifting the child's "center of interest" from the wrong to the right without coercion or the endangering of respect for personality — these were central among points of departure in the more prevalent discussion of control. Where the discussions of the disciples of Herbart were most silent, that is, in the realm of the child's active tendencies, likes and dislikes, and the teacher's function in their guidance or redirection, the writings of Froebel's followers were loudest and most insistent. Books, reports, and articles written between 1890 and 1900 and based on Froebel's teachings indicate a tendency to regard discipline, in the usual sense of obedience, order, and restrictions, as secondary in importance and of great danger to individuality. Then with the spread of kindergarten practices, and in contrast with the Herbartian insistence upon "much obedience" and restraint, it was further contended that discipline was not needed at all.

¹ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1896, pp. 478 ff.

"When the harmony between control and spontaneity is thoroughly understood and based on the child's productive self-activity, there will be no need for what has been called discipline in the schools."¹

The leaders of this movement saw no conflict between spontaneity and external control except in cases of maladministration of the latter. The conception of unfoldment toward a fixed goal or ideal and that of the unity and harmony of forces, even of apparent opposites, made necessary such a view. To control the child within bounds was necessary to a proper realization of the "perfect law of liberty."² The control was not to seem external and arbitrary to the child, however; the child was not to experience conscious coercion. For such would be destructive of self-hood.³ There was opposition, therefore, to external constraint through the teacher's personality, since this interfered with individuality, the divine spark of childhood. We find frequent insistence, therefore, upon a control based on love, sympathy, and a knowledge of the interests of children.⁴

A common attitude of this group was that an important source of control was to be found in the child's love of activity for the sake of the activity. It was

¹ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1897, p. 175.

² Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1897, pp. 160 ff.; Tompkins, Arnold, *Philosophy of School Management*, 1895, pp. 212-218.

³ Tompkins, Arnold, *ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, pp. 154-170; Parker, F. W., *Talks on Pedagogics*, 1894, pp. 238 ff.; see also Hughes, J. L., "The Harmony between Control and Spontaneity," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1892, pp. 187-198.

regarded as essential to recognize the difference between the child's tendency to seek the end of his activity and his tendency to get satisfaction, and hence stability and orderliness, from the pursuit of activity itself.¹ No longer was there any justification for a system of external motives, rewards, or prizes as ends set up to induce application in study or right conduct.² The motive was to be found in activities that were consonant with the child's dominant tendencies. From this conception and that of the great number of activities of childish interest, it was but a step to the recognition of a possibility of shifting the child's absorption in a lower or less desirable activity to an equally intense interest in something of greater moral worth. And the notion that this could be done without destroying the unity or continuity of the child's experience, and without negations, led to the demand for the study of the child's interests in order that proper redirection could be brought about without a persistent employment of authority or external dictation.³ The latter methods were to last for the shortest possible time.⁴

A closely related field of emphasis was in the employment of objective materials as factors in control.⁵ The

¹ Hughes, J. L., *Froebel's Educational Laws for All Teachers*, pp. 174 ff.

² Parker, F. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 359-375; Tompkins, Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-196.

³ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1897; Froebel, *Education of Man*, translated by Hailman, William, 1887, pp. 13-15.

⁴ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1897; *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1892, pp. 187 ff.

⁵ Parker, F. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 346 ff., 355-359.

conception of unity of child life and nature and of the active character of the child led to emphasis upon opportunity for the employment of natural materials in the pursuit of childish purpose. The fact that the symbolic implications of their employment led to rigid limitations of the ends and methods of their use, as had been true in the formalization of object teaching, did not prevent a tendency toward their normal use by the child. The control possibilities could in some degree be realized even if the psychological interpretations of the processes involved were unsound.¹

The great emphasis placed upon social relationships and play as practical educative media was largely in connection with the formation of moral disposition.² It is in the literature of this group that we first encounter any considerable emphasis upon a self-control that is positive in character. Up to this time there was the attitude, explicit or implied, that self-restraint, the personal holding in check of certain evil tendencies, was the central factor in self-control. But with the kindergarten movement, it was to be both positive and negative, the former being regarded as the more important.³ Such traits as courage, a sense of responsibility, and obedience were to be learned in the matrix of social participation involved in well-directed play. The

¹ Parker, F. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 167-170.

² Parker, F. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 345 ff.; Tompkins, Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-218; DeGarmo, Charles, "Social Aspects of Moral Education," *Third Year Book*, National Herbart Society, 1897, pp. 53-55.

³ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1897, pp. 139 ff.

learning of obedience through habits of conforming to the rules of play is indicated in the following :

"One of the most essential qualifications for good citizenship is reverent submission to law. The boy's first training in obedience to law under the circumstances of full citizenship is obtained on the playground. There he is among his equals, and the rules of the game are the laws by which every player must be governed. The habit of obedience to rules in boyhood is the surest foundation for coöperative submission to laws in manhood."¹

But perhaps the most pervasive emphasis of the kindergarten movement was that of the close relation of the intellectual and the moral in the child's growth. All volitional and intellectual activities alike were regarded as moral.

"Everything done has a moral or immoral tendency. That is, doing forms by repetition habit, and habit makes up character."²

SUMMARY

With the extension of the kindergarten idea, there began during the last decade of the past century certain revisions of attitude toward elementary school control. Coming mainly from the kindergarten movement, was a growing recognition of the child's active capacities and a corresponding demand for decrease of emphasis upon external appeals or "motives." The idea of "spiritual unity" in the school and in the life of the

¹ Hughes, J. L., *op. cit.*, 1897, pp. 140 ff.

² Parker, F. W., *Notes of Talks on Teaching*, reported by Patridge, Lelia, 1883, p. 167; see also Tompkins, Arnold, *The Philosophy of School Management*, pp. 183-185.

child necessitated a careful regard for the method of employing the direct controls of authority and force. The demand for spontaneity and freedom required similarly the limitation of obedience and restraint. The child's love of activity and the possibility of securing satisfaction from the successful pursuit of interesting activity were emphasized as substitutes for the more direct methods of obtaining conformity. Demands for a knowledge of the children's interests and for the use of a variety of objective materials were emphasized as factors in control. Self-control, heretofore identified with personal restraint, became in this view a more positive affair, associated to some extent with social participation. The movement called attention to the close relation between the intellectual and moral factors of growth.

The movement called attention to the following in particular in relation to control :

1. The moral possibilities in a proper guidance of the child's impulsive life
2. The possibility, with increased attention to the child's active capacities, of a decrease in the use of artificial motives and other direct appeals, such as authority and force
3. A tendency to regard the child's interest in activity rather than in the end of activity as an important source of control
4. A questioning of self-control as self-restraint and a tendency to regard freedom and control as functions of social participation
5. Recognition of the importance of a knowledge of the child's interests as a factor in control .
6. Recognition of the importance of a variety of objective materials as a factor in the child's control

7. Recognition of the close relation between moral and intellectual growth
8. The importance of maintaining unity among the influences affecting the child's moral disposition
9. The need for seeking within child nature and the demands of society the basis of authority as a substitute for the earlier authority based on religion

CHAPTER VII

HERBARTIANISM AND THE MORAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT IN RELATION TO CONTROL

ALONG with the kindergarten influence, discussed in the preceding chapter, there occurred during the last decade of the century a still newer movement in American education. This was the spread of the psychology and pedagogy of Herbart. Closely related to Herbartianism and extending well into the present century was a widespread and concerted effort, at times assuming international proportions, to provide moral control through direct instruction. This we shall call the moral education movement. It is the purpose of this chapter to indicate the new attitudes, or changes of conception and practice, relative to control that were in significant degree associated with these two movements.

(A) THE HERBARTIAN MOVEMENT IN RELATION TO CONTROL

Following the first national interest in the kindergarten idea and simultaneously with its rapid development and initial effects upon elementary education in the decade 1890 to 1900, note of which has been made

in the previous chapter, we find injected into elementary education from another direction a new and quite different influence which seems to have had a positive bearing upon control. The psychology and pedagogy of Herbart were introduced in the effort to improve character through more scientific methods of presenting carefully selected subject matter. In contrast with the kindergarten emphasis upon utilizing the native tendencies and present interests of children, the new conception would in the main deny the existence of original specific tendencies and propose to build disposition and self-control through properly presented ideas.

The critical attitude toward extreme authoritarianism had already resulted in some effort to find a more satisfactory conception than that of formal discipline. This is shown in the attitude of those still adhering to the older view.

"The fact that the act-impelling desires are awakened by knowledge shows that instruction in duty has a vital relation to the training of the will, and hence to moral training; and this is sufficient answer to all the recent cavil respecting the relation of instruction to effective moral training."¹

The relation assumed here, however, was of an external character. The independent intellectual act of learning about a given duty or virtue was regarded as complete within itself as a separate process. Having learned about a duty, the knowledge was supposed then

¹ White, E. E., "Moral Training in the Schools," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1886, pp. 128-137.

to awaken desire, which in turn might stimulate an independent will to act in the performance of duty.

It was now asserted, therefore, that effort should be made to "discover the reflex action of a proper training of the understanding upon the will activity of the pupil."¹ And in further objection to the older view, it was contended that little aid had been derived from psychological analyses that did not "show the genesis of volitional activity in knowledge," and that did not "trace its progress up to the fullness of the deed." The criticism was made that, while the teacher had "always been ready to train the will by manly example, reproof, and commendation, he had never set himself seriously to the task of developing a pedagogy of will-training." It was contended, therefore, that "behavior in school ought to be the idealized consequence of proper ethical instruction rather than the commonplace source of its lessons for life." At the same time, it was further asserted that "in the common-school studies is found the concrete basis and antecedent condition of all subsequent practical, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral interests of mankind and hence the root of all rational volition."² This was an open break with the prevalent view of the separateness and external relation of the moral and other assumed faculties and represented the beginnings of Herbartianism in this country.

¹ DeGarmo, Charles, "The Relation of Instruction to Will Training," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1890, pp. 118-126.

² DeGarmo, Charles, *ibid.*

With the rise of Herbartianism, school discipline, heretofore conceived as the principal means of moral control and character development,¹ became subordinated, in theory at least, to the methodic development of properly selected ideas as the true source of desire, volition, and moral conduct. In denying the existence of any innate and separate faculty of conscience or will, Herbartianism gave first place to the building of proper moral disposition. In this theory, the child's will, as with other aspects of mental life, came into being through the operation of certain well-defined laws of interaction between externally received ideas and existing mind content and through associations among the existing contents themselves, the initial content being of an elementary character spontaneously generated through the sensory mechanism. The process of building the mind, particularly that aspect involving the interconnecting or integrating of the new and old, known as the process of apperception, was the mechanism of interest, the medium of desire, and the origin of volition or will action. The peculiar state of pleasure accompanying the apperceptive process was the normal and legitimate manifestation of interest.

"First, ideas secured our attention and may have excited some feeling. If they excited feeling to a sufficient degree, desires and longings sprang up; and finally convictions and resolutions were reached. Such is the history of the activity called willing. . . .

¹ DeGarmo, Charles, *op. cit.*

Feelings, desires, and determinations are not activities outside of and separate from ideas, but are an outgrowth from them.”¹

A first principle, then, in teaching, was that of interest.

“To the Herbartian a lively, permanent interest is the highest immediate purpose of instruction. . . . Good, interesting thoughts, as well as good discipline, are to be aimed at; indeed, they are of first importance.”²

This interest was not for the purpose of making disagreeable materials more acceptable or to make learning easy, but was the normal emotional function of the apperceptive process in the building of the child’s volitional life or will.

“Whatever may be true of will training through the exercise of authority, the teacher must never forget that instruction can reach the will only over the bridge of interest, for only through interest can instruction set up ends for which the mind is willing to struggle. . . . There are two prime requisites for arousing the kind of interest that culminates in the establishment of motives of right volition: attention and apperception. . . . The attention, however, which is a condition of will as influenced by instruction, must be spontaneous, not forced; it must arise from the instruction itself, and not presuppose the volition which it is designed to influence.”³

If the proper method of “placing thoughts in the mind” was used, the newly presented materials would be interesting, providing the proper apperceptive background had been built up. Hence the test of teaching was in the child’s interest in his work. Permanent interest along desired lines could be developed by a

¹ McMurry, F. M., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1892, pp. 421-433.

² McMurry, F. M., *ibid.*

³ DeGarmo, Charles, *op. cit.*

proper control from behind, that is, by seeing that proper subject matter had been built up previously and then by providing repeated opportunity for apperception to take place in connection with kindred new thoughts. From interest in the thought would follow logically desire, volition, or will action and the correlative moral conduct. The child's character could be determined, therefore, by proper teaching of ideas of those objects or modes of conduct that received social sanction. This control-from-behind process of will-building could meet the demands for proper moral character by the use of subject matter representing those aspects of life that embodied particularly the standards and relations of approved conduct. Consequently, we find the Herbartians emphasizing the careful selection and teaching of subject matter as the main method for moral control.

"He who takes proper care of the ideas that enter the child's mind, seeing to it that they are thoroughly understood and interesting, is determining to a considerable degree the kind of person the child shall will to be. Of course, he cannot determine it entirely, for the child has native tendencies that will assert themselves, but he can do much toward it."¹

The sharpness of contrast between this and the usual view of control lay in the fact that, while the older view placed emphasis upon the developing of habits without ideas, much of the Herbartian emphasis was upon the formation of ideas without habits. Consequently, we

¹ McMurry, F. M., *op. cit.*

find immediate expressions of dissatisfaction and criticism. These will be considered in a subsequent chapter. It is necessary now to examine the theory in relation to its implications for the more intimate and personal side of the pupil-teacher relationship.

While ultimate moral control was to be developed through the building up of masses of ideas which were to have dynamic, volitional force and from which will-action in general was to proceed, there was a second phase of control which related to the impulsive character of the child. This phase, called government, operated to determine the immediate response of the child and particularly to suppress unapproved overt action.

"It is the business of government to hold youthful impulses in check until training has time to form a will which shall be able to control them."¹

This kind of control, necessary, so it was assumed, because of the natural petulance of young children and the absence of any developed apperceptive basis of self-direction, was an evil to be endured and a prerequisite to training or educative instruction proper. Within itself, though it was broader than instruction and included the more personal and direct aspects of control, it was not formative of disposition.² According to

¹ DeGarmo, Charles, "Herbartian Pedagogics," *Educational Review*, Vol. 1, 1891; Herbart, J. F., *Outlines of Educational Doctrine*, translated by Lange, A. F., 1901, pp. 30-43, 160-162.

² Herbart, J. F., *ibid.*; DeGarmo, Charles, *ibid.*; see also Compayré, G., *Herbart and Education by Instruction*, translated by Findlay, M. E., 1907, pp. 84-105.

Herbart himself, therefore, the child's "time is to be fully occupied at all events, even if the immediate purpose is merely the avoidance of disorder. . . . Specific tasks, not to be abandoned till completed, assure order much better than random playing, which is apt to end in ennui."¹

The function of authority in control is most clearly revealed in the view of the relations of government and training. While government referred more particularly to restrictions, punishments, and unreasoned conformity to commands or to the immediate requirements of school procedure, it was supposed to operate only intermittently. In the meantime, however, restraint was necessary. Therefore, training, including reasoned obedience and conformity to regulations, in coöperation with instruction, was supposed to pervade the remainder of school life. While the obedience assumed as necessary, irrespective of reasons conceived by the child, had been treated as government, that which was required with due regard for a reasonable basis on the part of the child, but without regard for his inclination, was within the province of training. The theory assumed a value in the felt authority and in the reasoned obedience to its commands as a very important part of the process of will-building. The following indicates the relationship :

"Training presupposes an efficient government and the obedience consequent to it. . . . Government acts at intervals. But the

¹ Herbart, J. F., *op. cit.*

pupil cannot be allowed to live in a state of lawless liberty in the meantime. He must be sensible, be it ever so little, of certain limits which he is not allowed to overstep. . . . At the beginning and before an evil will has had time to develop, training must take the place of will. . . . It must lend its own external firmness and uniformity. . . . Authority and love are surer means of securing order than harsh measures are."¹

The Herbartians of this country, however, appear to have been more interested in the possibilities of instruction as a means of building disposition and hence were less insistent upon Herbart's doctrines relative to the régime of rigid order. Those who discussed this phase of procedure were inclined to regard the requirements of all legitimate control as fruitful sources of moral growth. The Herbartian literature of American origin is silent regarding that phase of control which Herbart credited with negative moral possibilities while at the same time regarding it as a necessity because of the impulsiveness of the child. Hence, the methods proposed for dealing with the child in the classroom, except in the immediate instructional processes, were not unlike those which proceeded from the more prevalent theories based on the assumption of separate faculties and the correlative authoritative morality. In the assumed absence of will on the part of the young child, it was regarded as essential that this lack be supplied by much obedience to the teacher's will. The following quotation indicates the conception :

¹ Herbart, J. F., *op. cit.*; DeGarmo, Charles, *op. cit.*

"The training and development of the will depend upon exercise and instruction. There are two ways of exercising the will. First, by requiring it to obey authority promptly and to control the body and mind at the direction of another. The discipline of the school may exert a strong influence upon pupils in teaching them concentration and will power under the direction of another. Especially is this true in the lower grades. Children in the first grade have little power or habit of concentrating the attention. The will of the teacher, combined with her tact, must aid in developing the energies of the will in these little ones. The primary value of quick obedience, of exact discipline in marching, rising, etc. is twofold. It secures the necessary orderliness and it trains the will. Throughout the school course there must be much obedience and will effort under the guidance of one authority."¹

The Herbartian literature does not indicate any pronounced recognition of the need for guiding the impulsive tendencies of children into normal purposive behavior as a factor in control. There was some recognition of the demand for an aim on the part of the child in both the control and the acquisitive phases of his development, but the early conceptions identified externally presented or imposed ends with the proper employment of this factor. The following indicates the view:

"An aim may be set before them [the children] which they are to reach by their own efforts. For example, let a class in the first reader be asked to make a list of all the words in the last two lessons containing *th*, or *oi*, or some other combination. . . . As children grow older, the problem set before them, the aims held out, should be more difficult. . . . There are few things so valuable as setting up definite aims before children and then supplying them with incentives to reach them through their own efforts."²

¹ McMurry, C. A., *The Elements of General Method Based on the Principles of Herbart*, 1903, pp. 205-215.

² McMurry, C. A., *ibid.*

In concluding this section it is to be noted that, if Herbartianism made any contribution to control, it was in giving an increased recognition to the importance of the careful selection of subject matter as a factor in moral growth. At any rate, most of the comprehensive treatments of the subject following this period give distinct recognition to this factor.¹

(B) THE MORAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT

(1) *Direct Instruction in Morals*

It appears that Herbartianism, in its large emphasis upon the use of carefully selected ideas and the consequent employment of the school "studies" as means of moral control, was not greatly removed from the traditional practice of teaching by "principle and precept." This apparent fact, together with that of the importance which the movement attached to method in the "presenting of ideas," seems to have had, for the next two decades at least, a positive bearing upon practical efforts to obtain moral control through more direct methods than were involved in the "incidental" procedures of Herbartianism. The expectation of great moral improvement from "good" literature, from history, and from science led to the tendency to inject into the curriculum materials chosen primarily because they gave "ideas" of "right" conduct and so, supposedly, generated the conduct itself. It should be noted that

¹ See Griggs, Edward Howard, *Moral Education*, 1904, pp. 222-268; Dewey, John, *Moral Principles of Education*, 1909, pp. 29-45.

practically all subjects were now regarded as having great value in moral control if only they were presented properly. In 1909 a committee of the National Council of the Education Association found from an investigation of 1000 elementary schools that "58 per cent of the teachers gave first place to that group of subjects comprising history and literature, literature being somewhat the favorite."¹ However, twenty per cent of the teachers concerned in the investigation considered the relative ethical significance of the subjects so slight and the method of instruction so important that they refused to make any special selection.²

The prominence of the subjects in moral control is further revealed in the attitudes of leaders in teacher training institutions. In 1910 an investigation of "the present status of moral education in institutions for the training of teachers" showed that the subjects mentioned in the preceding investigation were regarded as second only to "the activities of school life" in moral development. The following, taken from an interpretation of the findings, is indicative of the trend of conception :

"If the opinions of these one hundred seventy normal-school, college, and university instructors represent a fair 'sampling' of the general consensus of opinion among the men and women engaged in the work of training teachers, it is clear that those who are to-day being prepared for teaching in the lower schools are being impressed

¹ Barnes, C. W., "Moral Training through the Agency of the Public Schools," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1909, pp. 129-140.

² Barnes, C. W., *ibid.*

hroughout their preparatory work with the idea that the chief media through which the development of moral habits and ideals may be encompassed are (1) the activities of school life and (2) indirect instruction through literature, history, and science. These two sources together receive practically fifty per cent of the firstrankings and over fifty per cent of the second rankings.”¹

There was little consensus, however, regarding the methods by which the moral values were to be realized. We quote the following from the general conclusions of the report :

“Although more than a majority of the instructors in the institutions believe that, in the lower schools, indirect moral instruction hrough literature, history, and science has a very important place, there seems to be little explicit effort to emphasize, in presenting these subjects to intending teachers, the methods through which heir moral values may be realized.”²

So extreme was the emphasis upon the ethical potency of the subjects themselves that literature in particular appears to have come to be regarded as having a certain intrinsic or inherent moral efficacy, greater even than the value of concrete experience and obtained without use in the latter.

“No other study in the elementary school compares in ethical value to the study of literature, because human duty, right character, and conduct are therein presented with greater detail and analysis than even conduct in the concrete presents.”³

¹ Bagley, W. C., “The Present Status of Moral Education in Institutions for the Training of Teachers,” *Religious Education*, Vol. 5, February, 1911, pp. 612-640.

² Bagley, W. C., *ibid.*

³ Barnes, C. W., *op. cit.*

Manual training and science, as well as other new additions to the curriculum, were now regarded, along with the older subjects, as having primarily an intrinsic moral value. This consideration seems to have been largely the basis of their more general introduction during preceding periods, and it came increasingly to be their main justification as permanent additions to the curriculum, as was shown in the preceding chapter.

Contrary attitudes toward the moral efficacy of the various subjects and the continued reliance upon the "appeal to religious fear" or other external "moral" stimuli only reveal further the presence of the notion that the subjects were regarded as having inherent moral worth.

"An old argument, but one which is usually maintained with much vigor whenever the question of moral instruction is up for discussion, is this: The organization of the school and the various branches of study included in its curriculum are pregnant with moral content; some even go so far as to say with religious ideas and implications. In fact, one writer in a discussion of the subject says: 'Each subject and each experience has its roots in the infinite. There is no subject in the curriculum, there is no relation in the life of the school, which is not packed with potential divinity, and which may not make for morality.'" ¹

In this connection it should also be noted that there came about a criticism to the effect that the newly added subjects had resulted in inadequate command of

¹ Reeder, R. R., "Moral Training as an Essential Factor in Elementary Education," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1908, p. 564.

the tools of knowledge. The complaint in one of its forms is expressed in the following :

"The many things which are now crowded into the curriculum must be eliminated, not only to make room for moral instruction, but because they do not, in and of themselves, contribute anything of lasting importance from an educational standpoint."¹

It was contended, moreover, that the "incidental" method of the Herbartians had failed to justify the claims made for it.² The demand for an educational product more adequately equipped with habits of moral control was beginning to take deep roots both in the social consciousness and in the thoughts of teachers.³ And before the end of the first decade of the present century the transfer to the school of responsibility for the child's moral growth appears to have made teachers in general more sensitive than previously to the whole question of moral training. But that no articulate practical conception of its nature as yet existed is also shown in part in the following :

"Within a few years a strong demand has arisen for ethical teaching in the schools. Teachers themselves have become interested and wherever they are gathered the question 'What shall this teaching be?' is eagerly discussed. The educational journals are full of it. Within a year there have been published seven books on the subject."⁴

¹ Mowry, W. A., "Moral Training in Public Schools," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1908, pp. 12-13.

² The principal criticisms of Herbartianism will be considered in the next chapter.

³ Dewey, John, *The Educational Situation*, 1902, pp. 9-20; also *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1906, pp. 36 ff.

⁴ Palmer, G. H. and A. F., *The Teacher*, 1908, p. 31.

The period may accordingly be characterized as one of general professional awakening to the school's responsibility for the moral control of children, due to the failure of other social factors to continue as proper formative agencies in this function. The consequence of the extreme pressure for immediate results and economy of effort seems to have been a rather widespread emphasis upon immediate or direct methods of moral instruction.¹ Therefore, those who had adhered to the conception of formal discipline found continued favor for their more "formative" modes of moral training. We find a variety of practical attempts to improve the moral status of the child through "plans" for the teaching of specific "moral lessons." Among these the Fairchild system of moral training through "illustrated morality lectures" shows the general theoretical assumptions underlying such practices. In this particular "plan" a topic of recognized importance in school life, such as the "Ethics of Sports," was illustrated by a series of photographs representing methods and situations in athletics taken from American and English life especially.

"Their meaning is then explained so that the children can see for themselves what true sportsmanship is the world over."²

This scheme, begun a decade previously "as an experiment," was typical of those based avowedly on the

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*

² The Moral Education Board, *Moral Instruction in Schools and Colleges*, 1906, p. 3.

assumption of the efficacy of ideas to generate conduct in situations other than those to which they were specifically related.¹ But aside from the advocates of such conspicuous procedures as the foregoing there was now evidence of a moral education party, whose general aim was to secure a distinct place in the curriculum for specific "moral lessons." In taking stock of the situation relative to the teaching of "moral lessons" in 1906 it was contended that :

"Generally speaking, systematic moral instruction may be said to have no place in our American public school system, for it has only been tried to a very limited extent in a few small places."²

It was reported³ that as early as 1904 a few cities were offering "extended and systematic courses in moral instruction."⁴ In certain cities a syllabus including a "list of topics for practical lessons on morality" was in use by teachers.⁵ By 1908 leaders in close contact with a substantial portion of practice were still inclined to emphasize a separation of the intellectual and moral elements in education and to divide the latter into two parts, namely, "moral instruction" and "moral train-

¹ See also the Brownlee plan, Hart, J. K., *A Critical Study of Current Theories of Moral Education*, 1914, pp. 11-20.

² Barnes, C. W., paper read before National Council of Education, 1906; see also Reeder, R. R., *op. cit.*

³ Meyers, G. E., "Moral Training in the Public Schools," *Pedagogical Seminary*, December, 1906, Vol. 13, pp. 409-460.

⁴ Carr, J. W., "Moral Instruction in the Anderson Public Schools," *Proceedings, Religious Education Association*, 1904, pp. 302-310.

⁵ Hervey, W. L., *Proceedings, Religious Education Association*, 1904, pp. 311-321.

ing." This is in part shown by the preliminary report of the Committee on Moral Education appointed by the National Education Association.

"The public school will do all that can reasonably be expected of it if it aids the pupil to lay a broad foundation for the development of character in afterlife. This is done in two ways:

1. By aiding him to form lofty ideals of honor, truth, justice, duty, and the like.
2. By training him in the formation of certain moral habits of self-control, cleanliness, obedience, honesty, justice, industry, fairness; considerateness, patience, perseverance, self-respect, respect for others, loyalty, reverence, and love."¹

And though by 1910 direct instruction in morals occupied a much smaller place, relatively, than other factors, the emphasis was evidently wide in scope. This is in part shown by the fact that a number of teacher-training institutions were now offering "courses designed primarily to train intending teachers in the science and art of moral education."² In a list of seven suggested means of moral education, direct instruction ranked third in importance according to the opinions of teacher-training instructors, as shown in one investigation.

"Direct moral instruction through principle and precept, illustrated by concrete cases, finds first favor with fewer than ten per cent of those expressing an opinion and second favor with slightly more than ten per cent. It takes, however, first honors as the third choice."³

¹ *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1908, pp. 450-456.

² Bagley, W. C., *op. cit.*

³ Bagley, W. C., *op. cit.*

Whether or not a growing discontent with the "incidental" methods was causing a reaction in favor of the more direct means is difficult to determine from the data. At any rate, we find the tendency to select "certain portions" of history and literature for employment in specific lessons set aside for direct moral instruction. In the "Tentative Report of the Committee on a System of Teaching Morals in the Public Schools," prepared for the National Education Association in the latter's effort to provide "a feasible course for use in the public schools," we find among other proposals and suggestions the following:

"Committees of teachers should collect and collate material from history and literature, daily life, and other sources to illustrate and enforce the lessons."¹

While it was insisted that, "judging from the experience of other nations," it was "not wise to add moral data as a new and separate element in the course of study," nevertheless it was believed that:

"To omit all reference to the formal presentation of moral and ethical ideals is likewise unwise."²

It was proposed, therefore, that a systematic presentation of the "virtues" be brought about by their gradation and classification for instructional purposes.

The following lists for the first and third grades, respectively, indicate the nature of the work proposed:

¹ *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1911, p. 345.

² *Ibid.*, p. 351.

"Obedience, cleanliness, kindness, unselfishness, helpfulness, self-control, cheerfulness."

"Honesty, respect for others, cheerfulness, responsibility, care of the body, kindness to animals, patriotism, civics."¹

The following "suggestive outline" of the method of teaching "courage" in the sixth grade further reveals the direct character of the course :

"1. Explanation

"2. Quotations :

"'Courage in danger is half the battle.' — Plautus

"'Falsehood is cowardice — truth is courage.' — Lowell

"'They can conquer who believe they can.' — Emerson

"'Cowards die many times before their death ;

The valiant never taste of death but once.'

— Shakespeare"²

(2) Eclecticism in Control

Another phase of the general movement for moral education should be mentioned in this connection. This was the tendency to regard a number of factors as of coördinate significance in the development of character. The "Preliminary Report of the Committee on Moral Education," made to the National Education Association in 1908, was followed by animated discussion in which was expressed discontent with the "subjects" as the main source of moral training. The factor of discipline in its more historic reference to order, punctuality, and the like was given considerable emphasis. Importance was attached to a number of

¹ *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1911, p. 351.

² *Ibid.*

other factors, such as the character of the teacher, the "social atmosphere," athletic sports, methods of teaching, and school life, as well as the other methods mentioned earlier in this treatment. It is of interest to note that some such range of factors was combined into what may be regarded as an "eclectic" view of control, in which approximately equivalent moral potency was attached to factors that had at one time or another received primary emphasis.¹ The comments below, made by individuals requested to "rank in order of importance" several suggested means of moral education, also reveal the attitude.

These teachers had been asked to rank in the order of importance the following: (1) systematic instruction through principle and precept; (2) explicit instruction and discipline from time to time as conditions necessitate; (3) indirect but still systematic instruction in connection with other subjects, history, literature, etc.; (4) activities of school life.

"I think it most desirable that all of the methods listed should be combined, and without at least 1 or 2 [systematic instruction and indirect instruction through literature, etc.] supplemented by 4 [activities of school life], I do not look for satisfactory results."²

"All the first four [methods named in the list] are good, necessary, and complementary. Why omit any one of them? The same reason applies to the teaching of morality as applies to the teaching of language or arithmetic."³

¹ See Faunce, H. P., "The Moral Factor in Education," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1901; Reeder, R. R., *op. cit.*; Griggs, E. H., *Moral Education*, 1904; in which certain chapters treat these factors separately.

² Sharp, F. C., University of Wisconsin. ³ Quoted by Bagley, *op. cit.*

Such theoretical attitudes indicate the acceptance of the mode of direct instruction in morals as coördinate with "discipline," personality of the teacher, or the more active factors which have been mentioned in a preceding section. And so far as the writer is able to determine, there was in none of these attitudes any unifying principle which would bind the various factors into a self-consistent whole. Conceptions of activity and of the direct impartation of ideas, though representing divergent assumptions and emphases relative to mind and child nature, were, nevertheless, to be brought into juxtaposition whether they could be harmonized or not.

The practical situation represented in 1910, therefore, what might be regarded as an unintelligible or amorphous mixture of assumptions, based mainly on Herbartianism with its emphasis upon method and "ideas" and the older theory of formal discipline with its emphasis upon the civic virtues.

"Moral education should include a knowledge of certain duties that each child should perform. . . . The course of study, methods of discipline, the recitation, the study period, the playground, the social life of the school should each furnish means for training and testing pupils in right conduct."¹

It is interesting to note that some of these factors were regarded as having a positive function, while others were negative in influence. After listing the desired "virtues," it was contended that :

¹ "Tentative Report of the Committee on a System of Teaching Morals in the Public Schools," *op. cit.*

"These qualities are constructively wrought into the child's daily life and, by the discipline of the school, any violation thereof is promptly and adequately punished."¹

SUMMARY

Herbartianism, though disregarding the impulsive life of the child, placed great emphasis upon the possibility of securing moral control through the methodical presentation of carefully selected subject matter. School discipline was subordinated theoretically to the formation of moral disposition through systems of ideas. In denying the existence of will or other moral powers to which appeal could be made, the principle of interest based on an assumed active quality of ideas already gained was emphasized. According to this view of development, properly presented ideas generated their own dynamic energy quite without reference to the child's impulsive life. By their own urgency and capacity for qualitative reaction in connection with new materials, the latter could be assimilated to the former in never-ending reconstruction of character. By a proper regard for the quality of ideas presented as well as for the method of their presentation, the child's character could be molded in almost any desired direction.

Moreover, by discovering the "centers of interest" through which the inherent "correlation" of ideas or the "concentration" of subjects was effected, the unify-

¹ "Tentative Report of the Committee on a System of Teaching Morals in the Public Schools," *op. cit.*

ing principle in character formation was to be found. The theory called attention, therefore, to the demand for unity in the child's educational growth and to the importance of connections among materials of the curriculum as a factor in producing such unity. Richness of subject matter and interest through the method of its presentation were the overshadowing factors of the educative process and of character formation. Discipline, or the mere production of the conditions of efficient instruction, was deprecated by this view. In contrast with the intrinsically higher function of character development through the method of teaching, discipline was reduced to a position of minor importance. In the strict Herbartian view it was an evil to be endured, though with some of the Herbartians there was an emphasis upon its formative moral value in producing certain generalized habits. But in the main discipline served to suppress impulse and to produce conditions of conformity through unquestioned obedience.

Closely associated with Herbartianism was a wide practical emphasis upon the indirect development of moral habits through instruction in good literature, history, and other subjects. Not greatly removed was the older notion of moral development through teaching by principle and precept. These attitudes appear to have combined in a general tendency to employ a variety of schemes or instructional devices for producing character through the impartation of ideas about

good conduct. Though the movement appears to have taken for granted the usual discipline of conformity or obedience to school regulations, it attached great importance to the business of character formation as separate from but coördinate with discipline and intellectual development. Somewhat less obvious, but of apparently increasing significance, was a tendency to regard a number of factors as influential in character formation, such as the teacher, methods of teaching, school life, and the usual discipline of authority.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHANGED STATUS OF AUTHORITY IN CONTROL

In the preceding chapters it has been shown that the conception of authority in the control of pupils underwent certain rather drastic changes. Whereas authority was regarded earlier as a fixed force or entity, the counterpart of the natural perversity of children, employed under heavenly sanction for obtaining prompt and unquestioned obedience, both its character and its position became precarious with the later theoretical recognition of newer factors in control. With the growing emphasis upon methods of instruction, child spontaneity, and love of activity and with the introduction of new subjects that accompanied the general effort to discover a social basis of morality in the schools, there was a corresponding tendency to subordinate direct, authoritarian control. In extreme instances, as has been noted, its validity was questioned as derogatory to a realization of the democratic ideal. And quite generally, following the abandonment of the notion of "breaking the will" of the child, there was a theoretical, if not a practical, sensitivity to the importance of using care in the method of exercising authority in control.

It was not till the present century, however, that there was evolved a rational authoritarian conception of control which substituted assumed scientific conceptions of mind or child nature and social organization for the previously postulated religious forces and sanctions. This avowedly authoritarian view of control persisted in close relation to the moral education movement discussed in the preceding chapter. A representative manifestation of the point of view is the subject of the present chapter.

A NEW THEORETICAL BASIS OF AUTHORITY

Though the moral education party placed large emphasis upon the impartation of ideas about "right" conduct, there persisted the older notion that authoritative "training" in certain habits or selected duties through school "discipline" was the primary means of moral control.

"There are two distinct phases of the subject of moral education, training and instruction. Of these, the former is by far the more important, inasmuch as the school, through its organization and administration, furnishes abundant concrete situations to which the pupil may be led to make right responses."¹

Though this attitude appears not to have had either its own former aggressiveness or the theoretical concertedness of the related movement for direct instruction in morals, it was, nevertheless, quite general in practical

¹ Commission of the Michigan State Teachers' Association, *Preliminary Report on Moral Education*, 1910, p. 3.

circles, as shown by the fact that "teaching success" was generally measured by administrators in terms of "disciplinary success."¹

We note, however, a decided modification in the theoretical basis of the later proposals for continuing authoritative discipline as the "first means of moral education." Whereas the theory a decade earlier was based quite completely on religious authority and the psychology of the faculties involving the notion of the freedom of the will, it had come before 1910 to include a variety of assumptions, bound more or less consistently into a total theory of education. In at least one of its forms the theory consisted of attitudes derived, first, from the older dualism of the present and future — of child interest and future social welfare — as well as certain assumptions of the theory of formal discipline and the psychology of the faculties; second, from the then current introspective psychology of conscious states, particularly the doctrine of "attention"; and, third, from the interest in evolution and genetic psychology, particularly as expressed in the doctrine of "recapitulation." As the last of these sources will be considered in connection with the bearings of the child-study movement upon control, treated in the next chapter, the first two will receive attention here.

This newer authoritarian view in one of its widely

¹ Ruediger, W. C., and Strayer, George, *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. 1, pp. 272-274; see also Littler, Sherman, *School-Home Education*, March, 1914, pp. 252 ff. (data for years 1908-1910).

accepted forms is perhaps most consistently stated in two books by William C. Bagley, *The Educative Process* and *Classroom Management*, published during the first decade of the present century and adopted generally in teacher-training institutions.¹ Professor Bagley seems to begin with the assumption that no causal or inherent connection necessarily exists between the educative process and the "ultimate" or "ethical" ends of education.

"The laws that underlie the educative process are largely independent of the aims of education."²

Starting with this fundamental assumption, he proceeds easily to the older conception of the inherent opposition between child nature and "the ultimate ends of education" as demanded for social efficiency in present life.

"It is true that the inborn or brute tendencies which exist in man until he is educated away from them are, in reality, legitimate products of heredity. Yet they are in their essence purely individual, and make for the satisfaction of individual desires. They are opposed to everything that is social and altruistic."³

Having thus established opposition between the material and objects of education and having burdened heredity with heavy interference in the attainment of those objects, he is free to state the latter and interpret the former and to offer a means of establishing connec-

¹ *The Educative Process*, 1905; *Classroom Management*, 1907.

² *Ibid.*, 1905, p. 40.

³ *Ibid.*, 1905, p. 59.

tion between the two. Starting with "social efficiency" as the ultimate criterion in judging the product of the school, Professor Bagley said :

"In the first place [the child] must possess a certain capital of habit — or, better, he must possess a certain number of *habits*. . . . There is nothing indefinite or intangible about this requirement. The necessary habits may be labeled and enumerated, and their formation during childhood can be prosecuted systematically and in graded steps, so that, at the end of each year, each month, each week, even, the teacher may test with reasonable accuracy his work in this respect.

"In the second place, the product of the school must possess a certain capital of knowledge. . . .

"Finally, every individual who comes out of the school must possess a certain capital of ideals The pupil must be inspired with ideals of industry, accuracy, carefulness, steadfastness, patriotism, culture, truth, self-sacrifice, social service, and personal honor. . . . The great ideals have their origin in specific habits, and habits can be rigidly tested. Farther than this, perhaps, we may not go, except to do all in our power to generalize the specific habits on the basis of ideals."¹

In general, then, the essence of moral action was to be found in the suppression or inhibition of natural impulse in the interest of such socially desirable habits. This negative view is shown in the following :

"But the conquest of these tendencies is universally agreed to be a process of moral development; while from its very nature it is also a process of social development. The keynote of morality is self-denial; yet the very term 'self-denial' implies the denial of self to others — the true essence of the social spirit."²

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1907, pp. 226-228; see also *op. cit.*, 1905, pp. 40-66.

² *Op. cit.*, 1905, p. 59.

The rational basis of authority in control was approached more intimately in considerations of child nature as related to "economy" in learning. Here was found the apparently immutable basis of "freedom through authority." Of first importance was the problem of "securing and holding the attention" of pupils. The methods here, however, were educational forces themselves and, though regarded as separate from both the subject matter and the ends of education, were quite as important as the former and must harmonize with the latter.

"But here [in the securing and holding of attention], perhaps more than anywhere else, the methods that are employed to insure economy . . . must be subjected to the rigorous test of the ultimate end of education, for they involve the operation of educative forces that are as fundamental as the subject matter of instruction itself."¹

In examining the psychology of attention, then, from the "biological point of view," it was held, first, that, as a conscious state correlated with the instinctive "needs of the organism," it tended to attach itself primarily to objects having a primitive significance.

"All of our instincts, then — all of those complex adjustments with which nature has provided us — become correlates, on the mental or conscious side, of what may be termed tendencies to attend — tendencies to hold consciousness open and receptive to whatever impressions may fit in with the instinct."²

Spontaneous or "passive" attention, therefore, like the instinctive urges, was selfish, if not actually perverse,

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1907, p. 138.

² *Op. cit.*, 1907, p. 139.

because of its tendency to give first place to "immediate ends" rather than remote or socially valuable ends.

"Action based upon attention of this sort does not look into the future; it takes no account of any remote consequences. Furthermore, its expression is, so far as the individual is concerned, purely selfish."¹

Since these "immediate ends" were in conflict with the demands of present society for "sustained and directed activity" involving "unremitting effort toward the attainment of a far-off goal," the subordination of "passive attention" to those objects or forms of activity involving remote ends was the *sine qua non* of all education. Hence, it was held, second, that:

"It is the essential prerogative of the human mind . . . to 'look ahead,' to project itself into the future, to construct in imagination an idea of what this future will bring forth or demand, and then to adapt its adjustments to the end thus previewed."²

And while this capacity could not be attributed to the child as an original element, growing with increasing physical maturity and experience, since to do so would be to grant an element of sociality to native equipment, there could, however, be postulated a basis for its acquisition.

"It is not the result of inherited or instinctive tendencies, but is rather to be looked upon as an acquired art, and furthermore as an art that can be acquired only through a period of active attention or effort."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1907, p. 140. ² *Op. cit.*, 1907, p. 141. ³ *Op. cit.*, 1905, p. 100.

Because attentiveness to remote ends was weaker than to objects of present desire, another factor was necessary in order to make the leap from lower to higher interests. Here we find emerging the older conception of a separate will, stated in terms of conscious attention and requisitioned through authority or other incentives to produce the sustained effort demanded by the state of active attention.

"Active attention and 'will' may, therefore, for our purposes, be looked upon as synonymous terms. Volitional effort is a struggle against desire — generally speaking, a struggle against instinct, against impulses of a lower order. . . . An 'act of will' is a condition of attention in which the struggle against the lower tendencies or impulses is especially strenuous."¹

Because this "willing" or "active attention" was a struggle against desire and, therefore, "obviously always unpleasant," the "overwhelming desire 'to do something else'" must be strenuously (often forcibly) repressed.² Directly associated with this factor was the teacher; hence her great importance.

"It is at this point that the function of the teacher is all-important. . . . The stage of active attention is the field in which the arts and devices of the teacher find their highest utility. . . . The task of guiding, pulling, or prodding [the mind of the child] is assigned to the teacher. It is this task that makes the work of the teacher, especially in elementary schools, so largely a battle against nature. It could not well be anything else. One may seriously doubt whether there is anything innate in the child that will lend him to the increased effort that this implies."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1905, pp. 103 ff.

² *Op. cit.*, 1905, pp. 108, 189.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1905, p. 108.

The transition could not be effected and "secondary passive attention" fully and economically sustained, however, by the use merely of authority. Too much waste had in the past been incurred by this method. Hence child impulse must be requisitioned.

"There must be an adjustment, a compromise. Education consequently does not neglect the instincts, the primitive interests. On the contrary, it seizes them and turns them to its own ends."¹

In addition to "prodding," then, the teacher was to employ "pulling" by presenting

"... as an incentive to effort not only one remote end, but all sorts of intermediate ends, the approach and attainment of which shall keep the worker at his task until finally the daily discipline of toil becomes a matter of habit, and the remote end is constantly approached without undue struggle, and perhaps drops entirely out of consciousness. In the work of the schoolroom, the principle finds application in a multitude of devices."²

We find here in modified form the older emphasis upon graded "incentives" which appeal to "instinctive desire" as the means to "concentration upon things that are not in themselves attractive." The inconsistency of appealing to "will" or "active attention," involving essentially a "conflict with" and "inhibition of" present desire, and at the same time of making present desire the necessary means to "effort" is, according to this view, more apparent, however, than real. For, while the suppression of present desire for remote ends involved an inevitable "struggle between

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1907, p. 110.

² *Op. cit.*, 1907, pp. 142 ff.

the thing that one desires to attend to and the thing that one knows one should attend to,"

. . . "it should be remembered that active attention does not preclude the operation of instinct; in fact, probably all operation of active attention is dependent primarily though indirectly upon some instinctive desire. Instinct is the force that makes the *idea* of the remote end effective in controlling action along a given line."¹

"It [the idea of the remote end] simply postpones the satisfaction or gratification of an instinctive desire, using the desire as a means of stimulating effort toward its gratification."²

While there was thus an emphasis upon the positive use of child nature as a means of providing "effort" in study, through "hope of reward," "immunities," and other "instinctive forces," there was at the same time the assumption that the authoritative suppression of impulse through the discipline of the school was the necessary means of securing the "conditions" of "active attention."

"The conditions that are most favorable for the concentration of attention by the entire class must be established and preserved. . . . This requirement implies that each member of the class inhibit any impulse that may be inconsistent with these conditions; each member of the class must subordinate his own desires to the welfare of the class as a whole. This thesis is so simple and so closely parallel to the requirements that are demanded by all forms of civilized society that it is strange that one should think for a moment of denying the necessity of preserving discipline. . . . The first condition of effective discipline is respect for the authority of the teacher."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1907, p. 158. ² *Op. cit.*, 1907, p. 168. ³ *Op. cit.*, 1907, pp. 92 ff.

It appears that chief reliance was to be placed upon "arbitrary authority" in the development of "moral" habits during most of the elementary school period.

"From the standpoint of moral culture, the years eight to twelve are preëminently the time for developing specific moral habits — habits of cleanliness, industry, honesty, and obedience — with very little attempt at 'moral suasion,' but rather a chief dependence upon arbitrary authority."¹

In concluding this section it should be noted that while the main assumption of this general view seems to have been that the attainment of freedom of thought and action was by way of a strenuous period of authoritatively controlled conduct, the theory involved certain obvious advances beyond the earlier authoritarian view of moral control. The essential advance seems to have been in the larger practical regard for the moral implications of the child's impulsive life. While explicit reference to this factor was usually by way of its depreciation, nevertheless, there seems to have been some practical regard for it. In general the difference seems to have been in the demands of "active attention" as related to "instinctive desire." For while the older view, in its assumption of a separate will as the sole moral agent, expected the child to be able to "give attention" before attending to any particular object, idea, or act, the modified view would provide objects of attention. We find, therefore, a careful emphasis upon the employment of a variety of means of attention

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1905, p. 194.

that are closely associated with the active side of the child's life. For example, note the following:

"The dictum 'Keep pupils busy' finds a much more practical and dignified expression in what may be termed the 'doctrine of substitution.' This doctrine would prevent the expression of undesirable impulses by substituting some other form of activity rather than by requiring an absolute inhibition of all movement. Thus the introduction of manual training is justified, from one point of view, because of the fact that it provides objective work demanding an exercise of various muscles; the surplus energy finds outlet, and does not express itself in undesirable ways."¹

SUMMARY

Aside from the tendency to emphasize increasingly a larger number of factors in control, there persisted in modified form the avowedly authoritarian conception of moral and intellectual growth. Though at the opening of the present century the religious factor had almost disappeared from leading theoretical formulations, the latter retained many of the practical implications of the former. The changed status of authority was largely theoretical, therefore, and consisted mainly in the substitution of certain assumptions regarding the opposition of child nature to the demands of society for the traditional religious notions. While repeating the earlier dualism of the present and future — child interest and social welfare — the conception substituted "active attention," as a conscious state, for the forma-

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1907; see also Thorndike, E. L., *Principles of Teaching*, 1906, pp. 22 ff.; Keith, J. A. H., *Elementary Education*, pp. 124 ff.

tive notion of free will. Because of the demand for a leverage to get the child across from spontaneous or "passive" attention to effort or "active" attention and because of the great importance of the latter, it was necessary to employ authority or other incentives. Since moral growth was identified with self-denial or the conquest of impulse for the sake of permanent interests in remote ends, prolonged attention to uncongenial materials was an important source of character development.

As it was futile, however, not to utilize child nature in education, interest in immediate ends, social approval, rewards, and immunities were proposed as economical means of developing interest in remote ends. Of particular importance was the use of authority in providing the conditions of effort or "active" attention. While "arbitrary authority" was the chief reliance of the elementary-school period for the development of moral habits, the general theory involved an essential advance beyond the older authoritarian view in its larger practical regard for the moral implications of the child's impulsive life. While the traditional view involved the assumption that the child was able by act of will to exhibit attention before applying the power to external objects, the revised conception appears to have had greater regard for supplying the necessary objects of attention. Moreover, some emphasis was placed upon activities congenial to child nature as a substitute for the rigid

suppression of impulse and as an important means of securing the conditions of effort.

In general, the conception discussed in this chapter introduces the problem of harmonizing external direction and spontaneous activity. No solution is offered, however, and the earlier effort to utilize both factors without harmonizing them is perpetuated. The following are noted in particular :

1. The possibility of discovering within child nature and the demands of social life the proper criteria of authority in control
2. A diminished severity in the avowedly authoritarian conception of control, involving some practical regard for the active side of child life

PART FOUR

THE SCIENTIFIC MOVEMENT IN EDUCATION
IN RELATION TO CONTROL—
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PHASE

CHAPTER IX

CONTROL AS AFFECTED BY EARLIER CHILD-STUDY METHODS

THE changes in elementary-school control that took place during the last decade of the past century seem to have been only in part the direct results of the broader educational movements discussed in Part Three of this book. Contributing to these changes and to their spirit was the method of science, now beginning to be adapted to the study of certain aspects of human behavior. Already two phases of the study of childhood can be distinguished at the opening of the decade, each destined to exert influence in matters of control. These were, first, the earlier observational and descriptive methods inspired in part by the growing interest in biological evolution and "natural development," employed generally by teachers and other leaders, and, second, the controlled laboratory methods employed by a small group of serious students of psychology. Coming a decade later, was the "new child study," dominated still more by the spirit of Darwinism and also employing the method of experimentation.

It is the purpose of the present chapter to trace the reported bearings of these forms of child study upon

control in the elementary field. More specifically the chapter will include the following: (A) child-study methods as affected by the kindergarten and certain earlier notions of biological evolution; and (B) the bearings of the more scientific laboratory procedures of the experimental psychologists.

(A) CHILD-STUDY METHODS AS AFFECTED BY THE
KINDERGARTEN AND CERTAIN EARLIER NOTIONS
OF BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

To a limited degree practical recognition had been given to the fact that rigid external control and enforced silence did not insure effective learning.¹ But it was not till near the last decade of the century that the prevalent insistence upon intense order was opposed because of its actual interference with effective growth.² We also note a tendency to "study the troublesome child as a means of averting disorder."³ There was the growing feeling that, if the impulses of the child could be identified and if the outside influences could be catalogued, the teacher could adapt disciplinary measures to the needs of the individual.⁴ Such general attitudes seem to have arisen from the demands for improvement of practice and from a growing recognition of the active character of the child. But up to this

¹ School Committee Report, *Common School Journal*, Vol. 6, 1844, p. 217; Hoose, J. H., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1870, p. 147; Lathrop, D. A., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1870, pp. 52 ff.

² *Report*, United States Commissioner of Education, 1888, pp. 160 ff., 217-219. ³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

time there is no indication of a genuinely reconstructed conception of control on the basis of new knowledge of child nature. This was to be brought about, in part at least, by the child-study movement.

While this movement appears to have been in part an outgrowth of the general tendency, as already indicated, to study the nature of children in order more effectively to guide their growth with diminished need for authority or force, it received positive emphasis from the kindergarten philosophy of Froebel.

"Froebel's study of the child that he might learn its own processes of self-development, self-revelation, self-enrichment, mentally and morally, laid the foundation for the deep interest in child study now shown so universally by teachers. . . . The interest was undoubtedly aroused more rapidly by the establishment of kindergartens. . . . [The kindergartens] revealed the fact that the child may be educated for a time most effectively without books. This made teachers think as they never had done of the relative value of the child and knowledge and showed objectively the great importance of studying the child most carefully at all stages of its growth, so that it might be guided in its education in accordance with the laws of its natural development."¹

It seems, however, to have had its specific beginnings as an organized American movement in those conceptions of "natural development" which led to efforts to employ the genetic method of study in determining more exactly the origin, waxing, and waning of capacities and interests in children. These were supposed,

¹ Hughes, J. H., *Froebel's Educational Laws for All Teachers*, 1897, pp. 2-5.

according to the theory of "recapitulation" or the assumed analogy between the mental and physical development of the child and that of the race, to appear in a sequence which was of great educational and moral significance. To know the order of the appearance and disappearance of these traits was to know the dominant characteristics of children in their differentiated stages of development.¹ Because of their alleged bearing upon each other, and hence their assumed infallibility and the need for environmental conditions which would insure their uninterrupted expression, the cataloguing of individual traits was of permanent pedagogical significance. The conception of evolution on which the studies proceeded, namely, "that the best and not the worst will survive and prevail,"² demanded that the child be given an opportunity to live over, in his turn, the successive stages of the racial development if he was to attain to proper moral, physical, and social status in contemporary life. In thus reliving the life of the race, the traits characteristic of each successive stage of racial development would have an opportunity to manifest themselves and in so doing prepare for the next stage, until finally those traits demanded by present civilized life could in their turn flower quite "naturally." This process could take place only under conditions of unrestraint. Consequently, the kindergarten and other less formally

¹ Thorndike, E. L., *Educational Psychology*, Vol. 1, pp. 271 ff., 290 ff.

² Hall, G. S., *Adolescence*, 1904, Preface, p. xviii.

organized relations were to be widely used as the most "natural" setting in which observations and records of these evolutionary manifestations could be made.

This movement began in America with the studies made in 1879 by six Boston primary teachers under the inspiration and guidance of G. Stanley Hall.¹ A wave of studies followed, using mainly the method of simple observation and description. The studies were made principally between 1890 and 1900, the climax occurring about 1895 and a rapid decline taking place after 1900.²

While reported effects of the movement in general have peculiar bearing upon control, most of the attitudes expressed and generalizations reached indicate increased insistence upon phases of the problem which were already receiving some emphasis, particularly from the kindergarten.³ But the results of certain specific studies led to new conceptions with reference especially to details of procedure. While most of the reports reflect individual views and attitudes rather than depersonalized interpretations of exact results based on scientific analysis, their unanimity on essential points is indicative of definite though limited general

¹ See results published in *Princeton Review*, 1880; see also Hall, G. S., "Child Study as a Basis for Psychological Teaching," *Report*, United States Commissioner of Education, 1892-1893, pp. 357-384.

² Bolton, F. E., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1902, pp. 703-710; see also child-study bibliographies, *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1891 to 1905, Vol. 1-15.

³ Hanus, Paul, "Results of Child Study Applied to Education," *Transactions*, Illinois Child Study Society, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 30; see also Van Liew, C. C., *ibid.*; O'Shea, M. V., *ibid.*

effects. Putting the matter generally, child study resulted in an increased theoretical recognition of the demand that guidance be provided for the active, emotional, and æsthetic or appreciative phases and qualities of conduct. The results represented the beginnings of conscious efforts to guide growth by providing opportunity for a wide range of directed behavior harmonizing with child nature.

When the movement was at its height, but before its more far-reaching effects had been discriminated or felt, there was some effort to formulate for general application its available outcomes. In 1895, the executive committee of the Illinois State Teachers Association requested F. W. Parker to inquire of all prominent students of the movement regarding any "foregone conclusions," if there were any, that should be applied to education. The questions sent out were as follows:

"If we, as teachers, were to apply the already acquired results of child study, in teaching and treatment of children, what prevailing methods would be prohibited?

"What principles, methods, or devices, for teaching and treatment of pupils, not now in common use, should, in your opinion, be taken as fundamental and authoritative, and applied in school work?"

Analysis of the replies of the twenty outstanding leaders to whom the questions were addressed indicates a surprising unanimity of attitude on a few points, but considerable variation regarding others. The employment of class procedure involving physical activities as a means of avoiding "repression" and as "natural and neces-

sary phases of any psychical state of the child" was common to a number of the replies.¹ A second prevalent conclusion was that the school should give attention to individual differences and avoid the class or mass standard.² Another common point of emphasis was upon the need for sympathetic observation and treatment of children.³ The only other factor which received wide recognition at this time and which had considerable bearing upon control was the demand for abolition of "most current methods of punishment."⁴

In the same year we find, in a report on the "Training of Teachers" made to the National Education Association by a subcommittee of five of the Committee of Fifteen a recommendation as follows:

"To know the child is of paramount importance. How to know the child must be an important item of instruction to the teacher in training. . . . What are his likes and dislikes? How far is his moral nature developed, and what are its tendencies?"⁵

A number of later articles and reports dealt with achieved effects upon the attitudes and practices of teachers, as well as with findings that might be applied. First among results having a bearing upon the teacher-

¹ Dewey, John; Van Liew, C. C.; O'Shea, M. V.; see Parker, F. W., editor, "Results of Child Study Applied to Education, Letters from Eminent Scientists," *Transactions, Illinois Society for Child Study*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1895, pp. 5-52.

² Hall, G. S.; Baldwin, J. M., *ibid.*

³ Hall, G. S.; Hanus, Paul; Dewey, John; O'Shea, M. V., *ibid.*

⁴ Baldwin, J. M.; Barnes, Earl, *ibid.*

⁵ *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1895, pp. 236-253; see also *Educational Review*, Vol. 9, 1895, pp. 209-229.

pupil relationship, and hence upon control, was the new position given children. The number of personal or group inquiries regarding different aspects of child life had greatly increased.¹ At the time of taking account of results the focus of matters educational was upon the children themselves.² For the time, at least, children, their interests, and their traits, physical, active, emotional, moral, and æsthetic, were the objects of study. Though later interpretations of the techniques of study employed indicate the mechanical character of the treatment accorded pupils generally, it was uniformly believed that an atmosphere of increased sympathy between child life and the adult life of both teachers and parents had been created.³ The individuality of the child was being exalted. He was being considered apart from the average standard. In this connection it appears that separate mention should be made of the wide influence of Francis W. Parker. Because of his hostility to customary mass treatments and uniform standards, his positive emphasis upon studying the "individual child," and his great sympathy and deep understanding of child life, he appears to have

¹ Chrisman, Oscar, "The Results of Child Study," *Education*, Vol. 18, 1898, pp. 323-332.

² Allen, Mrs. J. G., "Results of Child Study," 1896, pp. 20-33.

³ Lowden, T. S., *Education*, Vol. 18, 1898, pp. 45, 112, 171; "Effects of Child Study," editorial, *Education*, Vol. 20, 1900, pp. 49 ff.; Parker, F. W., *President's Report*, Illinois Society for Child Study, 1898, pp. 62-65; Noss, T. B., "What Our Schools Owe to Child Study," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1902, pp. 716-719; Dewey, John, discussion, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1902, p. 719.

exerted more than a temporary influence in the new movement. As an outstanding exponent of the growing tendency to respect the personality of each child, he seems always to have been alert for conditions, both physical and social, that would promote the expression of individual powers. Further evidence of this emphasis is found in the titles of new magazines appearing at the time.¹ The child's peculiarities, his physical and emotional traits, his intellectual abilities, his likes and dislikes, and the similarities and variations between him and other members of his group were being noted first in so far as methods would allow.²

The influence of Herbart and his followers seems also to have had at least a theoretical bearing here.

"The work of Herbart and his followers stands as a protest against the mass treatment of children, merely in accordance with the standards set by a mythical average or type child. . . . This same work of the analysis of the child's thought circle upon entering school has been regularly and successfully carried on by Rein in his small first-year classes."³

A closely related claim was that the child's physical responses were more fully respected. Child study had shown the cruelty of long, fixed positions in seats, and

¹ See *The Individual Child and His Education; The Child.*

² Hall, G. S., "Results of Child Study," *Proceedings*, National Congress of Mothers, 1897, pp. 165-171; Chrisman, Oscar, *ibid.*; Whitney, A. S., *Education*, Vol. 16, 1896, pp. 466-473; Butler, N. M., discussion, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1895, pp. 347 ff.; Brown, E. E., *Transactions*, Illinois Society for Child Study, Vol. 1, 1894, pp. 73-76.

³ Van Liew, C. C., "The Child Study of Herbart," *Transactions*, Illinois Society for Child Study, Vol. 2, pp. 126-135.

certain other practices which prevented normal bodily functioning. It now condemned physical repression, external restraint, and capricious, arbitrary orderliness.¹ It had confirmed and increased the demand for the employment of overt action both as a factor of control and as a normal educative medium. And it was placing equal significance upon the moral possibilities of physical and intellectual activities.² As indicating the newer attitude in contrast with prevalent practices and as showing the emphasis upon the moral element in physical activity, the following is quoted:

"First, and foremost, child study has shown that the strongest potential capacity is the capacity for action. . . . It has shown the futility of trying to teach morality by word of mouth. Morality deals with action. If I might briefly define four-fifths of the morality now taught in our schools, I should say that this school morality consists in the eternal negation of action."³

It was urged that the subjects be made over in terms of the children's interests. The first requisite in moral education was to awaken and guide activities in which the child would participate with enjoyment.⁴ The

¹ Parker, F. W., *op. cit.*

² Thorndike, E. L., *Notes on Child Study*, 1901, pp. 125-133.

³ Halleck, R. P., "Some Contributions of Child Study to the Science of Education," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1898, pp. 354-362; see also Bolton, F. E., *op. cit.*; Dewey, John, *op. cit.*

⁴ Parker, F. W., *Transactions*, Illinois Society for Child Study, Vol. 3, 1898, p. 625; Dresslar, F. B., "The Contributions of Twenty-Five Years of Organized Child Study in America to Educational Theory and Practice as Applied to the Grammar Grades," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1907, pp. 910-914; Barnes, Earl, *Studies in Education*, Vol. 1, pp. 203-212.

pressure for more positive control through directed activities is indicated in the earlier reports. We quote the following:

"Discipline has been shown to be too severe, and usually restrictive rather than directive. . . . The added need is direction, advice, and something to study adapted to the various interests and stages of development of the different classes."¹

It was believed that a considerable working consensus had been reached relative to the employment of play in particular as a factor in moral control. On this point Thorndike in 1901 said:

"Another common-sense opinion which investigation has supported is that children cannot profitably lead a mere placid intellectual life. They must have emotional and physical activity of some sort, or they will become sneaky, pusillanimous, and full of petty vices, and, if they do not have healthy emotional excitement, they will find unhealthy excitement in illicit ways. Athletic games and social clubs are efficient agents in moral education, and for girls as well as for boys."²

It is of interest to note in this connection the tendency to employ play activities as means of inoculating, through present indulgence, against future "criminal

¹ Rowe, S. H., "The Highest Phase of Child Study," *Education*, Vol. 18, 1898, pp. 615-620.

NOTE: An interesting illumination of the problem with reference to the employment of activities and of the definition of pupil activity as something complete within the child, held at the time, as well as the general lack of a criterion of worth, is indicated in the following: "The difficulty is we don't know just what activities to utilize, nor do we know just what sorts of occupations will utilize the activities which the child possesses." Cf. Bolton, F. E., *op. cit.*

² Thorndike, E. L., *Notes on Child Study*, 1901, p. 133.

outbreaks." To prevent teasing and bullying in later life, for example, there was the notion, called the doctrine of cartharsis, that "exercise of these impulses in children's plays and games does not strengthen them, but on the contrary, drains off the energy in a natural and harmless way, in a sort of vaccination sense. If these impulses were not allowed free expression in natural forms of amusement, . . . then in their restraint this energy would remain as a poison to the whole system and later give rise to criminal outbreaks."¹ And the report of 1907, previously referred to, emphasizes particularly the various social relations of the school and the community life as means actually being employed to supplant the earlier narrow discipline of the teacher. The following indicates the growing attitude:

"School management and discipline have largely shifted their point of view from devising rules to prevent breaches of discipline, to earnest attempts to so condition the children while in school that all will realize that schools and teaching are devised for them and not for teachers. . . . The word *discipline* has largely given place to *management*, and even this word contains a growing content of coöperation. . . . School government has come to be more a matter of moral training and social coöperation."²

A most pronounced expression of these tendencies was in the form of various organizations for "self-government" or "self-control" and efforts to emphasize the element of play as a central organizing feature of

¹ Bush, F. L., "Teasing and Bullying," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 4, p. 370.

² Dresslar, F. B., *op. cit.*

school life. The bearings of these movements will be considered more in detail in a later section. Of the former we may cite such movements as those typified by the George Junior Republic, the Columbia Park Boys' Club, the School City, and many more of like nature.¹ Of the movements to make the play activities of greater importance in moral control the most outstanding instance was the experiment of Principal E. J. Johnson at Andover, Massachusetts.²

The movement confirmed the growing conviction that children had no sense of right and wrong to which appeal could be made in their control.³ The procedure which the movement emphasized was that of determining the child's standpoint and his basis of belief in the right or wrong of specific acts of conduct, in order that the teacher might know where to begin and how to proceed. More closely related to the question of right and wrong than to the emphasis upon recording children's interests were the conclusions relative to children's motives. Effort had been made to determine their inherent goodness or badness. Again the growing

¹ George, William, *The Junior Republic*, 1909; Dresslar, F. B., *op. cit.*; Blum, Julius, *Pupil Participation in School Government*, Columbia University Master's Thesis, 1909; see also Scott, Colin A., *Social Education*, 1908, pp. 58-77; Hull, William I., *The George Junior Republic*, publication of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 205, August 10, 1907.

² Dresslar, F. B., *op. cit.*; see also Lukens, T. H., in *Educational Review*, Vol. 13, pp. 105-120, especially pp. 108 ff., 118 ff.

³ Barnes, Earl, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1899, pp. 1051-1057; Monroe, W. S., *op. cit.*

conviction that they were not mainly evil was sustained; and it was pointed out that thoughtful teachers were beginning to look upon the "bad" child as one needing special study, particularly with reference to environmental and hereditary influences.¹ It was forcefully brought to the attention of teachers that disobedience or "wickedness" was often due to defective hearing, bad eyesight, poor digestion, or even to hunger, rather than to perversity.² Regarding the employment of punishments, the movement had shown that children regard pain largely from the standpoint of feeling rather than from that of the justice involved. It was found, moreover, that most of the current forms of punishment connected immediately with wrong feelings. It was concluded, therefore, that most punishments should be abolished and that great care should be exercised in the use of those forms only which could be found to lead immediately or ultimately to proper moral feelings.³

The movement made more explicit certain relations of the home and school in the effective guidance of pupils.⁴ With this factor, which had received much

¹ Chrisman, Oscar, *op. cit.*; Barnes, Earl, *op. cit.*; Parker, F. W., *op. cit.*

² Chrisman, Oscar, *op. cit.*; Thorndike, E. L., *op. cit.*

³ Chrisman, Oscar, *op. cit.*; Barnes, Earl, "Punishments as Seen by Children," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 3, 1895, pp. 235 ff.; Noss, T. B., "Effects of Child Study," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1902, pp. 717-719; Monroe, W. S., *op. cit.*

⁴ Parker, F. W., *op. cit.*; Hall, G. S., "Child Study in Its Relation to Education," *Forum*, 1900, Vol. 29, pp. 688-702.

emphasis through the influence of Froebel and the kindergarten, came greater interest on the part of teachers in the home life of their pupils and greater concern on the part of parents in the welfare of their children and the general good of the school.¹ In a study of "conflict of authority" for the purpose of determining the relative weights and duration of parental and teacher authority in conformity to school requirements involving a breach with home training, it was found that home stimuli were strongly operative, particularly among younger children, in determining loyalty.²

From such studies as the foregoing, generalizations were gradually being made relative to the variety of elements operative at all times in the control of the child's experience. In contrast both with the traditionally assumed prepotency of a hereditarily fixed moral predisposition toward perversity, on the one hand, and with the "nature is right" doctrine of the genetic psychologists, on the other hand, there was a growing recognition of the directive or formative influence, for good or ill, of the child's environment as a whole. About 1900 we find studies emphasizing this broader influence.³

¹ Allen, Mrs. J. G., *Child Study from the Mother's Standpoint*, 1896, pp. 20-33; Chrisman, Oscar, *op. cit.*; Whitney, A. S., in *Education*, Vol. 16, 1896, pp. 466-473.

² Mansfield, Edith, in *Child-Study Monthly*, Vol. 3, 1898, pp. 529, 539.

³ See Mead, G. A., "The Child and His Environment," *Transactions, Illinois Society for Child Study*, Vol. 3, 1898, pp. 1-11; see also Speer, H. L., "The Influence of the Environment on the Moral Life of the Child," *The Individual Child and His Education*, Vol. 1, 1903, pp. 138-142.

While these studies seem to have been made largely from the point of view of the sociologist's interest in societary organization among children, there can be discerned a definite psychological interest, perhaps the genesis of social psychology, in the bearing of "physical things" and the "conduct of human beings" in the formation of character.¹ The child's physical and social environments in contrast with any postulated powers of his own, regarded as self-sufficient, were now to be regarded as the subtle and changing, but nevertheless objective, factors with which "human engineering" or moral control was to be concerned. Since conduct was conceived as dependent upon environmental stimuli for the conditions of response as well as upon bodily conditions and prior habit or inclination, control was to become indirect — aiming to provide the stimuli to which socially desirable responses could be permanently connected. As the more pervasive bearing of environmental factors is to be discussed in a later section dealing with behaviorism and the social view of learning in relation to control, it will receive only passing attention here. Regarding the bearing of physical factors, Thorndike said:

"The mere presence of filth, shoddy manufactures, adulterated foods, carelessly kept buildings, etc. acts as a stimulus to uncleanness, dishonesty, and laziness in unformed minds. Pictures, books, and newspapers are the chief moral agencies among things."²

¹ Thorndike, E. L., *Notes on Child Study*, 1901, pp. 125-133.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 126 ff.

With reference to the moral bearing of the child's social environment, he said :

"In our conduct we are still more potently the creators of the moral natures of children."¹

And it must be here noted that closely related to the increased sensitiveness to the more pervasive and wider influence of environmental factors, particularly as emphasized in sociological studies, was the psychological emphasis upon "suggestion" as a factor of great significance in the moral control of children. Discussing the influence of suggestion considered as the rather broad range of human actions, beliefs, and requirements, Thorndike said :

"Suggestion is then an even more potent influence in childhood than in adult life. The common adages, 'Example is stronger than precept,' 'Evil communications corrupt good manners,' gain emphasis when applied to children. All their mental life is in part a product of suggestion. Their accent and gait, their taste in food or dress, their opinions and emotions, their interests and ideals are its plastic material. The arguments and precepts and lessons and rewards we consciously apply have as their constant help or hindrance the suggestions pouring in from books, teacher, playmates, home, in fact from everywhere."²

The following quotation on the importance of suggestion in matters of moral education is offered :

"Suggestion, as I have said before, is the introduction within us of a practical belief which is spontaneously realized; the moral act of suggestion may therefore be defined as the art of modifying an individual by persuading him that he is or may be other than he is.

¹ Thorndike, E. L., *Notes on Child Study*, 1901, pp. 126 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

This art is one of the most important appliances in education. . . . It has been justly said that the art of managing the young consists, before anything else, in assuming them to be as good as they wish themselves to be."¹

But in contrast with the reported effects of the movement and the general tenor of personal attitude were the pedagogic dictates of theoretical psychology which, with certain important exceptions to be noted in the next section, confirmed the older authoritative view of control as applied to most of the elementary-school period. The literature thus far examined indicates that on the basis of essentially the same psychological theory quite opposite pedagogical practices relative to control were advocated. The following exceptional view harmonizes with the general attitude reflected in the reported effects of the movement as a whole :

"That there is danger in making obedience in childhood the all-prominent means of saving grace, modern experimental studies upon the origins of a child's powers lend strong testimony. . . . All sense impressions need to issue immediately or finally into some form of appropriate activity. . . . The growing brain has not at six or seven developed such relationships between the various sensory areas that one impulse may be inhibited or controlled by another to a very great degree. . . . Self-control cannot be attained through the inhibition of impulses by fears implanted in childhood, for when fear is removed there is nothing to prevent the impulse which it restrained from having full sway. . . . Instead of trying to suppress action by commands, instead of trying to

¹ Guyau, *Education and Heredity*, quoted by Thorndike, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

secure instant and unquestioned obedience continually, the aim should rather be to arrange the environment of the child so as to grant him the largest possible measure of freedom.”¹

It was here assumed that self-control, in the sense of choice of response through inhibition, could come only later when the parts of the brain, the cells themselves, had built up certain cross connections by which it was possible to reflect and to balance motives and impulses. At about the period of adolescence the associations would “shoot together,” reflection of a higher order would begin, and self-control proper could be expected. But up to this time it was assumed that action must be more or less impulsive, following the promptings of deep-seated instincts, persistent interference with which was morally harmful. Children could not be expected to restrain undesirable activities before the mechanisms of inhibition had time to perfect themselves. Control was anticipatory, therefore, and was to be secured through providing approved forms of activity which would gradually replace “evil impulses.” The following indicates the attitude :

“Many interests must be developed which will compel a rich abundance of right action and which, consequently, will inhibit impulses of lesser force to evil conduct. . . . To elevate authority to the supreme place in the child’s life is not to breed respect for it, but to arouse antagonism toward it.”²

¹ O’Shea, M. V., “Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child,” *The Outlook*, Vol. 58, 1898, pp. 128–130.

² O’Shea, M. V., *ibid.*

It was further contended that obedience was not the prerequisite of self-control, but that the latter must be begun at the same time that obedience is expected.

"From the earliest age the child is struggling for self-direction, and if he is prevented from following this natural development, we have as a result either the helpless and dependent human being or the revolutionist with his hand turned against all law."¹

Moreover, in matters requiring conformity on the part of the child it was held as essential that his reflective judgment be utilized as far as possible. Previously the appeal to reason had consisted mainly in presenting a reason, usually that which embodied the adult standard, to the child. But aside from limited theoretical recognition of its necessity, it had not been considered desirable even to offer reasons for requirements. Obedience had been considered a moral good. But now it was urged that the child feel a reason of his own for performing acts of conformity. It was found that how the child ought to feel had nothing to do with the problem.

"To accomplish the best results in school discipline, it is essential that the child's reason be taken into consideration. However crude his reasoning may be, the best results cannot be attained if he is forced to obey regulations opposed to what he considers a just code of ethics."²

But of those whose pedagogical interpretations of psychology were less favorable to the child and his

¹ Barnes, Earl, in *Education*, Vol. 18, 1898, pp. 387-395.

² Monroe, W. S., "Child Study and School Discipline," *Educational Review*, Vol. 14, 1897, pp. 451-457.

interests during the elementary-school period, it is of importance to note that G. Stanley Hall, the most active and ardent exponent of child study, held views relative to pupil control that in many respects were diametrically opposed to the spirit of most of the reported effects of the movement. This interpretation of Hall's view is confirmed by Patty Smith Hill, who in conversation says, "With the possible exception of Hall, the exponents of child study were inclined to favor greater freedom for the child of elementary school age." The peculiarly appropriate harmony between Dr. Hall's interpretation of child development through certain assumed and sharply defined stages, regarded as a recapitulation of the cultural stages in the development of the race, and the customary assumptions regarding the characteristic functions of the successive divisions of the school is of great historic significance. It is a clear illustration of the influence of existing procedure in determining psychological theory.

Examination of this conception indicates that the nature of the child was interpreted quite largely in terms of the factors and stages of the educative process that were regarded generally, and especially by Dr. Hall, as essential to the proper working of the schools. During the elementary grades and in contrast with the kindergarten and high-school periods, the child's nature was most susceptible to the demands for drill and arbitrary conformity. The following quoted from his

later writings, when the achievements of the movement had become explicit to many leaders, is substantially the same as his conceptions at the inception of the child-study movement, more than twenty years previously. Of the period of child life from eight to twelve years, he said :

"Never again will there be such susceptibility to drill and discipline, such plasticity to habituation, or such ready adjustment to new conditions. It is the age of external, mechanical training. Reading, writing, . . . now have their golden hour. These necessities may be hard for the health, the body, sense, mind, as well as for morals, and pedagogic art consists in breaking the child into them betimes as intensively and as quickly as possible with minimal strain and with the least amount of explanation or coquetting for natural interest and in calling medicine confectionery. This is not teaching in its true sense so much as it is drill, inculcation, and regimentation. The method should be mechanical, repetitive, authoritative, dogmatic. The automatic powers are now at their very apex, and they can do and bear more than our degenerate pedagogy knows or dreams of . . . incessant insistence, incitement, and little reliance upon interest, reason or work done without the presence of the teacher."¹

It is of great present significance to note in the foregoing that Hall recognized the moral havoc which such

¹ Hall, G. S., *Adolescence*, 1904, Preface, Vol. 1, pp. v-xx; see also "Education of the Will," paper read before American Institute of Instruction, *Report*, 1882, pp. 256-271; also *Princeton Review*, Vol. 10, 1882, pp. 306-325; also "Moral Education and Will Training," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 2, 1892, pp. 72-89. The same article appears in modified form in *Youth, Its Education, Regimen, and Hygiene*, 1906, Ch. 12. The same point of view is expressed in another article "Moral and Religious Training of Children," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 1, 1891, pp. 196-210; as representing the same theoretical position, see the following much used text of the time: Halleck, R. P., *Education of the Central Nervous System*, 1896, pp. 226 ff.

arbitrary and autocratic methods might involve. But his educational philosophy, being based in part at least on a dualism of the present and future and of the child and his environment, kept him from giving full pedagogical recognition to the moral dangers imminent in such treatment. There was a great body of material, essentially uninteresting but of great future value, so it was assumed, which at some time must be acquired through drudgery. As the intermediate grades had been the time for such acquisitions, it was inevitable that it should be so now. Consequently, we find a psychological theory which fits the philosophical view. As further showing the harmony, if not a positive influence, of traditional procedure and the theory of distinct stages and differentiated traits, we quote the following :

"Hall has here made a distinction which teachers have for a long time almost unconsciously recognized in practice. The methods employed in what we term the intermediate grades are quite distinct from those employed in the primary and grammar grades. . . . It is also to be noted that traits are differentiated for intermediate and grammar grades. For these and other reasons, it would seem that the recognition of a distinctive and unique period between the ages of eight and twelve is justified, from the standpoint both of theory and of practice."¹

To others who used Hall's major conceptions as harmonizing with their own views, the pedagogical

¹ Bagley, W. C., "The Pedagogy of Morality and Religion as Related to the Periods of Development," *Religious Education*, Vol. 4, 1909-1910, pp. 91-106.

implication of children's rebellious dislike for the intermediate-grade monotony and tedium¹ was for the teacher "constantly to battle against nature."² It was to be a time for forming "specific moral habits of cleanliness, industry, honesty, and obedience, with very little attempt at moral suasion, but rather a chief dependence upon arbitrary authority."³

It is of considerable importance to note at this point the presence in these latter views of the influence of the experimental, introspective, and association psychologists, particularly that of Titchener, whose theories of control were dualistic in character, being based on the assumption of independent conscious stages requiring adherence to a postulated will in one guise or another, such as that explicit or implied in "active" attention.⁴

But it is of quite as great importance to note that certain ones of these psychologists from whom authoritative justification for these practical attitudes was

¹ See Kline, L. W., "Truancy as Related to the Migratory Instinct," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1898, Vol. 5, pp. 381-420; see also Bagley, W. C., *ibid.*; also *The Educative Process*, 1905, p. 192.

² Bagley, W. C., *ibid.*

³ Bagley, W. C., *ibid.*, p. 194; see also Hall, G. S., "The Ideal School," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1901, pp. 478-484.

NOTE: This view, in conflict with the increasing attitude toward milder methods of producing learning, is plainly shown in the author's statement following the preceding: "This statement may smack of barbarism and suggest an unwelcome return to the severe moral culture of the past. . . . If the child is to be treated by barbaric methods, it is because from an ethnic standpoint he has barbaric characteristics." Bagley, W. C., *ibid.*

⁴ Titchener, E. B., *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 134-157.

obtained had from the results of newer insight modified their earlier positions. To these developments and their bearings on pupil control we now turn.

(B) EARLIER LABORATORY STUDIES IN RELATION TO CONTROL

Special note should be made of the changes in theoretical attitude resulting from the more scientific work of the laboratory psychologists, from whom many of the American leaders in the child-study movement had derived much of their inspiration. After pursuing the "new psychology" for thirty years, in which much laboratory experimental observation was carried on and much information gained in the attempt to reach a consensus as to inner mental processes and relations, there was now (between 1890 and 1900) a dawning realization of unity and continuity among the previously assumed separate elements in consciousness. The confessions of Professor Wundt, the founder of the new "physiological psychology," by which he meant "psychology studied by the method of physiology," — that is, by experiment — are of importance as representing the first great step toward a still newer psychological interpretation of the basis of control. The following quoted by Professor James in this connection is of significance :

"And if I were asked in what for me the worth of experimental observation in psychology has consisted, and still consists, I should say that it has given me an entirely new idea of the nature and

connection of our inner processes. I learned in the achievements of the sense of sight to apprehend the fact of creative mental synthesis. . . . From my inquiry into the relations . . . I attained an insight into the close union of all those psychic functions usually separated by artificial abstractions and names, such as ideation, feeling, will; and I saw the indivisibility and inner homogeneity, in all its phases, of mental life . . . that the notion of distinct mental 'images' was one of those numerous self-deceptions which are no sooner stamped in a verbal term than they forthwith thrust non-existent fictions into the place of the reality. I learned to understand an 'idea' as a process no less melting and fleeting than an act of will or feeling, and I comprehended the older doctrine of association of 'ideas' to be no longer tenable."¹

On this confession James, who urged a still more unified conception of mental behavior, made the following interesting comment :

"As I interpret it, it amounts to a complete espousal of the vaguer conception of the stream of thought and a complete renunciation of the whole business, still so industrially carried on in textbooks, of chopping up the 'mind' into distinct units of composition or function, numbering these off, and labeling them by technical names."²

This view seems to have represented one important factor of the first stage in the attainment of the present organic view of control. There was, first, the notion of the intellectual, emotional, and volitional synthesis of psycho-physical behavior. Along with this change of conception was the growing emphasis upon the instinctive and habitual factors of conduct and a cor-

¹ *Philosophische Studien*, Vol. 10, pp. 121-124; see also James, William, *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 20-22.

² James, William, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 21.

responding decrease in the appeal to will as the source of drive. And with still other developments, particularly the spread of the conception of biological evolution, came the conception of the continuity of these with environmental energies, completing the cycle of unity. This wider interpretation will be considered in its place in a later section.

Thus the earlier Froebelian emphasis upon the active tendencies of children, with the subsequent general movement to catalogue these, on the one hand, and the developments in theoretical and experimental psychology, on the other hand, were making inevitable a more functional and behavioristic view of mind and the moral element in behavior and were at the same time establishing a basis for criticism of existing conceptions. The two phases of child study were converging to produce a conception of education involving a maximum of the element of behavior as opposed to preëxistent notions of learning as primarily cognitive or passive. On the general effects of the child-study movement, James said:

“One of the best fruits of the ‘child-study’ movement has been to reinstate all those activities (the practical, involving the use of ‘clay, wood, metals and the various kinds of tools’) to their proper place in a sound system of education.”¹

The notion of the active character of knowledge as embodying consequences in conduct is further indicated in the following:

¹ James, William, *Talks to Teachers*, 1899, pp. 147-149.

"Education is for behavior and habits are the stuff of which behavior consists."¹

This emphasis upon conduct as the factor of great importance in the guidance of learning was a step in the synthesis of "discipline" and growth. The usual assumption of "order" as a prerequisite to learning was being undermined, since activity was given scientific sanction as an aspect of growth. In concluding this section, account should be taken of the next stage in the development of the behavioristic conception. The view became explicit in psychological theory with the publication by Thorndike in 1898 of the results of numerous experiments in animal learning.² Referring to the pedagogical implications of his findings, he concluded that the child must be allowed "to do the thing — to do, to do, to do." The distinctly social phases of the theory will be considered in a later section.

SUMMARY

The movements, conceptions, and proposals reported in this chapter indicate the following developments in relation to the moral control of children in elementary schools :

1. A wide recognition, on the basis of data collected, of certain immoral bearings of physical repression, denial of bodily movement, arbitrary orderliness, punishment, and the like

¹ James, William, *Talks to Teachers*, 1899, pp. 147-149.

² Thorndike, E. L., "Animal Intelligence," *Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy and Psychology*, No. 4, Vol. 5, Ph.D. dissertation, 1898.

2. An increased sympathy for childhood
3. Some practical recognition of the demand that guidance be provided for the active and emotional, as well as the intellectual, phases of conduct
4. A theoretical emphasis upon overt action both as a factor in control and as a manifestation of normal mental development
5. An emphasis upon attention to individual differences and the avoidance of mass treatment
6. The demand that subjects be made over in terms of children's interests as a factor in moral control
7. Recognition of the importance of play and various forms of group activity as factors in control
8. A tendency to regard matters of right and wrong from the point of view of the child and in relation to specific acts rather than in relation to fixed standards
9. An extension of the theoretical emphasis upon the directive influence of diverse environmental factors and a negation of the assumed prepotency of fixed hereditary predisposition toward perversity or goodness

CHAPTER X

DISSATISFACTION, CRITICISM, AND BEHAVIORISM IN RELATION TO CONTROL

THE preceding chapter has indicated what appears to have been the initial stage in American pedagogical theory of an attitude toward morality based on the conception of continuity of personal and environmental energies. It was there shown that the combined influence of Froebelianism and the earlier manifestations of the scientific study of childhood was in the direction of greater attention to control as a function of individual and environmental factors. These were usually thought to be separate, however, and in some cases actually opposed to each other. As yet, therefore, the conception of unity was not widely explicit in educational discussion. And while recent movements, Froebelianism in particular, had placed much emphasis upon the educational use of the child's instinctive behavior, the theories were usually based on some form of the idea that these instincts must develop or unfold according to some adult symbolic pattern or toward some predetermined, fixed goal, to which present childish behavior must be subordinated. The result was that, when "harmonious development" was conceived

rigidly in accordance with its assumed symbolic implications, it became unduly suppressive. But when the emphasis fell, as seems to have been more generally the case, upon "spontaneity," "development," or "self-expression," without a corresponding regard for criteria of worth, the result was often the chaotic following of childish whim or caprice.

It should also be noted that previous conceptions of motive had been both the cause and the effect of existing conceptions of mind and subject matter as separate affairs. Since the mind was regarded as separate from the facts to be learned and as having its own laws of operation, it was inevitable that some external means of contact or stimulus to learning be induced. Consequently, either the theory of effort, the hard putting forth of mental energy without the presence of pleasure or satisfaction, or the use of interest conceived as pleasurable excitation externally evoked to compensate for the naturally disagreeable quality of a separate material had become thoroughly established in pedagogical thought and practice.

This situation, together with certain recognized limitations of Herbartianism, furnished a basis both for a criticism of existing attitudes and for a further impetus to the behavioristic conception, which, through theoretical exposition and the results of experimentation, was soon to receive wide attention. It may be said, therefore, that the transition from the earlier "wild experiments" to the "new child study" was accompanied

by the simultaneous observation of weaknesses and proposal of changes. In this chapter will be traced, accordingly, the general dissatisfactions, theoretical criticisms, and new proposals relative to control based on the beginnings of the behavioristic movement in psychology and the new child study.

(A) GENERAL DISSATISFACTION AND CRITICISM

Such titles as "Faculty Psychology and Calvinism," "The Dogma of Formal Discipline," and "Some Suggestions for a Philosophy of Education" are suggestive of the presence of discontent and a struggle, through pointing out theoretical defects in older attitudes, toward a newer, unifying conception in education.¹ Similarly, there existed already, even in the midst of the newer educational movements, certain evidences of dissatisfaction with the "new education." Just as in previous periods there were those who decried "loose schoolcraft," so there were now those who objected to too much "freedom" in education. As early as 1892 it was insisted that radical tendencies were gaining a "dangerous" hold upon educational practice.

"Here [in education] the socialistic factor in human progress is spreading out of safe bounds into the region of wild experimentation."²

¹ See Gilbert, C. B., in *Education*, Vol. 16, 1895, pp. 37-46; Hinsdale, B. A., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1894, pp. 625-635; Ellis, C. A., *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 5, 1897, pp. 159-201; see also *Educational Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 128-142.

² Monroe, J. P., "Some Dangerous Tendencies in Education," *Educational Review*, Vol. 3, 1892, p. 145.

The existing tendency, in large part the result of Froebelianism and child study, to follow the blind, impulsive tendencies of children in the name of freedom, self-expression, or "education through self-activity" was provoking controversial strife and possibly some reaction in favor of a more rigid adherence to customary, authoritative control. Similarly, the extreme emphasis upon the objectivity of ideas and their sufficiency, if only they were presented properly, as instruments in forming moral character, as well as certain notions about "centers of interest" in the same subject and "association" and "correlation" among studies as demanded by "recapitulation" in evolution, were being questioned.

At the same time there was a growing opposition in theoretical circles to the traditional notion of the volitional factor in behavior. A strong emphasis in theory, not yet widely accepted, was the demand for eliminating the "will" as a mystical entity possessing unique power as the motive force of moral conduct. The first stage of this emphasis, as we have seen, was the contentions of the Herbartians, who held that properly implanted systems of ideas generated the volitional power necessary for their own execution in conduct. At the same time, other serious students of psychology, Professor James in particular, were coming rapidly to the view that there was no special *ad hoc* will power in view of which sound principles of control could be urged. James in his classic doctrine of ideomotor

action was primarily concerned with showing that no such power as will existed.

"The psychologic agents in this drama [of prudential and moral life] may be described . . . as nothing but the 'ideas' themselves—ideas for the whole system of which what we call the 'soul' or 'character' or 'will' of the person is nothing but a collective name. . . . This is the so-called 'associationist' psychology, brought down to its radical expression; it is useless to ignore its power as a conception; psychologists trained on biological lines usually accept it as the last word of science on the subject."¹

While the Herbartians and Professor James seem to have been the early leaders of the opposition, it must be noted, however, that a substantial leadership in theory and an overwhelming portion of practice were as yet dominated quite entirely by the doctrine of formal discipline with its postulated will and other faculties. As evidence, E. E. White's *School Management*, in new and revised form, reappeared in 1894 to receive even wider adoption, apparently, than the edition of 1886. The report of the Committee of Ten, submitted as a basis for the reorganization of secondary education, was attacked in 1894 principally because its proposals were based more or less explicitly upon the doctrine of formal discipline.² Indeed, it appears that as late as 1900 will training through the authoritative determination of conduct was quite the commonly

¹ James, William, *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 177 ff.

² McKenzie, J. C., "Review of the Report of the Committee of Ten," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1894, pp. 143-160; McMurry, F. M., discussion, *ibid.*, pp. 160-165; see also Small, A. W., "Demands of Sociology upon Pedagogy," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1896, pp. 174-184.

accepted view, so great was the lag between practice and advanced theory. For we find evidence of much discussion in practical circles of "will" development through a hierarchy of "motives" in which authority has ultimate value. In reference to this situation we offer the following quotation :

"No sooner is the wand of authority mentioned in connection with children than parents and teachers begin to discuss the child's will and its development. According to the general consensus of opinion the will acts in those moments only in which reason and desire are in conflict ; and in that conflict will appreciates the arguments of reason. If the rational line of action is followed out, will is declared victorious ; it is strong. If irrational or foolish motives, that is, desires, prevail, the will is declared vanquished ; it is declared too weak for battle with the agents of evil."¹

In this setting of many-sided theoretical positions and practical attitudes, educational discussion attained conspicuous proportions and strained divergence. Dr. Schlee of Germany, after his return from a study of educational conditions in the United States, characterized the situation as follows :

"There have never been such animated discussions in the educational world in America as at present."²

Accordingly, we find sharp clashes on essential points of theory. The apparent incompatibility of motive conceived of as spontaneous interest with that involv-

¹ Young, Ella Flagg, "Ethics in the Schools," University of Chicago, *Contributions to Education*, No. 4, 1902, pp. 29-31.

² "Latest Movements in Education in the United States," *Report*, United States Commissioner of Education, 1896-97, Vol. 1, pp. 178-185.

ing effort or the external application of the "will" to school materials became the center of theoretical dispute around which revolved much thinking and many proposals concerning the moral control of children. It appears that these deeper assumptions were regarded as being so diametrically opposed that neither a general effort to harmonize them nor a disposition to seek within them any fundamental common fallacy was possible. There seems rather to have been the tendency to perpetuate the existing divergence.

(B) FURTHER CRITICISM AND NEW PROPOSALS

It was at this time that there appeared an inclusive criticism and unifying statement of the demands upon education created by these theoretical conflicts on the one hand and the growth of knowledge and change of life on the other hand. In 1896 there was what seems to have been the first effective attempt to offer both a statement from the standpoint of biological evolution and social change of the inherent weaknesses of prevalent theories and a constructive conception of control anticipating later developments in behavioristic and social psychology. It was in February of this year that Professor John Dewey, then of the University of Chicago, prepared for discussion before the National Herbart Society a paper entitled "Interest in Relation to Training the Will," in which existing theoretical positions were so critically examined in the light of the implications of new knowledge concerning biological

evolution and certain social conceptions that, from this distance, it seems safe to conclude that a transformed stream of theoretical outlook issued forth, destined to determine the direction and character of much of subsequent theory and practice. A careful analysis of this contribution and another prepared for the same society a year later, entitled "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," indicates that the center of his attack was upon the prevalent assumption of a dualistic relation of the child to his environment.

The currently opposed views of "interest" and "effort" involved a common assumption — that the child was by nature separate and complete in isolation from the things with which his proper moral and intellectual growth demanded connection.

"This identical assumption is the externality of the object or idea to be mastered, the end to be reached, the act to be performed, to the self. It is because the object or end is assumed to be outside self that it has to be *made* interesting, that it has to be surrounded with artificial stimuli and with fictitious inducements to attention. It is equally because the object lies outside the sphere of self that the sheer power of 'will,' the putting forth of effort without interest, has to be appealed to. The genuine principle of interest is the principle of the recognized identity of the fact or proposed line of action with the self; that it lies in the direction of the agent's own self-expression and is therefore imperiously demanded, if the agent is to be himself."¹

He thus showed that the old doctrine of effort and the Herbartian doctrine of interest were both based on the

¹ Dewey, John, "Interest in Relation to Training the Will," *Second Supplement to Year Book*, National Herbart Society, 1896, pp. 213-214.

false assumption that what is to be learned stands somehow mechanically apart from the learner.¹ Back of his positive statements concerning matters of such widespread dispute is discerned, therefore, the fundamental assumption of man's biological continuity with environmental energies. On this point he later said:

"The idea of evolution has made familiar the notion that mind cannot be regarded as an individual monopolistic possession."²

Interest, effort, volition, thought — all, according to this view, are but distinguishable manifestations or phases of personal and environmental energies in organic and functional interrelation. And though the conception may have had its origin in the author's philosophic interests, particularly the development of American pragmatism, his sense for fact seems to be quite confirmed by more recent biologic findings, as will be pointed out in a subsequent chapter.

In offering a new view of the nature of motive in contrast with the prevailing dualistic notions which regarded the child as completely isolated from environment and which, accordingly, placed upon hereditary factors the major burden of responsibility for conduct, Professor Dewey contended as follows regarding the relation of the individual and environmental factors:

"Interest marks the annihilation of the distance between subject and object; it is the instrument which effects their organic union."³

¹ Tompkins, Arnold, "Herbartian Philosophy," *Educational Review*, Vol. 16, 1898, pp. 233-243.

² "Psychology of Elementary School Curriculum," *Elementary School Record*, 1900, pp. 221-233.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

Approaching the existing situation from the point of view of the demand for more unified action on the part of the child as implied in the conception of continuity of personal and environmental energies, it was charged that the "effort" and "interest" theories operated practically toward moral and intellectual "disintegration."

"The great fallacy of the so-called effort theory is that it identifies the exercise and training of the will with certain external activities and certain external results. It is supposed that because the child is occupied at some outward task and because he succeeds in exhibiting the required product, that he is really putting forth will, and that definite intellectual and moral habits are in process of formation. . . . The question of moral training has not been touched until we know what the child has been internally concerned with, what the predominating direction of his attention, his feelings, his disposition has been while engaged upon the task. If the task has appealed to him merely as a task, it is as certain, psychologically, as the law of reaction and action physically that the child is simply engaged in acquiring the habit of divided attention."¹ .

"When things have to be made interesting, it is because interest itself is wanting. . . . There are two types of pleasure. One is the accompaniment of activity. It is found wherever there is self-expression. It is simply the internal realization of the outgoing energy. This sort of pleasure is always absorbed in the activity itself. It has no separate existence in consciousness. This is the type of pleasure found in legitimate interest. Its stimulus is found in the needs of the organism. The other sort of pleasure arises from contact. It marks receptivity. Its stimuli are external. We take interest; we get pleasure. The type of pleasure which arises from external stimulation is isolated. It exists by itself in consciousness as a pleasure, not as the pleasure of activity. . . . The result here is also a division of energies."²

¹ "Psychology of Elementary School Curriculum," *Elementary School Record*, 1900, pp. 214-215..

² *Ibid.*, pp. 216-217.

Positively, it was proposed that interest should be regarded as an active affair and not an attitude merely. It was to be considered as a quality of successful activity rather than something evoked to bring about activity, since the child, being alive, was in continuous interaction with his environment and, consequently, more or less active at all times. Three phases could be recognized in this behavioristic conception of interest, the active, objective, and emotional or appreciative. These appear in the following:

"Interest is first active, projective, or propulsive. We take interest. To be interested in any matter is to be actively concerned with it. The mere feeling regarding a subject may be static or inert, but interest is dynamic. Second, it is objective. We say a man has many interests to care for or look after. We talk about the range of a man's interests, his business interests, local interests, etc. We identify interests with concerns or affairs. Interest does not end simply in itself as bare feelings may, but always has some object, end, or aim to which it attaches itself. Third, interest is subjective; it signifies an internal realization, or feeling of worth. It has emotional, as well as its active and objective, sides. Wherever there is interest there is response in the way of feeling."¹

In opposition to the current view of interest as momentary pleasure, externally excited, Professor Dewey pointed out its intrinsic character as the pleasure or "satisfaction" of successfully pursued activity, whether dominantly appreciative, reflective, or overtly physical.

"The child is a self-expressive being. In this self-expression he subjectively finds satisfaction, and objectively achieves something."²

¹ "Psychology of Elementary School Curriculum," *Elementary School Record*, 1900, p. 218.

² *Ibid.*

In place of the usually assumed opposition between interest and effort, therefore, it was pointed out that each was simply a way of viewing a developing activity, the former measuring the intensity of the identification of the child with the thing under way, and the latter measuring the persistence and expended energies of the child during the course of the undertaking. But he was quite as explicit in his recognition of the limitations of the current notion of self-expression. He discerned the effects of a too limited notion of "self-activity" as a cooped-up affair presumed to take place as in a mental vacuum and not sufficiently recognizing the overt phases of behavior.

"Omitting qualitative considerations, can we even say that the school in principle attaches itself, at present, to the active constructive powers rather than to processes of absorption and learning, acquiring information? Does not our talk about self-activity largely render itself meaningless because the self-activity we have in mind is purely intellectual?"¹

He likewise saw the results of a too loose interpretation of "self-activity" as indulgence and intellectual stagnation rather than as normal moral growth. Harmonious development conceived as undirected spontaneity was vigorously opposed not only because it did not provide positive moral growth, but also because of its recognized immoral effects. The necessity for guidance is indicated in the following:

¹ "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," *Third Year Book*, National Herbart Society, 1897, p. 30.

"The more or less spontaneous acts of the child are not to be thought of as giving moral forms to which the efforts of the educator must conform — this would result simply in spoiling the child — but they are to be thought of as symptoms which require to be interpreted, as stimuli which require to be manifested in directed ways, as material which, in however transformed a shape, is the only constituent of future moral conduct and character."¹

He pointed out the futility both of the tendency of the "new education" to treat impulsive activity as an end in itself and of the customary method of appealing to some "motive" external to the child's expanding experience. The strategic and very difficult place of the teacher in avoiding these extremes is indicated in the following:

"The teacher is not there either to submit to the special mode of self-expression in a given instance as a finality, as the ultimate law of his own work, nor is he there to ignore, suppress, or arbitrarily deflect it. It is blindness to suppose that there is no alternative save either to surrender to this special mode of interest, to humor the child, devoting oneself to stimulating it and keeping it going till the child gets self-conscious of the pleasure involved and proceeds to make that his aim, or else to set up some foreign ideal, whether of future work and needs, or of success, or attainment of moral perfection, and demand of the child that he put forth effort toward these ideals irrespective of his sense of their values — his interest. The teacher is there to utilize any special mode of self-expression, to make it function, to make it an instrument in bringing the child to consciousness of new and further ends, and to redirect his activity, through the accomplished end as means to the new end."²

¹ "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," *Third Year Book*, National Herbart Society, 1897, p. 28.

² Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1896, p. 244.

Control in this view, from the standpoint of the teacher, was to become a matter of providing conditions for the purposive realization of projected ends. It was a matter neither of indulging the child's whims nor of appealing to some vague, mystical will, but, instead, was exactly the problem of providing conditions of successful personal achievement. This was quite the crux of the teaching function. The teacher's service was to be indirect.

"The teacher is there with his knowledge of the future and the remote, not to set up the future and the remote as ideals to be striven for, but through the wider and deeper knowledge to interpret the present, to see what it really and not simply superficially means, and to furnish the conditions under which the child may come to the same interpretation of himself and thereby pass on to new activities of new import. In a word, the teacher is there for indirect, not for direct, purposes — for the indirect service of furnishing the conditions which shall mediate present interest into future interests, not for the direct service either of amusing or of stirring up by immediate appeal the child's will power, so-called."¹

Criticizing, in the light of such suggestions as the foregoing, the limitations of the prevalent use of "external motives" in control as found in the general educational situation, Professor Dewey said :

"We preach to the teacher; we expect of the teacher that all instruction and discipline shall make for character. We then surround the teacher with conditions which absolutely necessitate that a very considerable part of instruction shall make simply for the accumulation of information. We deprive the teacher of the materials for securing to the child that active expression and construction which shall make for character. . . . We insist, as a

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1896, p. 244.

prime condition of morality, that the right act shall be done for its own sake, from the motive of intrinsic affection. We then carefully set up conditions which necessitate that the teacher shall, for the most part, appeal to the child on the side of future rewards or success, of present affection for the teacher, of dislike or bothering or trying her, of so-called wholesome dread or fear of her. Just because we refuse or neglect the positive materials and instruments of self-expression, and thus permitting and occasioning an activity in which the child shall be interested in and of itself, finding his motivation in his work, we make it an absolute necessity for the teacher to resort to all these factitious and external 'moral' stimuli—motives which theoretically we condemn as inconsistent with true morality.”¹

Further analysis of the two papers mentioned in the foregoing indicates that Herbartianism, just gaining a foothold in American education, was even more completely deprived of its theoretical cudgels than was Froebelianism. For while Froebelianism placed great emphasis upon the sympathetic employment of the child's instinctive urges, Herbartianism not only failed to give positive emphasis to them as educational forces but built itself around a conception of mind structure and morality which of necessity disregarded and even suppressed the impulsive life of the child. Approaching Herbartianism, then, from the standpoint of his conception of the continuity of the child and environmental energies, Professor Dewey was quite explicit regarding the weakness of its central doctrine. The following quotation, which is critically destructive of its underlying tenets, reveals at the same time the

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1896, p. 245.

genesis of ideas in experience and their nature as agencies in control as conceived from the point of view of behaviorism :

"I should have no interest in convicting the Herbartians of inconsistency did it not (like the Kantian self-contradiction) point to a truth of decided practical import. The weakness of both Herbartian psychology and pedagogy is its giving the idea a sort of external existence, a ready-made character, an existence and a content not dependent upon previous individual activity. . . . Both doctrines fail to recognize the genesis of ideas, the conceived ends, whether as to generality or definiteness, out of concrete spontaneous self-expression ; and equally fail to recognize their function as being the guides and directors of this native expression. Herbartianism seems to me essentially a school master's psychology, not the psychology of a child. It is the natural expression of a nature laying great emphasis upon authority and upon the formation of individual character in distinct and recognized subordination to the ethical demands made in war and in civil administration by that authority. It is not the psychology of a nation which professes to believe that every individual has within him the principle of authority, and that order means coördination, not subordination." ¹

Following this attack on Herbartianism, which appears to have been even more critical and disruptive of its essential doctrines than that concerning Froebelianism, there was some evidence of a reaction favoring child impulse.

"The Froebelian view is better, and this, back of the Herbartian pedagogy, makes the child a greater factor. The difference lies in the fact that we have, according to Froebel, a larger native force in the child than according to Herbart." ²

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

² McMurry, F. M., discussion, National Herbart Society, *Fourth Year Book*, 1898, p. 114.

Equally critical were the attitudes expressed relative to the assumed potency of direct moral instruction as represented in the moral education movement growing out of Herbartianism and the older notion of teaching morality through "precept." Control in this view was interpreted in terms of special materials, the impartation of particular ideas, called moral, which were expected to exert immediate influence upon conduct. The resulting tendency, discussed in a previous section, to provide special time and place in the curriculum for this work met with violent opposition in view of the contention that the procedure attempted to confine moral education to special provinces of life, to the working up of vague feelings, sentiments, "good will," and the like with little if any felt connection with the concrete situations of the children's own personal and coöperative experiences. The earlier manifestations of opposition were directed more specifically at the contentions of the Herbartians themselves.

"The Herbartians harp upon history and literature because they contain the rich moral and social culture, influences which they wish to see redeveloped in every child."¹

Then in referring to the results of applying the method to a large number of pupils, it was pointed out that :

"Pupils who have gathered note books full of lessons of fortitude, patience, self-reliance, sympathy, and the like do not recall any lesson in the course of study which has been of practical

¹ Stickney, Lucia, *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1896, pp. 414-418.

benefit. . . . It is said in a recent school journal that ‘the study of literature gives mainly exalted pictures but imperfectly connected in the pupil’s mind with the planning of his own everyday life.’’’¹

And still as late as 1907 we find the following :

“We are hearing a great deal to-day concerning the ethical value of good literature; but special studies have shown that children from eight to sixteen who have been supplied with the best literature of all times have not depicted in their own conduct the virtues depicted in their reading.”²

This extreme emphasis upon the “studies” in the child’s moral control was sharply criticized in a report of the Moseley expedition, London.

“It must be admitted that the American methods often have the disadvantage of substituting one authority for another — that of books for that of the teacher.”³

But later criticisms were based more avowedly on the newer psychology. The year 1910 seems to represent fairly well the beginnings of the rapid spread of the results of new knowledge of transfer and experimentation. We find a violent attack upon certain proposals for moral instruction made by the Committee on a System of Teaching Morals in the Public Schools appointed to report to the National Education Associa-

¹ Stickney, Lucia, *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1896, pp. 414–418.

² O’Shea, M. V., “Notes on Ethical Training,” *Educational Review*, Vol. 3, 1907, pp. 368–373.

³ Mark, H. Thistleton, “Moral Education in American Schools,” *Special Reports*, Educational Department, Great Britain, Vol. 10; see also Meyers, G. E., “Moral Training in the Public Schools,” *Pedagogical Seminary*, December, 1906, Vol. 13, pp. 444–460.

tion in 1911. An outcome of a London meeting of the International Committee on Moral Training had been the appointment of an American Auxiliary to the National Committee¹ "to report a feasible course for use in the public schools."² In its "tentative conclusions" the committee, while giving theoretical recognition to "influence of environment," "social life of the school," "school discipline and routine work of the school," "content and course of study," and "personality of the teacher," at the same time declared that:

"The influence of the environment and example are alike conditioned upon the establishment in the soul of the child of an ideal or standard of excellence toward which all objective influences must trend. . . ."

"The school is an agency of the state, and the sanction of the state may without criticism be used to enforce moral instruction."³

"The first lesson the child must learn is that of obedience."⁴

This report was criticized as being primarily a proposal that certain catalogued "virtues" based on the theory of formal discipline be carefully explained and taught directly without recognizing "that the particular situation in which a trait is to function determines its desirability and that it is not possible to develop it separate from that situation."⁵ In further criticism

¹ N. M. Butler and Clifford W. Barnes, President and Secretary, respectively.

² *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1911, p. 344.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁵ Coe, George A., discussion, *ibid.*

it was contended that such a listing and direct impartation of virtues did not "point directly to social ends approved as being of value."¹ The traditional and "formative" character of the proposed procedure was a distinct factor in the objections.

"They are constructed on an inverted plan. First come definitions or explanations of virtue, then illustrations, and finally applications. . . . What is this if not precisely the teaching about virtues that has brought formal moral instruction into disrepute? . . . Obedience is a second-grade subject only, though the hardest struggle to obey comes later on; truthfulness and honesty appear in the second and fifth grades only."²

It should now be noted that, all along, the critical attitudes toward such proposals as the foregoing and toward existing practices and conceptions in general included references to their social limitations. Even in the specific, critical, psychological analyses of the more personal phases of experience, such as motive, interest, and "self-activity," as well as the source of ideas, there was constant reference to the demand for fuller recognition of environmental influences. The purely personal or individualistic notion of behavior, particularly as expressed in the Herbartian theory of learning, was attacked at every point as an utterly inadequate view of the facts of experience. And though the present discussion has been concerned with a statement of those criticisms and proposals that were mainly psychological, it has been found that they would not frequently

¹ Coe, George A., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1911, pp. 382-384.

² Coe, George A., *ibid.*

limit themselves to personal or intellectual considerations in isolation from environmental influences.

It appears, then, that the unifying principle implicit in the behavioristic view of life could become articulate only through its exemplification in environmental terms. Since, in the traditional conceptions of control, certain hereditary or other postulated factors had been required to assume the burden of causation in conduct, there was little need for giving attention to external influences other than the more direct means employed by the teacher or parent in the suppression or redirection of conduct. But the growing recognition of environmental complicity in the determination of character required an extension of the conception of learning to include a wider range of connections. Behaviorism, therefore, was to have its chief pedagogical manifestation in a view of conduct which combined personal and environmental phenomena in a continuous process. Its implications were explicit with reference both to the social character of learning and to control as a function of procedure which fully provided for such social growth. The attempts to reorganize the school in the light of the demands of democracy and finally to adopt in its instructional procedure conceptions that were in harmony with the behavioristic theory of knowledge will be considered in a subsequent chapter. There a more complete statement of attitudes critical of existing individualistic practices will be offered in relation to the social interpretation of behavior and instructional reorganization.

SUMMARY

The expressions of dissatisfaction, the criticisms, and the theoretical proposals reported in this chapter indicate the following developments in relation to the moral control of children in the elementary school :

1. A growing dissatisfaction with the moral results of education based on existing attitudes toward freedom, motive, interest, effort, and the like
2. Recognition of radical theoretical defects with reference to Herbartianism, Froebelianism, and the doctrine of formal discipline
3. An increased respect for children's activities as a reaction to the extreme Herbartian emphasis upon ideas as the sole instruments of moral control
4. An effort, on the basis of conceptions from biology, psychology, and social theory, to establish theoretical unity in the child's educational and moral development
5. An undermining of the usual assumption of "order" as a prerequisite to learning in view of the theoretical identity of learning and behavior and the continuity of personal and environmental energies
6. The attainment of theoretical synthesis of interest, effort, and motive
7. Recognition of immoral and disintegrating effects of external appeals in control
8. Recognition of theoretical weaknesses and immoral bearings of current notions of self-expression, "self-activity," and unguided spontaneity
9. Emphasis on the importance of the teacher in the guidance of children's activities
10. Recognition of the "formative" implications of the moral training movement

PART FIVE

**THE SCIENTIFIC MOVEMENT IN EDUCATION
IN RELATION TO CONTROL—
THE SOCIAL PHASE**

CHAPTER XI

TRANSITIONAL ATTEMPTS TO EFFECT SOCIAL CONTROL IN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

It is not apparent from this study that the first efforts to effect a social reorganization of the elementary school were as closely related to the movements involved in Froebelianism, Herbartianism, and the related moral education movement, or even to the more critical attitudes toward these movements expressed or implied in the beginnings of behaviorism, as they were to the increasing social pressure felt by the school for civic efficiency. Attempts, principally during the first decade of the present century, to reorganize the school on a social basis had at least other sources not involving explicit articulation of the essential features of these particular movements and attitudes. It is clear from the data, however, that the movement for social reorganization came increasingly to embody the effects of these newer movements and criticisms. Both the theoretical and practical attitudes toward elementary-school control as related to the more recent social emphasis in education seem, therefore, to include two rather distinct but overlapping stages as follows: (a) transitional attempts to effect a social control based on dualistic conceptions of moral and intellectual

development and the allied antithesis between personal and social interests; (b) critical attitudes and efforts to formulate and effect in practice an organic view of control based on a philosophy which attempted to articulate social theory with certain newer conceptions in social psychology. Our present concern is with the first of these stages.

As expressions of the effects of social change and the demand for morally effective citizenship and before there was any consistent practical point of view relative to the nature of social control as applied to social organization, we note at least three interrelated phases of education growing in importance at the opening of the new century and having peculiar connection with control. These were the studies of the influence of environmental factors upon children's conduct, the related social and psychological interest in the more or less "spontaneous" or "imitative" tendencies to social organization among children, and the effects of the demand for more efficient civic participation as expressed in the spread of the political and social sciences. It was out of these developments, apparently, that there sprang a variety of proposals and transitory modifications of practice, such as pupil participation in school government, efforts to use social pressure or public opinion as a central factor in securing conformity, and increased emphasis upon "the activities of school life" as the principal means of moral growth. In this chapter, therefore, we shall give specific consideration to the

following: (A) pupil participation in school government; (B) "social pressure" as a factor in control; (C) "social atmosphere" and "activities of school life" in control; and (D) the bearings of "self-organized group work" upon control.

(A) PUPIL PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL GOVERNMENT

Emerging from the newer theoretical interests just mentioned were the beginnings of conscious effort to reorganize the institutional life of the school with reference particularly to the demands for better control. It appears that previously there had been little or no general effort to guide the spontaneous social relations of children in the elementary school. The dominant practice was teacher-control. And as the first efforts were in response to the demands for training in the mechanics of governmental participation, due to the persistence of the idea of democracy as a political organization merely, we find crude attempts to guide children's social relations in the interest, primarily, of governmental participation. Hence the participation was confined to those tendencies which related especially to good order and discipline. The limited scope of this initial application of social principles was inevitable in view of the prevalent historic notion that practice designed to promote civic and moral character should grow out of the discipline of the school and should not interfere with the teaching of particular subjects. The earlier notion of the school as a social organism centered,

therefore, about an elaborate system of machinery for external discipline and regulation. There was the belief that social reorganization required that the discipline of the school be reconstituted through the adoption in rather exact form of typical features of national or local society organization. The following descriptive statement of the nature of the School City is indicative of the assumption :

"The School City is an organization of the pupils of a school into the city form of government. The pupils are citizens. The three divisions of popular government, legislative, executive, and judicial, are established. The pupils elect from among their number a mayor, judge, city clerk, city council, etc. Each room in the school bears a relation to the entire School City like that of a ward to a city, electing ordinarily two members of the School City council and being apportioned its quota of police, health officers, etc. Elections are held at least four times a year. Responsibility for the good order and discipline of the school rests upon the pupils themselves as citizens of the School City and upon the officers in their various capacities. The teachers or principal give advice and guidance and supervise this pupil self-government, and it thus becomes a method of moral and civic training."¹

That the conception was thus limited in application to a disciplinary appendage to the otherwise regularly constituted school régime is shown in part by the apparent ease and rapidity of its adoption.

"In hundreds of cases, many of which have come within my own notice, teachers and school officers eagerly adopted the idea without any serious study or investigation on their own part."²

¹ *The School City*, The National School City League, 1911, p. 4.

² French, C. W., "The School City," read before the eighteenth Educational Conference of Academies and High Schools in Relation

There was not merely a lack of any very marked change of conception or practice with reference to the more fundamental learning and teaching functions, but there was a positive tendency to espouse the new idea precisely because it involved no such change.

"With an organization of self-government in the school the academic work is not altered save in so far as the teacher's disciplinary tasks are lightened, thereby making more effectual the teaching work. . . . Pupil self-government has but little to do with the curriculum of study. It is concerned rather with the relations of the children toward one another and toward the school authorities."¹

Such accentuation of school discipline was considered necessary, as it was supposed, in order "to give children a chance to learn by actual practice the legitimate operations of the democracy of which they would one day be citizens." The implicit faith in pupil government as the panacea for the existing social ills is revealed in the following:

"This we know, that in the main our people are lacking in a true conception of the benefits of democracy; and this we believe, that by permitting the pupils in the school to share in its government, they will become habituated to democratic living."²

Further analysis of the conception also reveals a large measure of faith in the transfer effects of practice which with the University of Chicago, Department of History and Political Science, 1904; see *School Review*, 1905, Vol. 9, p. 33-41.

¹ *Some Suggestions regarding the Organization and Conduct of a Plan of Pupil Coöperation in School Management*, Self-Government Committee, New York, pp. 8-11.

² Welling, Richard, "Pupil Self-Government as a Training for Citizenship," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1911, pp. 1005 ff.

is limited to situations inherent in the existing school organization and only remotely resembling the imitated political machinery.

"We . . . believe it to be an efficient method of giving the pupils a habit of mind that will consider the public business as a matter of the private citizen's interest."¹

The supposed efficacy of such practices was thus also in harmony with the emphasis which the psychology of the time placed upon the imitative and gregarious traits of children.² With the wholesale adoption of many forms of adult political machinery, it was confidently believed that the whole educational system was to be reconstructed on the single basis of the judicial direction of these traits.³ Nevertheless, the control of relations was to be avowedly restrictive or coercive and conducted mainly in the interests of conditions conducive to learning conceived as individualistic acquisition. In their more successful forms, such as the George Junior Republic, the Gill System or School City, the School State, the Commission Plan, and the Student Council, the schemes were in reality based on the external authority of the teacher or school head, who reserved final jurisdiction in practically all matters.

¹ Welling, Richard, "Pupil Self-Government as a Training for Citizenship," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1911, pp. 1005 ff.

² See especially Royce, J., "Social Aspects of the Higher Forms of Docility," *Outlines of Psychology*, Ch. 12.

³ Hall, G. S., "Social Phases of Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 18, pp. 613-621.

This is a stated principle of the introduction of the School City.

"Let the pupils feel that the authority to make rules, to administer punishments, and at any time to take up the absolute government, when Pupil Government fails, is still the right of the teacher, just as the military power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation should step in when civil government, resisted or defied, leads to anarchy."¹

Though in some instances, as in the George Junior Republic, it was school policy "to advise sparingly and to command only when necessity requires," authority was always present.

"In so far as the coercive aspects of life in the George Junior Republic are concerned, it is an illusion to suppose that it has evolved either a government of the people or by them. All the machinery of force which characterizes the school, down to the guns (unloaded, I hope) which the guards carry—as shown in photographs—is superfluous and unnecessary. A good deal of it is, of course, a play which is educative in a certain sense; that is, the children get a dramatized presentation, in which they are themselves the actors, of the way in which governments are run. A play, however, necessarily leaves out that particular factor which makes the interest real. It is Mr. George, and the authority vested in him by the adult state, that is the real force back of all the children's laws."²

As these various attempts to reorganize the school socially were in reality only variants of the usual monar-

¹ Ray, John T., *Suggestions for the Practical Introduction of Pupil Government, Plan for Pupil Coöperation in Government of Schools*, no date.

² Scott, Colin A., *Social Education*, 1908, p. 66; see also Hull, William L., "The George Junior Republic," *Publication No. 205, American Academy of Political and Social Science*, August 10, 1907.

chical systems of control, the character of self-control which they tended to develop was largely that of self-restraint. Even in the most generous schemes of participation, the activities of the children were to be controlled in the most rigid sense of the word. There was as yet no general idea of the demand for the positive guidance of children's relations as the most effective social function of the school, to which all intellectual requirements were essentially subordinate. Consequently the plans were often regarded frankly as "safety valves" for insuring the conventional mode of teaching procedure. The obvious authoritative, restrictive character of the schemes; their evident time-consuming character; their detached, imposed connection with the more intimate instructional function of the school; the criticism that they assumed adult qualities impossible in children, that "a teacher is wanting at the moment of opportunity," that they encouraged "play at the most serious business that engages citizenship," that they granted authority but could not locate responsibility, that they caused pupils to underestimate "criminality or the crime of lawbreaking, in view of light penalties"—these were some of the factors which contributed to their speedy decline. Their sudden arrest, like their rapid spread, indicated their external and mechanical position and their lack of unity with the undercurrent of educational and social change. They represented an outward annexation, just as the various

new subjects previously introduced have since been regarded.

Because of the ephemeral and temporary, though sincere, character of these early efforts at readjustment, most of them may be regarded as transitional rather than as strategic or of permanent significance. And because they exaggerated the function of discipline as a factor separate from learning, it appears that the cause of progress toward a unified conception of educational procedure may have been weakened in certain respects. The following, found in a statement of reasons for the failure of the self-government schemes, indicates that such was held as a possibility:

"I believe we have often weakened the cause of education by believing that discipline is an important issue."¹

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these efforts were entirely negative in their contribution. They represented a step away from the usual monarchical system of imposed requirements in the spirit of coöperation which they often created and in that the machinery of organization was in a sense between the pupils and the teacher.² The mechanism of control was more obvious to the child than the command of a teacher ruling directly. That the procedure

¹ Thompson, W. O., "Self-Government by Students in Schools and Colleges," *Social Education Quarterly*, Vol. 1, 1907, pp. 41-53.

² See Cronson, Bernard, *Pupil Self-Government; Its Theory and Practice*, 1907, p. 157; Simpson, Adeline, *Principal's Report*, Public School No. 110, New York; see King, Irving, *Social Aspects of Education*, 1912, p. 305.

was at least the preliminary outworking of a changing attitude toward the whole educative process is indicated by the views of some of its most serious exponents. In offering reasons for its sudden failure and in referring to its possibilities, it was contended that it was

"not a ready-made device for governing a school. It is, instead, an educational process, a conception, which involves both the intellectual and the ethical, and makes possible the realization of that philosophical doctrine enunciated by Dr. Dewey: 'Education is life.'"¹

But that the plans failed generally is perhaps sufficient evidence that the social reorganization of the school was not to be attained in a technique for facile discipline merely.

(B) "SOCIAL PRESSURE" AS A FACTOR IN CONTROL

One important phase of the change of attitude toward control, shown in the hundreds of efforts to employ self-government, was the extreme emphasis upon social pressure or public opinion as the central factor in control. Though this was apparently the logical outgrowth of the various plans for shifting discipline to the pupils themselves, particularly in the effort to maintain self-government without the cumbersome machinery usually employed, the idea was more exactly the result of an exaggerated emphasis upon certain theoretical conceptions derived from the beginnings of social and political science. It was a partial educational correlate

¹ French, C. W., *op. cit.*

of the assumed opposition between personal and social interests now receiving renewed substantiation in interpretations of the results of studies of "primary groups" made by students of sociology as a phase of the growing interest in social organization. From such studies essential societary organization was coming to be regarded as a much more pervasive affair and as having much deeper implications for school reorganization than were implied in the mere "policing" or self-government schemes.¹ Thus, with the advance of the social sciences, a variety of factors approached more explicit emphasis in the conception of control. We are here concerned, however, with the attitudes toward social pressure as the force to be utilized by the teacher in the direction of "spontaneous" social activity.

The efforts of students to formulate the educational equivalents of social organization had begun just before the present century in repeated statements of "The Demands of Sociology upon Pedagogy."² Central

¹ See especially Johnson, John, "Rudimentary Society among Boys," *Studies in History and Political Science*, Johns Hopkins University, second series, No. 11.

² See Small, A. W., *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1896, pp. 174-184; Barnes, Earl, "The Pupil as a Social Factor," *ibid.*, pp. 184-189; Hinsdale, B. A., "Some Social Factors in Rural Education in the United States," *ibid.*, pp. 261-269; DeGarmo, Charles, "Social Aspects of Moral Education," National Herbart Society, *Third Year Book*, 1897, pp. 35-57; Millspaugh, J. F., "Sociology's Demands upon the Schools," *Proceedings*, N. E. A., 1898, pp. 267-271; Howorth, I. W., "The Social Aim in Education," National Herbart Society, *Fifth Year Book*, 1899, pp. 69-108; Hall, G. S., "Some Social Aspects of Education," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 9, 1902, pp. 81-91. See also *Educational Review*, 1902,

among these earlier formulations, based essentially on political theory, was the demand for attention to the implications of the concept of antithesis between personal and social interests.¹ As indicating the earlier theoretical shift of emphasis to the social life of the school in the continued use of coercive and restrictive control, in which the individual was opposed to the group rather than to the teacher, the following is quoted :

“In the matter of punishments for school offenses the personality of the teacher should remain in the background and the social nature of the school should come to the front. The idea should not be tolerated for a moment that offenses are committed against the teacher; they are not personal but social; they are against the good order and efficiency of the school itself. Every child should see clearly and feel keenly the truth of the social relations. . . . The objection to corporal punishment lies mainly in the fact that it is for the most part non-social in character.”²

At the same time that public pressure for a new kind of control was becoming insistent there was also a beginning of reliance upon the same force in the child's moral control. At a time when public opinion was arousing educators to the need for more effective con-

Vol. 23, pp. 433-445; Monroe, J. P., “Influence of Growing Perception of Human Interrelationship on Education,” *Proceedings, American Sociological Society*, Vol. 3, p. 47; Jenks, Jeremiah, “Social Basis of Education,” *Educational Review*, Vol. 30, 1905, pp. 442-463.

¹ See especially Kidd, Benjamin, *Social Evolution*, 1894, p. 85; Howerth, I. W., *op. cit.*; DeGarmo, Charles, *op. cit.*

² DeGarmo, Charles, *op. cit.*, pp. 52 ff.; see also Patten, “Economics for the Public Schools, *Annals, American Academy of Social and Political Science*, January, 1895.

trol, the educators were themselves resorting to public opinion in the control of children.

"It is social pressure in and out of school that is the main reliance for regularity, punctuality, and order."¹

The idea seems not to have become explicit in practical formulations, however, till a more general demand was made for an adequate theoretical basis for the various plans for self-government. It was here that the results of the study of "rudimentary social organization" among children were employed.

"Our study of 'primary groups' and particularly of the social life of the school furnishes the point of view from which to understand the nature and value of pupil self-government or pupil coöperation in government."²

Central among these later formulations, therefore, was the demand that the school supervise the "spontaneous" social tendencies of children "that they might not interfere with the regular and proper work of education." Since the class group or the school as a whole was now regarded as an aggregate which, if not organized by the teacher, would organize itself, consciously or otherwise, and bring disturbance and opposition to the effective realization of the teacher's aims, it was imperative that the force be directed in the interest of the necessary conditions of acquisition.

¹ DeGarmo, Charles, annotation, Herbart's *Outline of Psychology*, 1901, pp. 37 ff.; see also Kandel, I. L. (editor), *Twenty-Five Years of American Education*, p. 33.

² King, Irving, *Social Aspects of Education*, 1912, p. 304.

"The first reaction of the teacher to this budding social spirit is often a feeling that it should be suppressed because of interfering with the legitimate work of the school. As soon, however, as it is seen to be inevitable, the thought comes that it should at least be controlled, so as to produce a minimum of distractions or, perhaps, that it may furnish a safety valve for the bubbling spirits of youth."¹

That this "spontaneous" group action and control was regarded as a negative affair, requiring authoritative conformity on the part of its anti-social members, is in part indicated in the following:

"All social groups exercise quite naturally and necessarily a definite control over the individuals within them, and they possess in some form or other what may be called an instinct or possibly an ideal of lawfulness. Without some authority over the individual and without some capacity to harmonize diverse interests, the group would soon cease to exist."²

The problem, then, of effecting the social control of individuals who were regarded as hostile to such control was to be solved through resorting to the pervasive and powerful force of "public opinion." The machinery of the self-government devices was only an incidental medium for the efficacious operation of this superforce.

Thus, out of the historic notion that the individual should subordinate his interests to those of the group grew the extreme view that moral discipline should be provided through the control effected by organized public opinion in group life. The potency of social

¹ King, Irving, *op. cit.*, p. 262; see also Scott, Colin A., *Social Education*, 1908, p. 94.

² King, Irving, *ibid.*, p. 304.

pressure as a means of producing conformity among adults was now proposed for school use.

"Public sentiment may become as potent a factor for moral uplift among children as among adults. Almost unlimited possibilities for good lie in this comparatively neglected field in school discipline."¹

The closer relations between parents and teachers brought about by movements already mentioned made possible the employment of concerted attitudes on the part of the community or organizations thereof, such as parents' associations, for purposes of control. Hence certain theoretical attitudes and practical developments appear to have been mutually helpful in leading to the emphasis upon control through public opinion in regular class groups. There was the idea that the teacher, after effecting proper organization, should recede to the background and that the force of public opinion in the group should become the source of authoritative control. The forces of approval and disapproval, heretofore the most prevalent and potent controls used by the teacher and only implicitly by the group, were, according to this notion, henceforth to be exercised altogether by the group under the teacher's conscious direction. The implicit faith in the moral self-sufficiency of group opinion and in its practical efficacy in extreme situations is illustrated in the following :

¹ Reeder, R. R., *How Two Hundred Children Live and Learn*, Ch. 7, cited by King, Irving, *Social Aspects of Education*, 1912, p. 405.

"In its higher forms, group control becomes a great character-forming agency. In the school the power of public opinion to restrain the individual from wrongdoing and to punish him in case he has offended is much greater and more effective than that possessed by any teacher or superintendent."¹

(C) "SOCIAL ATMOSPHERE" AND "ACTIVITIES OF SCHOOL LIFE" IN CONTROL

The large place given to "public opinion" in control was only one manifestation of the growing awareness of the influence of environmental factors in character formation. A related expression of this formative influence of society upon individuals was in the increased emphasis upon the "social atmosphere" of the school as an important factor in the child's moral growth. In the earlier view of this factor, the elements of which had not become clearly disengaged, it was regarded as static and isolated.² Like the conception of public opinion in its earlier usage, the term designated a vague force rather than dynamic social energies having continuity and objectivity in the specific corporate activities of the school.³ Its supposed fixedness and finality in determining moral conduct conceived as a repertoire of habits of conformity to the social will is indicated in the following :

"Every institution has its moral atmosphere and tone. Strong personalities establish the standards and cut the patterns which

¹ King, Irving, *Social Aspects of Education*, 1912, p. 305.

² Mead, G. H., "The Child and His Environment," *Transactions, Illinois Society for Child Study*, Vol. 3, 1898, pp. 1-11.

³ Griggs, E. H., *Moral Education*, Ch. 12, especially p. 114.

persist year after year by imitation and repetition. The children come and go, but the institution with its traditions, its moral standards, its rules and regulations, chiseled as it were in adamant, remains. Its molds and dies give shape to all who pass through. Moral training with children is more a matter of atmosphere and standard, of example and imitation, than of formal instruction.”¹

The supposed efficacy of these less tangible but more personal and direct modes of control had, however, a theoretical basis. They, like the self-government schemes in which a prominent force was supposed to be the instinctive desire of children to copy or imitate the activities of adults, were also based on the psychology of imitation. Whereas the “instinct” operated in the self-government plans to cause the child to imitate quite freely the activities of others, it operated even more directly in the workings of “social atmosphere,” “public opinion,” and the like. Just as there was supposed to be a direct relationship between the child and subject matter, regarded as objective material, whereby intellectual growth could proceed through immediate appropriation, so, associated with this general view, was the notion that children exercised a similarly direct influence upon one another, quite irrespective of the effects of corporate sharing in the use of materials in the production of results.

But another factor, more clearly differentiated than the foregoing, was emphasized in connection with the “social life” of the school. Included in this concept

¹ Reeder, R. R., *How Two Hundred Children Live and Learn*, Ch. 7, cited by King, Irving, *Social Aspects of Education*, 1912, p. 399.

were the various forms of group participation, such as clubs, councils, assemblies, plays, and the like. Such matters have received continued and increasing emphasis as legitimate and necessary factors in control since their first observed value in the first part of the century. In the beginning we find the desire to include more than mere discipline in the concept of the school's social life.

"There are other factors besides discipline and good order in the school that should enter into the question of its social life."¹

Moreover, it was considered essential that this social life be recognized as more pervasive than the mere external social functions.

"It is important to bear in mind that the social life of the school is a great deal larger and more complex than a mere series of evening parties or other so-called social functions."²

It is necessary to note, however, that these social activities were quite generally regarded as appendages to the teaching function rather than as essential aspects of the school regarded as a social institution and possessing organic unity and continuity with other aspects of life. In practice they were avowedly the principal means of moral control as contrasted with intellectual development. This is clearly shown in the attitudes of leaders in the professional education of teachers. The investigation of "The Present Status of Moral Education in Institutions for the Training of Teachers," referred to in a preceding section, revealed that "the

¹ Brown, J. F., *The American High School*, p. 368, cited by King, Irving, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

² King, Irving, *ibid.*, p. 268.

activities of school life" were regarded as of first importance in the moral control of children.¹ With the continued dualism of the moral and intellectual in growth and the absence of a conception of the social nature of intellectual growth, it was inevitable that these overt corporate manifestations should become a principal factor in children's moral control. The designation "extra-curricular" activities, later applied to such procedure, further accentuates the original detachment.

(D) SELF-ORGANIZED GROUP WORK

In what appears to have been the last "infirmity" of practical attempts to establish a social control of pupils without visible change in the usual notion of learning, we find concerted efforts to introduce "self-organized" group work as an adjunct to "regular" lessons in the subjects. The idea centered in what was designated as the social education movement, representing "two dozen or more societies" and finally converging in an annual session of the Social Education Congress, having as its official organ the *Social Education Quarterly*, as well as its own published *Proceedings*. "Group work" was regarded as the most unique contribution of this movement and was looked upon as marking "a definite and momentous revolution in educational method."² The following descriptive statement indicates the nature of the procedure :

¹ Bagley, W. C., *Religious Education*, Vol. 5, 1911, pp. 612-640.

² Editorial, *Educational Review*, Vol. 33, January, 1907, pp. 104-108.

"The children were told that they could have one-half hour each week to do exactly the thing they most liked to do, provided they should prove (to the teacher) that it should be of some service to the class, and should be profitable to the children themselves. They were asked to work in groups."¹

The justification of this concession of time from the regular program was found, however, in the contention that "it quickens interest in lessons." The factor of "discipline" was frequently emphasized. It was also held that the interest of every member was vitalized in "regular class work" because each pupil was given a chance to express his "power" in a particular group activity of his own choosing.²

This manifestation of the general tendency to utilize some form of corporate action in the interest of better control seems to have had its more immediate origin in the general child-study movement, particularly as manifested in the growing interest in the "individual child" and in "group life."³ This in part explains the continued separation of the intellectual and the moral, acquisition and character, in pupil control. There is evidence in this movement of an emphasis looking toward a certain practical unity among these factors, however, even in the apparent absence of an articulate

¹ Nelson, Alice M., "Group Work in a Grammar Grade," *Social Education Quarterly*, Vol. 1, 1907, pp. 29-33; see also Shaw, Clara B., "Some Experiments in Self-Organized Group Work," *ibid.*, pp. 16-21; Clark, Lotta, "Self-Organized Work in the High School," *ibid.*

² Nelson, Alice M., *ibid.*

³ Scott, Colin A., *Social Education*, Preface, pp. 4-5; *Educational Review*, *op. cit.*

theory. For, by way of reaction to existing individual methods, specific changes in "organization," having for their purpose "the development of the social nature of the individual under the stimulus of social conditions," were demanded. The following shows in part the tendency :

"Fastened seats, graded classes, small classes, tutors, all stand for education of the individual for himself practically in a state of isolation. . . . The only place where mutual helpfulness is not recognized as being in every way worthy is in school and in prison; in this particular the teacher mounted on the desk and the guard mounted on the walls have something in common."¹

Such changes appeared as the current interpretation of the practical demands created by the new social philosophy as typified in the Dewey School of Chicago. But that the practical efforts were not expressive of a complete theoretical unity with reference to learning and control is indicated by the presence, along with the foregoing attitudes, of the notion that "activities," like plays, games, stolen whispers, schemes against the teacher, and literary societies, were "diversions to regular work."²

In conclusion, it may be said that the earlier response to public demand for higher standards of social order in the school was made in terms of efforts to secure "humane and sympathetic government," on the one hand, and "unoffending behavior," on the other. To accom-

¹ Jackman, Wilbur S., "The Relation of School Organization to Instruction," *Social Education Quarterly*, Vol. 1, 1907, pp. 55-69.

² Jackson, Wilbur S., *ibid.*

plish this end, various schemes of self-government were employed and greater attention was given to "extra-curricular" activities as "outlets for surplus physical energies" or as "social sedatives," that is, for attaining both the negative morality and the conditions of effective learning conceived as a purely individual process.

SUMMARY

In this chapter the following developments have been reported with reference to moral control in elementary education :

1. Energetic efforts to effect a social control of children in response to increased social pressure for better citizenship training.
2. Wide criticism and marked failure of a variety of proposals and practices based on the following assumptions :
 - (a) Opposition between personal and social interests
 - (b) Control as a function separate from the school's proper educational work of directing intellectual growth
 - (c) Discipline as restraint and for the purpose of providing the conditions of acquisition
 - (d) The identification of freedom with mere physical unconstraint
 - (e) The restriction of the notion of democracy to the political aspects of social organization
 - (f) A prevalent opinion to the effect that moral control may be achieved by curriculum appendages which involve the adoption in rather exact form of certain features of governmental machinery
 - (g) The notion that social atmosphere, public opinion, and imitation are direct, static forces, capable of producing conformity and of molding character
 - (h) The view that the "spontaneous" social life of children must be supervised in order to avoid interference with intellectual achievement

CHAPTER XII

CRITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE PROPOSAL OF AN ORGANIC VIEW OF CONTROL

REFERENCE was made in beginning the previous chapter to the fact that, as the earlier efforts to effect a social reorganization of the elementary school assumed the proportions of a movement, they came increasingly to embody the effects of other conceptions. Thus, while many of the early attempts to effect change were conducted mainly in the interest of moral control regarded as a function separate from the school's proper educational work of directing the child's intellectual growth, a more thoroughgoing departure from this traditional emphasis was promised as the implications of behaviorism for learning were united with the demand for a democratic reconstitution of control. Whereas the first practical changes were based more or less explicitly upon the theory of separate mental and moral behavior and the related notion of opposition between personal and social interests, there was a growing conception, later to become articulate in practical formulations, of the unity of mental and moral development and of their continuity with environmental energies.

We come for the second time, therefore, upon that phase of the general educational situation which involved deep criticism and serious effort to discover an underlying principle of unity among the factors of the educative process as a means of eliminating obvious waste and of promoting economy of effort and a more effective morality (cf. Chapter X). We are now concerned, however, with the social aspects of the struggle. Two closely related phases of these more recent developments in control constitute the subject matter of the present chapter. They are, first, those attitudes, critical and constructive, which involved a synthesis of mental and moral behavior and their dependence for manifestation upon social direction and, second, the implications of democratic social relations for instructional reorganization and control. More explicit consideration than was intended in the earlier chapter will be given to the attitudes and criticisms that were involved in the first effective attempt to establish theoretical unification of instruction and control.

Due to their inherent connections, no effort will be made to consider these attitudes in any particular sequence. Roughly, however, the following order of topics seems appropriate: (A) critical attitudes and the general situation; and (B) general features and implications of the organic conception of control. And in view of the fact that the earlier and more general formulations have received amplification and continued refinement of statement since their first enunciation,

the more general statement of the conception will be followed in the next chapter by an effort to interpret more in detail certain important aspects of the theory.

(A) CRITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE GENERAL SITUATION

The deeper change already referred to appears to have been a reflection in part at least of the pressing demands of the general social situation for greater continuity of the educational function to correspond to the increased perception of unity in life itself. At least one interpretation so regarded it.

"We are feeling everywhere the organic unity of the different modes of social life, and consequently demand that the school shall be related more widely, shall receive from more quarters, and shall give in more directions."¹

But the school, in the prevailing attempts to effect social reorganization, had responded to the narrow and more generally explicit "political" conception of citizenship. Hence, the annexed forms of social organization were only partial and lacked continuity with life.

"When the democratic impulse broke into the isolated department of the school, it did not effect a complete reconstruction, but only the addition of another element. This was preparation for citizenship. . . . Citizenship to most minds means a distinctly political thing."²

¹ Dewey, John, "The School as a Social Center," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1902, pp. 373-383.

² Dewey, John, *ibid.*

By society Professor Dewey meant much more than the mechanism for government, with its correspondingly narrow conception of citizenship training.

"With the development of the State has come a certain distinction between state and society. As I use the terms, I mean by State the organization of the resources of the community life through governmental machinery of legislation and administration. I mean by Society the less definite and freer play of the forces of the community which goes on in the daily intercourse and contact of men in an endless variety of ways that have nothing to do with politics or government or the state in any institutional sense."¹

And because society in these more pervasive relations was really "an organic union of individuals," more or less consciously pursuing common ends in shared relations, the social reorganization of the school and its control must somehow become more effective in the promotion of needs arising in such associated living. As the content of the term "citizenship" expanded to include all the relationships of all sorts that were involved in membership in a community, there was increased need for knowledge of the meaning of the school as a social institution. The tendency toward change, therefore, though a partial outgrowth of the general dissatisfaction with the prevalent assumption, largely implicit, that separate moral codes for school and life were valid, was to become articulate only as the demands of social life could be more clearly envisaged.

Similarly, the change was a reflection of the demand

¹ Dewey, John, "The School as a Social Center," *Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1902, pp. 373-383.

for greater unity in children's formal educational experiences. The practical impossibility of a purely psychological consideration of the personal elements in behavior, in isolation from environment, and of a direct control which disregarded environmental mediation was pointed out in the conclusion of the chapter already referred to. It was there stated that expressions of criticism based on behaviorism necessarily involved frequent reference to environmental phenomena. It was in such terms alone that the factors and influences of behavior were to find their clearest enunciation. It will also be recalled that certain weaknesses of Froebelianism, Herbartianism, and other practices and attitudes were pointed out in connection with the earlier efforts to establish theoretical unification with reference to important aspects of experience, especially as these were related to control. Many obvious limitations of existing practice, such as its tendency toward a division of children's energies in view of its failure to utilize native or acquired dispositions and its individualistic character, were central, therefore, in the change of conception.

But perhaps the most significant expression of dissatisfaction relative to the individualistic character of practice was in the struggle to determine the reciprocal bearings of social relations and mental growth. Traditional conceptions still complicated the difficulty because they perpetuated the older differentiation between mental growth and freedom. The attempt to provide moral control through various "democratic" append-

ages to a curriculum of "studies" otherwise intact confused physical unconstraint with the expression of individuality and hence ignored the function of intelligence in freedom. The chaotic looseness and lack of unity in practices which accompanied this deeper theoretical misapprehension were regarded as the real source of the general reaction against existing "freedom" in education. Lacking a positive unifying principle, the only alternative discerned was to return to the "good old days" of authoritarian control.

"In our schools we have freed individuality in many modes of outer expression without freeing intelligence, which is the vital spring and guarantee of all these expressions. Consequently we give opportunity to the unconverted to point the finger of scorn, and to clamor for a return of the good old days when the teacher, the representative of social and moral authority, was securely seated in the high places of the school."¹

Lamenting the immoral consequences of such an inadequate view of the relation of intelligence to personal freedom, Professor Dewey said further:

"If individuality were simply a matter of feelings, impulses, and outward acts independent of intelligence, it would be more than a dubious matter to urge a greater degree of freedom for the child in the school."²

(B) GENERAL FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ORGANIC CONCEPTION OF CONTROL

As was given cursory mention in the chapter referred to in the preceding section, Professor Dewey's critical

¹ Dewey, John, *Elementary School Teacher*, Vol. 4, 1903, pp. 143-204.

² *Ibid.*

essays of 1896 and 1897 appear, in view of the diversity of conception which existed at the time, to have been concerned primarily with marshaling data, empirical and scientific, bearing upon the problem of unification in control. His various observations and proposed theses in these and later writings upon education related quite largely to the need for recognizing the tendency toward an inherent unity in all experience and of the demand for conscious regard for the conditions of such unity in instructional and managerial functions.

"Intellectually what is needed is a philosophy of organization, a view of the organic unity of the educative process and educative material."¹

After pointing out the two phases, the psychological and the social or moral, of any instance of conduct, and of the futility, therefore, of limiting moral training to certain isolated and more obvious social relations, such as "capacity to vote intelligently" and "disposition to obey laws," Dewey contended that school procedure must regard the child as already a member of society, even though he may not have attained to full consciousness of his social relations and purposes.

"The child is an organic whole, intellectually, socially, and morally, as well as physically. The ethical aim which determines the work of the school must accordingly be interpreted in the most comprehensive and organic spirit. We must take the child as a member of society in the broadest sense and demand whatever is

¹ "The Educational Situation," *Contributions to Education*, University of Chicago, 1902, No. 3, p. 45.

necessary to enable the child to recognize all of his social relations and to carry them out.”¹

This view was based, apparently, on two complementary assumptions: first, that any phase of experience is in organic relation with all others and with the experiences of other members of society; and, second, that existing conditions of life demand increasing consciousness of human interrelations. In approaching the conception of unity in school organization which this principle implied, it was insistently urged that moral control had been conceived in too narrow and formal a way.

“We have associated the term *ethical* with certain special acts which are labeled virtues and set off from the mass of other acts, and still more from the habitual images and motives in the agents performing them.”²

In commenting upon a prevalent form of profitless theorizing which set up from the outside certain aims of moral control without finding within them a proposed mechanism for their own realization, he said:

“It is remarkable that men are so blind to the futility of a morality which merely blazons ideals, erects standards, asserts laws, without finding in them any organic provision for their own realization.”³

¹ “Ethical Principles Underlying Education,” *Third Year Book*, National Herbart Society, 1897, pp. 10 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ “Psychology and Social Practice,” address of the President before the American Psychological Association, 1899, *Contributions to Education*, University of Chicago, No. 2, p. 36.

It was in providing the needed mechanism of harmony between intellectual achievement based on child impulse and the demand for a social criterion of worth that Professor Dewey appears to have made a positive contribution to the theory of control. He recognized the peculiar mental efficiency and moral unity to be achieved by the more explicit embodiment in class procedure of the factor of shared relations in the conjoint pursuit of purposes, which he regarded as inherent in society and more or less consciously pursued by adults. Regarding the changes which this principle of reorganization demanded, he said :

“The fundamental conclusion is that the school must be itself made into a vital social institution to a very much greater extent than obtains at present. The much and commonly lamented separation in schools between intellectual and moral training, between the acquiring of information and growth of character, is simply one expression of the failure to conceive and construct the school as a social institution, having social life and value within itself.”¹

It was on the basis of this central thesis that both the older and many of the newer practices were criticized, particularly with reference to the quality of control which they provided.

“Except in so far as the school is an embryonic yet typical community life, moral training must be partly pathological and partly formal. It is pathological inasmuch as the stress comes to be laid upon correcting wrongdoing instead of upon habits of positive service. The teacher is necessarily forced into the position where

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1897, pp. 13 ff.

his concern with the moral life of the pupils takes largely the form of being on the alert for failures to conform to the school rules and routine. . . . They are rules which have to be made in order that the existing modes of school work may go on; but the lack of inherent necessity in the school work reflects itself in a feeling on the part of the child that the moral discipline of the school is somewhat arbitrary. Any conditions which compel the teacher to take note of wrongdoing rather than of growth put the emphasis in the wrong place and result in distortion and perversion. Attending to wrongdoing ought to be an incident rather than the important phase.”¹

While former conceptions had given considerable attention to the repressive character of instruction and its failure to use child impulse, there appears to have been no explicitly recognized mechanism for coördinating impulse and social worth. F. W. Parker’s great emphasis upon “the individual child” and the need for providing conditions of success in the attainment of personal ends involving the use of “real objects” illustrates the earlier struggle to utilize impulse in the absence of a social criterion of worth.

“If the work be adapted to the state of mental and physical power and ability; if every onward movement brings success; if the work be real (that is upon real things and not drudgery); then let the child learn to do by doing; for the pleasure of doing and its resultant successes best fit a man to control himself and master all difficulties and obstacles that lie before him. . . . The opinion prevails among many teachers that intellectual development is, by its nature, separate and distinct from moral training. Of all the evils in our schools, this terrible mistake is productive of the greatest. The powers of the mind determine by their limitations

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1897.

all human action. There is no neutral ground. Everything done has a moral or immoral tendency. That is, doing forms, by repetition, a habit, and habit makes up character.¹

Likewise, the Froebelian conception, with which Parker's views were largely in harmony, was criticized because of its individualistic character. In referring to the prevalent view that education could be stated in "purely individual terms," Professor Dewey commented as follows:

"For example, it is said to be the harmonious development of all the powers of the individual. Here we have no apparent reference to social life or membership, and yet it is argued that we have an adequate and thoroughgoing definition of what education is. But if this definition be taken independently of social relationship, we shall find that we have no standard or criterion for telling what is meant by any one of the terms concerned. We do not know what a power is; we do not know what development is. . . . A power is a power with reference to the function which it serves."²

The presence still later of the idea that freedom in education referred literally to the spontaneous development of powers of which the child was supposed to have exclusive private ownership occasioned repeated reference, approaching rebuke, to the need for recognizing the function of environment and the demand for an adequate standard of direction. We find again in 1902:

"It will do harm if child study leave in the popular mind the impression that a child of a given age has a positive equipment of purposes and interests to be cultivated just as they stand. . . . To

¹ Parker, F. W., *Notes of Talks on Teaching*, reported by Lelia Partridge, 1883, pp. 163-167.

² *Op. cit.*, 1897, pp. 12 ff.

take the phenomena presented at a given age as in any way self-explanatory or self-contained is inevitably to result in indulgence and spoiling.”¹

Specific guidance was imperative in view of the wasteful character of uncoördinated action based merely on impulse.

“It is simply a desire to ‘mess around’; perhaps to imitate the activities of older people. Also it is doubtless possible to let ourselves down to that level and simply humor that interest.”²

In this connection he referred again to the opposed tendencies to employ, on the one hand, children’s interests without an adequate environmental criterion and, on the other hand, a procedure which intentionally disregarded impulse. The evils of these contrasted attitudes were quite comparable.

“Appealing to interest on the present plane means excitation; it means playing with power so as to continually stir it up without directing it toward definite achievement. . . . [This is] as bad as the continual repression of initiative in conformity with supposed interests of some more perfect thought or will. . . . There are those who see no alternative between forcing the child from without or leaving him entirely alone.”³

Personal impulse and social environment as stages or phases in an educative experience were thus not opposed to each other. Neither was one to be subordinated to the other. While the “new education” was “in danger of taking the idea of development in altogether too

¹ Dewey, John, *The Child and the Curriculum*, 1902, pp. 20 ff.

² *School and Society*, 1900, p. 55.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

formal and empty a way," as contrasted with continued effort to attain development by suppressive methods, the *desideratum* was to recognize the place of environment in experience. As between child impulse and race experience there was a middle term — the successful union of impulse and objective materials as represented in achievement. Since action, more or less balanced with environmental energies, was already under way, it was necessary to

"see what step the child needs to take here and now."¹

But this was not a matter of telling the child outright what to do next in response to inquiry or profitless "fooling"; neither was it a matter of ignoring his present unsuccessful strivings for some more perfect adult standard of achievement. It was, rather, a problem of mediating alternative possibilities through careful inquisitiveness or through suggestions, either verbal or material.

"Let the child first express his impulse, and then through criticism, question, and suggestion bring him to consciousness of what he has done and what he needs to do."²

Since the child was not already equipped with specific instinctive patterns of behavior which would spontaneously express themselves regardless of environment or which could be appealed to directly as a means of developing higher interests, it was necessary to provide

¹ *School and Society*, 1900, p. 23.

² *School and Society*, 1900, pp. 57 ff.; see also pp. 125 ff.

the conditions of educative behavior by supplying the particular environmental "stimuli" needed to "direct" impulse in desired ways. The problem of control was thus precisely that of providing the conditions of positive achievement in social activities.

"The problem of direction is thus the problem of selecting appropriate stimuli for instincts and impulses which it is desired to employ in the gaining of new experience. What new experiences are desirable, and thus what stimuli are needed, it is impossible to tell except . . . as adult knowledge is drawn upon as revealing the possible career open to the child."¹

Looking more carefully into the nature of control as here conceived, it appears simply as one important way of emphasizing the manner in which the normal development of personality takes place. Mind, as already indicated, is in this view a function of social relations.

"At present the tendency is to conceive individual mind as a function of social life — as not capable of operating by itself but as requiring continual stimulus from social agencies, and finding its nutrition in social supplies . . . [It] is developed in an environment which is social as well as physical, and . . . social needs and aims have been most potent in shaping it."²

Moreover, the previous separation between the mental and the moral was now regarded as theoretically at an end in view of the psychological conception of the relating of learning and doing. Learning in the behavioristic conception was precisely a matter of

¹ *School and Society*, 1900, p. 25.

² *Elementary School Record*, 1900, No. 9, pp. 221-232; see also *School and Society*, 1915, pp. 90 ff.

responding, of doing. It was in such doing in social situations involving the employment of objective materials in the accomplishment of ends that the complete synthesis of the mental and the moral, the personal and the environmental, was to be attained.

"The introduction of every method which appeals to the child's active powers, to his capacities in construction, production, and creation, marks an opportunity to shift the ethical center of gravity from an absorption which is selfish to a service which is social."¹

"The organic unity of the educative process and educative material" attained in the mechanism of directed social relations was precisely the method, therefore, of developing personality and at the same time of providing moral control.

"The statement of personality as an object, of social relations as a mechanism of stimuli and inhibitions, is precisely the statement of ends in terms of the method of their realization."²

Professor Dewey wished, therefore, to offer a mechanism for applying in practice the concept of unity of the mental and moral phases of behavior by proposing that the advantages and demands of the more inherent relations of society be utilized as the principle of instructional organization. A procedure which consciously sought to utilize these relations was regarded as the best means of moral guidance.

¹ *School and Society*, 1915, p. 17.

² "Psychology and Social Practice," presidential address before American Psychological Association, 1899, *Contributions to Education*, University of Chicago, No. 2, 1901, p. 36.

"The best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought . . . The child should be controlled in his work through the life of the community."¹

It was contended that under existing conditions "far too much of the stimulus and control proceeds from the teacher, because of the neglect of the idea of the school as a form of social life."² In social situations involving shared relations in the pursuit of common purposes was to be found the "principle of discipline."

"Within this organization is found the principle of school discipline or order. Of course, order is simply a thing which is relative to an end. If you have the end in view of forty or fifty children learning set lessons, to be recited to the teacher, your discipline must be devoted to securing that result. But if the end in view is the development of a spirit of social coöperation and community life, discipline must grow out of and be relative to this. . . . Out of doing things that are to produce results, and out of doing these in a social and coöperative way, there is born a discipline of its own kind and type. Our whole conception of school discipline changes when we get this point of view."³

The essential advance in this idea was that all behavior, and consequently control, was more completely a function of social relations than the earlier conceptions, with their emphasis upon heredity and depravity, had allowed. In this view discipline or the essential features of control were regarded, quite like all elements of intellectual growth, as learnings, habits, dispositions,

¹ Dewey, John, *My Pedagogic Creed*, p. 10.

² Dewey, John, *ibid.*

³ *School and Society*, first printing, 1899, pp. 30 ff.

modes of conduct, or character deposits. Moreover, they were continuous with one another as intrinsic factors in specific instances of experience taking place in time. Whatever responses were demanded by the particular social activity under way determined the disciplinary measures to be used. These were integral with the activity. They were related as means to end, as were all other responses, habitual, emotional, or intellectual. From the point of view of the child these responses were the positive instruments employed with greater or less conscious regard for their observed consequences in promoting or hindering action.

We find emerging here the place of the child as in part his own disciplinarian. His own suggestions or proposals for action, considered among others and particularly those of the teacher, were to become elements in the rational determination of the direction of activity. But they were only elements which, as in any rational procedure, appeared as suggestions to be tested in relation to foreseen consequences. They were not to be acted upon directly, for such would be to indulge childish whim and thus to impoverish personality. They were, instead, to be tried out in imaginative forecast under the guidance of the teacher's rigid inquisitiveness based on her wider experience and more fertile background of observed possibilities and sense of relative worth.

It was in this careful regard for the possibilities of participation and achievement in social undertakings

that the peculiarly neglected intellectual similarity of children and adults was to become a factor of great importance in control.

"No one seriously doubts that, with an adult, power and control are obtained through realization of personal ends and problems, through personal selection of means and materials which are relevant and through personal adaptation and application of what is thus selected, together with whatever of experimentation and testing is involved in this effort."¹

To provide the conditions, suitably selected in the light of racial values, whereby children could set up ends and achieve them was merely to recognize in purposive action the distinctly human prerogative and to allow children, therefore, simply to be human.

SUMMARY

In this chapter the following developments have been reported with reference to moral control in elementary education :

1. Critical attitudes indicating the following needs :
 - (a) Recognition of personal and environmental energies as stages in experience and as in no sense opposed to each other, as had been supposed in the various authoritarian conceptions of control
 - (b) A control related more widely than to the political aspects of society
 - (c) A control based on the organic unity of modes of social life and on the need for making more perceptible the intrinsic relations of members of society
 - (d) Proper regard for the implications of behaviorism for the unity of mental and moral behavior and of the demands

¹ "Psychology and Social Practice," *op. cit.*, 1899, pp. 12 ff.

of social integration for a practical synthesis of the control and instructional functions

- (e) The need for dissociating from self-expression, individuality, and freedom the notion of mere physical unconstraint and for recognizing freedom as a function of intelligent activity involving perception of alternative consequences
- (f) The need for recognizing the inadequacy of the notion that children have specific purposes to be indulged or cultivated as found and the moral harm of employing childish interest without an adequate standard of worth
- (g) The need for seeking the moral criterion in the inherent demands of coöperative enterprise
- (h) The need for recognizing certain intellectual similarities between adults and children to be utilized in moral control

2. The proposal of a mechanism for executing in practice the concept of unity of the mental and moral phases of behavior based on the following assumptions :

- (a) That the essential principle of instructional organization is to be found in the inherent relations of members of society in the pursuit of common ends
- (b) That the school itself, therefore, is essentially a social organism involving the coöperative achievement of aims and having continuity with existing modes of adult participation
- (c) That, from this point of view and with the educational use of impulse, discipline becomes relative to the aims of the pupils rather than to the aims of the teacher in providing the conditions of acquisition
- (d) That, from the point of view of the child, control is integral with the demands of personally conducted enterprise involving the rational selection and adaptation of means to ends in a social setting
- (e) That, from the point of view of the teacher, control is identified with the demands of instruction, broadly conceived as an affair of providing conditions, physical and social, which direct activity in appropriate ways

CHAPTER XIII

THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN THE ORGANIC CONCEPTION OF CONTROL

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the organic view of the control of children in elementary education, though positive and constructive in its general significance and statement, was, nevertheless, framed in the beginning as much on the basis of the defects as on the positive needs of the contemporary situation. Our previous statements, therefore, have involved much emphasis upon the negative implications of the theory for customary practice and attitudes. But in this final statement we are concerned with the more positive bearings of the conception, particularly with reference to those features which have not been considerably emphasized in the preceding discussion.

Accordingly, in the statements which follow there is no effort to offer a critical presentation. Neither is there any attempt to analyze exhaustively the various shades of attitude that now exist relative to the essential aspects of this general social view. The material is added in an effort to amplify and make more explicit certain phases of the conception already stated. The growing theoretical synthesis of the control and instruc-

tional functions demands a more comprehensive treatment of these developments than the limitations of the present study permit.¹ Only certain selected factors, therefore, will receive attention. These will be comprehended briefly under the following three general divisions: (A) the demands of society; (B) the demands of child nature; and (C) the social character of learning.

(A) THE DEMANDS OF SOCIETY

It is contended in the social view of control that under modern conditions social automatism is a practical impossibility in view of the rapid transmission of the effects of local change in habits, attitudes, and ideals which become a stimulus to change in remote places. The increasing diversity of factors thus entering the concrete life situations to which children must daily respond makes it evident that the single factor of school discipline or the direct control of the teacher is only one of a multitude of more persistent influences operating upon the child. When in the past the school was more isolated from the actualities of life than now, these extra-school influences were less obvious, less insistent; and consequently, the achievement of obedience or conformity to requirements coming from

¹ NOTE: As an outgrowth of the present study the writer has projected and in part organized a companion volume which, from the point of view of the synthesis here mentioned, deals explicitly with the educational bearings of control and the practical, engineering function of the teacher.

a single source, the teacher, was not the remote possibility which it now appears to be.

"The obedient mind is not a thing which can be achieved by the segregated means of school discipline alone."¹

A school product having well wrought habits of response to the demands of school routine and awaiting only the correspondingly definite situations of life for which they were supposed to be a specific preparation was, under former conditions, not merely an apparent possibility: it was an assumed necessity. But the futility of this former emphasis upon mere habit formation, apart from inclination and intelligence, is now regarded as obvious because of the failure of habits, blindly formed, to function adequately in the presence of strange elements and frequency of change in the situations of life to which the young must respond.

Moreover, the diversity of situations and adult influences which enter experience do not, except on the surface, constitute for the child a unified environment. A certain conflict among adult habits and practices formed and carried on upon different social planes creates many rather specific environments.

"No adult environment is all of one piece. The more complex a culture is, the more certain it is to include habits formed on differing, even conflicting, patterns."²

¹ Dewey, John, in *The Dial*, Vol. 64, April 11, 1918, cited by Kilpatrick, William H., *Source Book in the Philosophy of Education*, 1923, p. 160.

² Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922, p. 128.

And except for the child's facile responsiveness to the diverse elements of this multiple environment, certain intellectual stress would result from the discontinuity and inconsistencies involved in the habitual modes of response effected. This does come as experience continues to incorporate within itself such extreme conditions. In going from home to school, from school to outside companionships, to church, to social functions, to movies, or to popular literature; in passing from the realities of the concrete relations or duties of the home, school, and community to vicarious participation in the doings, sufferings, and aspirations of individuals or groups in remote parts, the child passes in quick succession to different nurtures, which tend to divide his semiconsciously formed habits against themselves, thus producing both emotional and intellectual strain and confusion.

"An individual is now subjected to many conflicting schemes of education. Hence habits are divided against one another, personality is disrupted, the scheme of conduct is confused and disintegrated."¹

Though the child may lack at birth an equipment of fully integrated behavior patterns, he has no lack of specific systems of response, inconsistent and short-sighted as they are among themselves, when the influence of the formal educational agency reaches him. Upon entering school he has fundamental habits and

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1922, p. 130; see also *Experience and Nature*, 1925, p. 300.

attitudes or emotional prejudices and biases in many directions. These have been given shape by his continuous participation in diverse, though definite and preexistent, modes of social intercourse. This molding influence of environmental factors is pointed out in the following :

“Habits once formed perpetuate themselves by acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities. They stimulate, inhibit, intensify, weaken, select, concentrate, and organize the latter into their own likeness. They create out of the formless void of impulses a world made in their own image.”¹

But for the lack of harmony and consistency among existing social relations, habits, expectations, requirements, and other more or less conscious influences, there would be no problem of education. Life itself would mold the young into systems of response acceptable to adults. But the very diversity of such influences, coming from situations involving stiff habits and more or less compartmentalized phases of institutional life, creates the demand for a selected environment having for its primary purpose the harmonizing and intellectualizing of the extremes of habit formed under such various and unremitting circumstances.

“What is necessary is that habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current.”²

¹ Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922, pp. 125 ff.

² Dewey, John, *ibid.*, p. 128.

To redirect or reshape child life means that the school must begin with this system of inconsistent methods of response, habits, insights, or inclinations which now constitute the child's character. The teacher must take into account what life has already done in contributing specific objective elements to the child's repertoire of habits or likings and dislikings. These are primary, while the child's impulses are secondary, though requisite as a means of providing unity and foresight in the reorganizing process.

"The direction of native activity depends upon acquired habits, and yet acquired habits can be modified only by redirection of impulses."¹

From the point of view of control this means that there is needed a mechanism which consciously allows impulse to assert its directive function upon the child's own stock of inclinations, and through such redirection to improve habits. As things now are in life itself, there is, in view of the demands for conformity, a minimum of opportunity for such forms of activity. Force, authority, and various forms of social disapproval and approval, or other intentional modes of control, in operating for the sake of immediate external response, have built into the child's habits similar forces. They have in large degree determined the things to which the child is sensitive. Hence, to substitute other forms of "appeal" or control that are

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1922, pp. 125 ff.

regarded as higher in quality or as inherent in social activities that allow greater unity of experience, the child's existing modes of control must be mediated. This, again, means that the teacher must begin with what already exists in the child's habitual modes of response. The place and functioning of impulse and intelligence in this reconstruction of attitudes, "motives," or character will be considered in the next section.

(B) THE DEMANDS OF CHILD NATURE

(1) *Impulse as a Factor in Control*

Just as the factor of change in life seemed to imply both an increased effectiveness of diverse environmental influences in determining child response and a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of direct, authoritarian control as a consistently employed theory, so the discovery of the place in education of the active impulses and tendencies of the child has likewise shifted the emphasis in control to procedure employing the dynamic effects of impulse. The exact educational correlate of the psychology of active tendencies has been, therefore, to employ the control possibilities inherent in purposive action rather than in imposed command. But in place of "freedom" through "spontaneous interests" regarded as objective and more or less immutable entities which could be discovered and catalogued for future use, the recognized pervasiveness and changing character of environmental stimuli have

made necessary a more exact interpretation of the active principle of interest.

The demand is not for a complete catalogue of children's interests to which the activities of the teacher are subordinate. It is rather for a more careful scrutiny of the nature of interests or purposes as methods of response arising in activity already under way and incorporating personal and environmental elements, the former looking to the dynamic and satisfying qualities of the activity and the latter keeping the perspective of adult values. The priority of more or less fully organized social activities having their own direction and content, on the one hand, and the emptiness and unorganized character of native impulsive action, on the other, offer two alternatives. In the one case impulse may be subordinated and the naïve docility of the child exalted, the result being a partial conformity, though at the expense of flexibility, to the adult standard in habits and ideals. In the other, by noting the manner in which organized habits and other environmental stimuli enter and give meaning and direction to impulse, the latter may be allowed a significant intellectual rôle in the child's moral control.

By thus putting the emphasis in control upon the way in which interests are actualized, conditions and objective materials may be provided, not only for initiating interests that are genuine, but also for guiding action in the light of racial values.¹ Such an emphasis should

¹ Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature*, 1925, p. 255.

thus combine insight of and sympathy for childhood with the demand for knowledge of social affairs as the only means of maintaining growing interests and increasing self-control.

How, then, according to this conception, do impulses and purposes perform their control functions? Or how does the special control function arise within a purposive procedure? These and related questions may be more adequately considered by showing the genesis of aim and method in an activity taking place in time. When the pupil's ordinary habitual modes of action and the energies of his environment, as coterminous stages of behavior, fail to adapt themselves in mutual and harmonious continuity, there occurs what, for purposes of discussion, may be called an *activity-situation*. Such disturbance of equilibrium appears, in view of its frequency of occurrence, as a normal manifestation.

"In every waking moment, the complete balance of the organism and its environment is constantly interfered with and as constantly restored." ¹

Without the coördination of environmental and personal energies there is dispersive response. The child flits from one thing to another and is then regarded as a trouble maker. It is contended that with disturbance of this balanced relationship activity for the time is dispersive and blind, and that the more complex the organism, the greater the variety of competing tend-

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1922, pp. 178 ff.

encies toward restoration of equilibrium or, what is the same thing, the resumption of forward movement. The young child's oft-recurring question, "What can I do?" is concrete evidence of such conditions of stress. It represents indecision and confusion in the face of multiple but vaguely discerned possibilities. Thus the child, like the adult, may be quite unable to purpose or to "make up his mind." To delay formal educational procedure till children exhibit purposes, therefore, is exactly to disregard their need for learning how to purpose wisely.¹ There is the demand for so weighting environmental stimuli, including both practical conditions and suggestions from the teacher's richer experience and conception of values, as to help the child in his hitherto unsuccessful efforts to converge his responses into unified activity. Out of disjointed, segmented starts and failures must come balanced forwardness of movement. This means that the teacher must suggest possible lines of activity, purposes, undertakings, problems, enterprises.

"There are a multitude of ways of reacting to surrounding conditions, and without some guidance from experience these reactions are almost sure to be casual, sporadic, and ultimately fatiguing, accompanied by nervous strain."²

Since numerous possibilities in the direction which action might take in a given situation constitute the

¹ Coe, George A., *What Ails Our Youth?* 1924, p. 19.

² Dewey, John, "Individuality and Experience," *Journal of the Barnes Foundation*, Vol. 2, January, 1926, pp. 1-6.

basis of choice or purpose, but do not always insure both a spontaneous germination and flowering of clearly perceived purposes as the specific guides of present action, purposing is obviously an experimental affair, in which both pupil and teacher participate.¹ The teacher's part is in helping the child to come into conscious possession of the basis of choice. But the teacher is not to choose for him. The value for the child is in making choice in the face of competing and clearly discerned possibilities, quite regardless of their source.² This, again, does not mean that the teacher literally gives the child ideas of possible directions which his action might take. No such direct transmission of ideas is a possibility. Moreover, it is pointed out that, if the child is required to do a thing without a perception of the intrinsic consequences and continuities of his acts or, what is the same, without a genuine idea, hypothesis, or purpose of his own, the resulting action is more or less capricious.

"Individuals act capriciously whenever they act under external dictation, from being told, without having a purpose of their own or perceiving the bearing of the deed upon other acts."³

By suggestion, however, the teacher can aid indirectly the child's various past experiences, now in more or less "subconscious" struggle for their turn in overt manifestation, to pass conscious test of fitness in the present

¹ Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922, p. 56.

² Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1926.

³ Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education*, 1916, p. 91.

situation. What is a mere bit of information as it comes from the teacher may or may not thus become a hypothesis or genuine idea for the child, according as the latter has or has not a background of experience or habits necessary for its tentative realization in imaginative forecast. When the *activity-situation* has thus, through the aid of the teacher and by the child's own struggle, resulted in an axis of direction for further response, there has taken place what is usually regarded as the assignment, the selection of purpose, and so on. It should be noted, however, that the purpose thus arrived at may be only a "tentative sketch," subject to continued revision and clarification as activity proceeds.

"The aim as it first emerges is a mere tentative sketch. The act of striving to realize it tests its worth. . . . Usually — at least in complicated situations — acting upon it brings to light conditions which had been overlooked. This calls for revision of the original aim; it has to be added to and subtracted from. An aim, then, must be flexible; it must be capable of alteration to meet circumstances. An aim established external to the process of action is always rigid."¹

It is held in this view that practically all of the more immediate or "spontaneous" suggestions of ends may be too vague for practical guidance. This fact and the identification of purpose with thought are indicated in the following:

"Any so-called 'end' or 'aim' or 'project' which the average immature person can suggest in advance is likely to be highly vague and unformed, a mere outline sketch, not a suggestion of a

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, 1916, p. 122.

definite result or consequence but rather a gesture which roughly indicates a field within which activities might be carried on. . . . The real intellectual shaping of the 'end' or purpose comes during and because of the operations subsequently performed. This is as true of the suggestion which proceeds from the teacher as of those which 'spontaneously' spring from the pupils, so that the former does not restrict thought. The advantage on the side of the teacher . . . is the greater probability that it will be a suggestion which will permit and require thought in the subsequent activity which builds up a clear and organized conception of an end."¹

(2) *Judgment and Creativity in Control*

At this point, then, there occurs a second phase of control having both simultaneous and temporal continuity with that involved in the method by which the confusion of an *activity-situation* is transformed through selective response into an axis of direction. And, as before, coördinate importance attaches to the teacher's function and the child's further procedure. From the point of view of the child, *derived activity-situations*, correlated with the method of attaining and clarifying the tentative objective which has been set up, now present themselves. Each such *derived activity-situation* involves multiple stimuli and demands choice or judgment. At the same time there is an added difficulty in effecting a choice of action due to the integration of present possibilities and the objective sought. Each *derived activity-situation* is not a

¹ Dewey, John, "Individuality and Experience," *Journal of the Barnes Foundation*, Vol. 2, 1926, p. 5.

separate step which is complete within itself in isolation from the end in view, but represents a more or less significant stage in the consummation, while the latter is continuous with the former and only represents its fulfillment.

This means, then, that the child must decide upon methods in terms of an end or objective which has not yet come into guiding clearness and which cannot do so till the successive stages have been completed. Since aim and method thus mutually bring each other into completer objectivity, the most delicate, the most important, and perhaps the most difficult aspect of control inheres in choice among competing possibilities without a definite external standard of value. It is at this point that control not only reveals its positive, experimental character, but also becomes obviously creative. The delicate balancing of choices in terms of a necessarily vague consummation of action appears as an essential feature of creativity. The persistence of the child in such situations constitutes the source of growth in creativity.

(3) *Child Docility and the Factor of Success in Control*

It is the natural response of the child, however, to seek definiteness of method when these *derived* activity-situations occur. Any method which presents itself as workable, whether from the child's own habits or from the teacher, or other source, is likely to be seized upon and employed at once, quite without a complete percep-

tion of the consequences to which the act commits him or the possible change of direction and revision of purpose which the suggestion implies. The apparent propensity of human nature to accept any suggestion for action or belief that produces emotional congruity seems to get in the way of the exercise of judgment and, therefore, of the fullest realization of the creative potentiality.

"Docility, desire for direction, love for protective control are stronger original traits of human nature than is insubordination or originality. The scales are always weighted in favor of habituation and against reflective thought."¹

Moreover, the suggestions from the teacher are likely to be in terms of some definite adult standard of value or achievement. Consequently, the richness of the creative quality can most easily be vitiated. The delicate balance between present possibility of action and vaguely conceived outcome so necessary to proper creativity is most easily upset by adult participation and suggestion. Yet the latter appears essential to creativity. But the method of employing suggestions seems quite as important as that they shall be given at all. The social values and products representing the reconstructed racial experience, so essential to the child's proper growth, are implicit in the influences, including the experience of the teacher, that surround

¹ Dewey, John, in *The Dial*, Vol. 64, pp. 333-335, April 11, 1918; see also *Democracy and Education*, p. 404; *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 54.

the child. And because of the naïve docility of the child, every gesture, remark, or suggestion from the teacher tends to give definiteness of direction to response when made in connection with the tension of these *derived activity-situations*. Such influences constitute approval, amendment, or condemnation; they are never indifferent. How, then, to suggest so that the child shall feel continued success in movement toward some end or aim not yet vivid to him and not specifically the adult standard implicit in the teacher's suggestion — this, in the view under consideration, represents an essential phase of the engineering problem of the teacher in the moral control of the pupil.

Before stating precisely this directive function of the teacher, it is necessary to note more exactly the nature of the factor of success in the child's learning. Must the child be conscious of this factor of successful movement? How is success related to the selecting and fixing of bonds or responses for future use? Must the child know when he has succeeded? If so, in terms of what? How can he know (in the strict sense of awareness) if the end of his activity is only now becoming decreasingly vague? For the child to know whether he has succeeded or failed seems essential, and yet it seems to imply a separate knower, which passes judgment after the fact. It is here contended that this element is not a new one, but is simply another way of referring to the nature of success itself. The adage "Nothing succeeds like success" has a very literal

meaning. Success is a quality of on-moving activity in its tendency toward a continued reëstablishment of equilibrium involving the interaction of a multitude of environmental and personal energies. These organic manifestations are pointed out in the following:

"Apart from language, from imputed and inferred meaning, we continually engage in an immense multitude of immediate organic selections, rejections, welcomes, expulsions, appropriations, withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, elations and dejections, attacks, wardings off, of the most minute, vibrantly delicate nature."¹

Any conscious knowing of what success is at a given moment seems to be secondary to the dynamic of impulse and conflicting habits in their effort to reëstablish consistency of configuration in order that movement may proceed.

"We are not aware of the qualities of many or most of these acts; we do not objectively distinguish and identify them. Yet they exist as feeling qualities, and have an enormous directive effect on our behavior. . . . In a thoroughly normal organism, these 'feelings' have an efficiency of operation which it is impossible for thought to match."²

The supremacy of this total psycho-physical repertoire of habits or strivings over conscious manifestations as a causal factor in overt response is exactly the reason one who has learned, say, to skate cannot at once describe the method by which he acquired the skill. It would appear that success literally succeeds quite successfully without full awareness of how it takes

¹ Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature*, p. 299.

² Dewey, John, *ibid.*

place. In other words, selective response effects to a certain extent a utilization of stimuli involving emotional consonance quite without a separate knowledge of such consonance and integration. Quite aside from awareness it is held that :

"Responses are not merely selective, but are discriminatory, in behalf of some results rather than others."¹

It is then the unconscious aspect of organic-environmental interaction as well as those habits that are revived to conscious status that are potent in determining whether success takes place or not. The child's existing habits, now disintegrating because of a lack of established continuity with some newly presented and strange distribution of environmental stimuli, strive at the touch of impulse to attain renewed consistency. This is the beginning of thought ; but it is a perversion to assume that the child thinks by means merely of consciously revived ideas or habits. Ideas are instruments of control, but they are not the only instruments. Moreover, the manner of their functioning, in contrast with the traditional view, is as an integral aspect of present experience rather than as accretions to mental life separated from personally conducted purpose.² A countless number of existing traits, bodily and mental and of varying emotional tone, are literally hammering for supremacy and release in action. They

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

² Hart, J. K., *Current Theories of Moral Education*, 1914, p. 17.

are potent, maybe, in determining what is conscious; they are potent, certainly, in determining the particular patterns of response that are released in giving direction to overt activity.

"Even our most highly intellectualized operations depend upon [these subconscious manifestations] as a 'fringe' by which to guide our inferential movements. They give us our sense of rightness and wrongness, of what to select and emphasize and follow up, and what to drop, slur over, and ignore, among the multitude of inchoate meanings that are presenting themselves. They give us premonitions of approach to acceptable meanings, and warnings of getting off the track. . . . These qualities are the stuff of 'intuitions' and in actuality the difference between an 'intuitive' and an analytic person is at most a matter of degree, of relative emphasis."¹

To say that organic function thus establishes continuity of action is to assert that success or satisfaction is attained.

"By satisfaction is meant . . . recovery of equilibrium pattern, consequent upon changes of environment due to interaction with the active demands of the organism."²

It appears erroneous, then, to assume that momentary knowledge of success is essential to learning if by knowledge is meant a conscious awareness at the time of the relative worth in on-going activity of alternative responses. To say that the child must know when he succeeds or fails means really that his knowing and succeeding are synonymous. In other words, he knows in the degree that he succeeds. But this does not mean

¹ Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 299-300.

² Dewey, John, *ibid.*, p. 253.

that he is aware of the success or that such awareness is requisite to it. It means, rather, that many responses are being selected for present and future use quite apart from those which the child consciously makes.

Likewise, to postulate any degree of satisfyingness as a separate necessity or as an "accessory after the fact" is simply to retain an element of the traditional assumption of external causation in behavior and its correlative, the notion of passivity in learning.¹ It seems in this view that it is essential to recognize, first as last, that life is life, and that, such being the case, it has within it at least a degree of unity in its tendency to be what it is. No single force back of action, like self-preservation, or some energizing toward a particular object or ideal is here implied. Objection is made to the tendency to point out elements of behavior, as in the learning process, and then of leaving the teacher to infer that they are separate manifestations, having their respective instructional implications. What is here regarded as of first importance is the demand for recognizing the factors of success, purpose, means, thought, learning, satisfaction, and control as ways of viewing a single process having a single genesis and unitary character.

There is in this discussion no intention, however, to deprecate the importance of conscious success. The first consideration has been to look at learning, pur-

¹ See Koffka, Kurt, "Mental Development" in *Psychologies of 1925*, Murchison, Carl, editor, Clark University, 1926, p. 133.

posing, success, and the like in their more primitive or "unlearned" manifestations. For it is exactly in the functioning of the marginal and unconscious habitudes that the deeper dispositions of the child are being molded. And it is in providing opportunity for their proper manifestation in successful activity that moral growth inheres.

"It is the control of the attendant learnings that constitutes moral instruction and training for citizenship."¹

Positively, then, it is necessary that the child come increasingly to select his responses with greater conscious regard for their probable consequences. This is to help insure success and, therein, the harmonious coördination of diverse simultaneous responses or learnings.

The twofold function of the teacher emerges here. The guidance is concerned with what are termed the "simultaneous" and "successive" stages of the child's developing activity.

"Direction is both simultaneous and successive. At a given time, it requires that, from all the tendencies that are partially called out, those be selected which center energy upon the point of need. Successively, it requires that each act be balanced with those which precede and come after, so that order of activity is achieved. Focusing and ordering are thus the two aspects of direction, one spatial, the other temporal. . . . Activity must be centered at a given time in such a way as to prepare for what comes next."²

¹ Maddox, William A., in *Twenty-Five Years of American Education*, 1925, p. 168.

² Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education*, p. 30.

The first function of the teacher is in aiding the child in both a perception of clearly discerned possibilities in connection with the several *derived* activity-situations and in preventing hasty decision as to the particular procedure demanded by each. Things must be so managed that judgment and forward movement are suspended, awaiting a clear perception of the relative bearings of all possibilities which it is possible to evoke for consideration. And yet the teacher's emphasis here must be properly balanced with the demand of the child, whether consciously insistent or expressed in capricious action, for forward movement, for achievement. Activity must not merely strive to exhaust the field of suggestions in the effort to locate the relatively most fruitful response to be used in further action ; the latter must be allowed to get under way. Successive *derived* activity-situations must follow in proper and hastened sequential linkage, if discouragement and the consequent demand for a more direct and external control are to be avoided. In other words, the child must be able to move forward.

To see that such movement takes place, even without attaining the perfect standard of excellence to which a more complete consideration of all possibilities at each stage might lead is, then, the second responsibility of the teacher. The "interest span," determined by physiological maturity and past experience, is of course a partial basis for determining the exhaustiveness with which each *derived* activity-situation is dealt before

further progress is allowed. However, achievement or accomplishment in the definitely consummatory sense of outcome or objective result is secondary, though requisite as a tool, to forward movement, or the unrestricted opportunity to use environmental conditions, objects, or stimuli in repeated organic unification of personal and environmental energies.

"Execution, satisfaction, realization, fulfilment are all names for the fact that an activity implies an accomplishment which is possible only by subduing circumstance to serve as an accomplice of achievement. Each impulse or habit is thus a will to [exert] its own power."¹

As has been mentioned in the foregoing, some such practical adage as "Nothing succeeds like success" or even the maxim borrowed from the field of economics and capitalistic enterprise, "Not acquiring dollars, but chasing them, hunting them, is the important thing," is apparently the most direct implication of behaviorism for the moral control of pupils and of the place of the teacher in such control.

(C) THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF LEARNING AS A FACTOR IN CONTROL

The foregoing considerations must be qualified, however. To leave the matter thus is but to refine for practical application the earlier emphasis upon success as employed by those whose interests were mainly in the "self-expression" of the "individual child," quite

¹ Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 140.

without the unifying principle of social worth. Also, apparently, an implicit faith in the efficacy and sufficiency of success without criteria of worth has led generally to illicit exploitation of children's energies. "Clockwork" precision in administrative adjustments and perfect routine orderliness are often the outcomes of such exploitation. Long hours of "home work" and manifest interest among pupils are the natural offspring of environmental manipulation looking more or less consciously to conditions of success. But in the theory under consideration it is too often overlooked that there are qualities of success, and that this consideration is most important in a social situation involving competing, often conflicting, aims of life. It is even more important in an educational régime which is itself in aim, spirit, and method largely the product of outgrown social situations involving ideals quite out of harmony with the present life of change.

The particularly unfortunate present perversion of the principle is in connection with the continued use of certain traditional assumptions regarding the nature of learning. The older view of learning as a purely individual affair brought with it a school machinery adapted to itself. But behaviorism makes it more and more evident that the individual is only one phase of the learning situation. His environment, particularly that of persons, customs, and ideals, as well as books and things, contains elements which complete the learning

situation. To the "process" these two phases contribute energies; in the results of the process both continue to function.

The learning is thus held in the matrix of social participation or sharing. It is commonplace that words attest to the mutuality of meanings as the products of shared experience. But the words are themselves only the symbols of meanings that are social. Sentiments, prejudices, attitudes in general are likewise the functions of social relations; they are not individual "monopolistic possessions." Because learning has usually been regarded as a private, personal affair, taking place through the hard putting forth of personal energies, the factor of success has likewise been restricted. What is needed, therefore, is a view of learning which identifies personal with group success. This leads to a more exact analysis of learning as a social affair and of control as a function of the interactive process.

The situation from which the child learns is not outside himself or his active doings and desires. It does not consist merely of stimuli which a separate environment provides. It is not one thing and the child another. Such a view fails to note the child's present active habits or energies.

"Operatively speaking, the remote and the past are 'in' behavior, making it what it is. The action called 'organic' is not just that of internal structures; it is an integration of organic-environmental connections."¹

¹ Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature*, p. 279.

The child does not start anew with a clean mental slate each time he responds to the novel in his environment.

"Activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection; activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsals."¹

The learning situation exists only in what the child is doing when novel stimuli are being dealt with in order that action may get balanced forwardness of movement. This means that, when others are present with the child, they are a part of the learning situation. It means, further, that the learner must adapt his action in view of what others are doing or have to do. Consciously or unconsciously he wishes to employ the stimuli provided by the presence of others as an aid in giving direction to his own activity, whether to forward or to hinder that of others. The presence and behavior of others are not mere static patterns to which the child tries to conform. The other members of the group are not just persons without expectations, demands, and purposes; they likewise are using environmental stimuli, objects, materials, and suggestions as the means of promoting their own activities in the achievement of results. The learner, then, uses their responses to him, to others, and to objects as means of determining his own future responses and of forming expectations with reference to the requirements of those with whom he is associated. Such cautionary mode of response is necessary if he is to retain even a minimum of connection with the group.

¹ Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 191.

Moreover, the use which he makes of objects, materials, and the responses of others constitutes for him their meaning. His responses gain an intellectual quality in proportion as their place in his activity is perceived.

"To have an idea of a thing is . . . not just to get certain sensations from it. It is to be able to respond to the thing in view of its place in an exclusive scheme of action; it is to foresee the drift and probable consequence of the action of the thing upon us and of our action upon it."¹

And as his acts are colored by constant reference to others, the intellectual content is obviously a social affair. This back-and-forth reference of present action which requires that the child see his doings as a phase of an inclusive action in which his response reacts favorably upon his own success only when it fits into the action of others is, first of all, the way social disposition is built.

"Only by engaging in a joint activity, where one person's use of material and tools is consciously referred to the use other persons are making of their capacities and appliances, is a social direction of disposition attained."²

It is therefore evident that, when children are working together, there is inevitably a greater or less degree of give and take, mutual helpfulness, shared responsibility, and "togetherness." And to say that the social view of learning requires a consciously provided mechanism of

¹ Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education*, p. 36.

² Dewey, John, *ibid.*, p. 47.

shared relations in the pursuit of common purposes is but to give emphatic recognition to the inherently social character of learning by making conscious provision for its facilitation. The relation which this conception of learning has to pupil control is found, then, in the fact that the child's way of coming to an intelligent use of objects, materials, and suggestions, as demanded in associated activity, is the means of forming moral disposition or inclination.

"When learning is a phase of active undertakings which involve mutual exchange, social control enters into the very process of learning."¹

Behavior is socially controlled because the child must, with greater or less conscious intent, refer his responses to the same situations in which others are acting. A greater variety of objects and stimuli must be responded to because effective participation in the group life requires that the child understand the various uses made of things and subject matter by his associates. This means greater probability that individual responses will attain flexibility. Viewed negatively, the variety of meaningful responses depends originally quite completely upon the present use which others make of tangible things and upon a connection between these and the child's own doings. And even as experience grows, the dependence upon others for diversity of response persists in proportion as spontaneity is re-

¹ Dewey, John, *op. cit.*, pp. 351 ff.

tained. The child must be helped to an increasingly conscious sensitivity to stimuli provided by this social setting. Suggestions of possible modes of response in particular phases of the inclusive activity are not to come from the teacher alone; the latter must encourage mutual helpfulness and criticism among the pupils themselves as a means of keeping alive and directing spontaneity.

Authority as a Factor in Control

The place of the more direct or personal modes of control, such as social approval, authority, and force, as exercised by the group or teacher, is implicit in the foregoing. In view of the more permanent and pervasive control afforded in putting things to use in associated pursuits, direct or intentional determination of immediate response, in which effort is made to reduce to a minimum or to slur over environmental mediation, is reserved, first, for those specific instances of capricious action that result from inability to attain a genuine axis of direction in the face of novel elements in the situation. Second, such personal means of control must be used in cases of inability to perceive the consequences of response, proposed or actualized, or of deliberate failure to refer present action to the conditions imposed by the particular setting in which activity is proceeding.

Such means have a necessary place in view of habitual inclinations and expectations nurtured under the direc-

tive influence of out-of-school environments. These lack intentional continuity and thus provide stimuli to the formation of dynamic patterns of response which, instead of identifying personal success with that of the group, may actually hinder the latter. In the home, on the street, or in play, the child's activities not only simulate quite unconsciously the conflicting patterns of his associates, both young and old, but also become organic functions of the latter. Where such direct controls as personal or group approval or disapproval, authority and force are employed, these become quite insensibly the child's means of giving direction to his own activities. He may thus use the direct "appeal" of forcing others as an habitual mode of response in associated activity, depending upon the exigencies of the situations in which he finds himself.

And while the child thus comes to school with propensities or habits which, from the point of view of accepted standards of social sensitivity, appear selfish, self-centered, or even "perverse," the reason is not that he has failed to refer his own action to that of others in giving direction to his own. It is rather that, in so doing without conscious foresight of the ultimate consequences upon his own action, he has built up shortsighted behavior patterns. In other words, he has not been guided in conscious mastery of the relative bearings of his actions upon those of others and of theirs upon his own. Such "unsocial" dispositions result, not because they were learned unsocially or

apart from social participation, but exactly because they were formed insensibly in social participation and involved, therefore, a minimum of foresight and conscious experimentation. The child is thus "individualized" in the adverse sense.

To redirect such habits it is necessary, of course, to begin with them. The sorts of appeal which have been effective in producing response must now be used. If the child is irresponsive, on occasion, to the demands of the observed or suggested consequences of his conduct, such that not only he but also others are prevented from proceeding on the basis of reciprocal reference, then it is necessary that methods sufficiently direct to produce the desired response be instituted. Though such means have a necessary place in instances of conduct, their moral value may be slight or even negative, since they ignore the child's deeper impulses and strivings toward unified action.

Moral control is thus not control by someone outside, in which immediate physical conformity is sought or attained. It is rather the succession of responses made by the child to the demands of a course of action in which he is reflectively engaged because its discerned consequences have a sufficiently purposive hold to keep him persisting toward the end. Moral control is present in the degree that the individual observes the various consequences of his action and then acts with increased success and power in the light of the conflicting alternatives. The distinctly moral in what the child does

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is in his living up to the highest potentialities requirements of the particular activities in which he engages. From the point of view of results in the child's character, the distinctly moral is the particular set of habits that are being formed.

SUMMARY

In this chapter the following additional considerations have been pointed out in connection with the organic conception of the moral control of children in elementary education :

1. That there is need for a control based on the demands of social change rather than on the assumption of a fixed future for which habits of conformity are the main preparation
2. That, since social change produces numerous environments which effect diverse, often conflicting, habits, thus causing division of energies and decreasing the efficacy of direct teacher control, a selected environment is necessary for the purpose of unifying and harmonizing children's habits or expectations
3. That, in view of the directive influence of the child's total environment, control has to do with noting the way in which objective conditions, materials, subject matter, and the suggestions or habits of others enter and give direction to impulse
4. That children's purposes or interests are really of a trial-and-error or experimental character and can be profitably actualized only by much guidance from the racial experience
5. That, in view of the mutual genesis and reciprocal bearings of children's aims and their own methods of achieving them, teacher guidance is necessary at all stages of children's activities
6. That, in view of the propensity of children to act on the basis of habitual response and in view of the importance of judgment in the development of standards of achievement, teacher guidance is continuously necessary

7. That, in view of the social character of learning and of children's shortsighted behavior patterns effected by out-of-school conditions, the teacher's alertness for opportunities, through question or suggestion, to raise response to the level of perception of consequences is imperiously demanded at all times

8. That direct measures, such as disapproval or authority, are necessary when pupils are unable to act on the basis of reciprocal reference in coöperative or personal undertakings

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE

THE more specific outcomes of this study concern (1) the identification of the instructional and control functions, (2) environmental complicity and new factors in control, (3) the impossibility of opposed conceptions of control, (4) the need for a philosophy of control, (5) the social criterion, and (6) the importance of achievement and of the teacher in control. After stating the more specific conclusions, brief account will be taken of certain generalizations which are held widely on the basis of common observation and which have been confirmed by the study. These relate to such matters as (1) the change of attitude toward child nature and (2) the more general emphasis relative to the nature and function of school discipline. A brief statement will then be made of the larger problem indicated by the study as a whole.

(A) SPECIFIC OUTCOMES

(1) The Identification of Instruction and Control

One of the more specific conclusions reached from the study concerns the changed relation of instruction and

control. The historical development shows unmistakably a trend toward the encroachment of the instructional function upon control until at present it is practically impossible to isolate theoretical data relative to the latter function alone. The increasing recognition of learning as behaving or of all behavior as learning precludes the possibility of separate theoretical treatment except as a matter of emphasis. Each appears as part and parcel of the other. Whereas the conception prevailed widely in the past that control was a negative affair, having mainly to do with providing, through restraint of the active side of child life, the conditions of learning conceived as the direct appropriation of subject matter, there has come with the theoretical acceptance of behaviorism the view that responses of conformity to imposed command are learnings just as truly as those acquired from texts.

A related factor which has contributed to the encroachment and the consequent loss of identity of the control function has been the importance attached recently to a proper guidance of the unconscious manifestations of experience. Here the learnings which proceed in connection with unconscious response are considered quite as fundamental in character formation as those effected in conscious reaction. Hence, in matters of direct control the importance of proper regard for the way in which these submerged reactions are affected supersedes the mere consideration of outward order or conformity.

(2) The Multiplicity of Factors in Control

The study has shown the futility of regarding any single factor, like the authority of the teacher at one extreme or certain supposedly immutable and self-contained purposes of the child at the other extreme, as the primary source of growth in freedom. The multiplicity of energies, personal and environmental, recognized as operative in each instance of experience, makes it appear unwise to assume a complete efficacy in the employment of any single procedure as a consistent policy. There appears in the literature a tendency toward a less fixed attitude regarding the particular factors that produce any given overt manifestation and an apparent ~~open-mindedness~~ regarding the kind of treatment demanded by such cases. Whether authority shall be employed depends on the nature of the case, its history, its present connections, and the kind of response which it is desired to build into the character of the child. Particular situations certainly demand the use of such direct means of producing response, but there is no evidence from the study of a trend in the direction of their use as a consistent policy. There is rather an apparent tendency to regard direct control as having only limited moral potentialities as compared with the discipline which comes from the positive employment of ideas, suggestions, objective materials, and the responses and demands of associates in personal achievement.

(3) The Impossibility of Opposed Conceptions of Control

It appears from the study that there are no such things as mutually opposed and at the same time self-consistent conceptions of control. There are simply different distributions of emphasis upon the factors which have been recognized as pertinent to the general problem. It appears that one's general point of view arises in connection with the relative emphasis placed upon factors consciously or unconsciously selected as relevant to control. Such a point of view may place great emphasis upon certain factors while disregarding or ignoring the presence and operation of others. It further appears that any such view does not literally fail to involve those factors which it consciously or ignorantly disregards. The factors are practically operative in each situation, whether the teacher has discovered them or not. Something is done about them, therefore, even if only to hinder their proper manifestation. Conscious attitudes which fail to include proper regard for their presence are merely limited or partial views.

In ignoring or denying the presence or relevancy of certain factors, on the one hand, or in placing primary emphasis upon them, on the other hand, general conceptions of control do not thereby oppose themselves to each other. The one merely refuses conscious consideration of factors which the other intentionally emphasizes. For example, it appears obvious from the study that those who adhere to a view of control

which denies the validity of authority fail to give due weight to at least two pertinent factors, namely, the kinds of control to which out-of-school conditions have made the child sensitive and the frequent inability of some children, if not all, to respond at all times on the basis of a conscious back-and-forth reference as between the demands of procedures in which others are engaged and the demands of their own present doings. In other words, there is failure to give proper regard to the force of existing customary modes of direct control, on the one hand, and to the inherent impulsive and social character of children's doings, on the other hand.

It seems equally clear that those who hold the general view that a child must be controlled before he can be taught have ignored some of the more recent discoveries relative to the nature of learning. It appears obvious that such a view restricts learning to what goes on between the teacher and pupil, what the child derives by conscious effort or application in the study of the printed page, or what he does consciously in more overt individual enterprise. The great variety of submerged responses which, so it is contended, make up the child's more fundamental inclinations or character are ignored by such a view. It is assumed that learning takes place only through that to which the child consciously and actively attends and that the process does not take place except as certain requisite conditions relating to posture, stillness, external mien, and other more or less objective matters have been established.

(4) The Need for a Philosophy of Control

Paradoxical as it may seem, in view of the gradual submergence of control in the educative function proper, the most fruitful practical outcome of the study, perhaps, is an apparent need for a philosophy of control. The very diversity of views and the great variety of factors regarded as significant to any adequate general attitude indicate the need for a certain wholeness of attitude which is sensitive to the multiplicity of factors involved in specific situations and which proceeds as consistently as possible on the basis of the demands which each situation presents. Such an attitude would not be different from one's outlook or general attitude toward the total educative function, except in emphasis. It would mean a tendency to regard the child's total education as a matter of control, which, after all, might be helpful in giving a certain stability or poise to the teacher's thinking. A brief statement of certain facts and implications of the literature examined will give weight to this proposal.

With the insistence upon freedom begun on a broad scale in American education accompanying the introduction and spread of Froebelianism, the pendulum of thought and then that of practice moved rapidly toward a relaxation of external constraint and suppression of action. But because practice has not only lagged behind theory but has also been in the immediate control of those whose duties have necessarily prevented

adequate consideration of the deeper implications of the new ideas and because their modifications have reflected this inadequate interpretation of theory, we find unfortunate misapplications of theory, involving a swinging of the pendulum to the utter extreme of complete physical unrestraint as the only conceived alternative to complete external dictation and control. This unfortunate condition, due, it may be, to no fault of the theory, has brought reproach upon the theory and a reaction against it, with a consequent reëxamination and effort at revision, but not without a resulting attitude of hostility toward even the good that may have been contained in it.

Thus, the history of the past three decades shows plainly a reaction to the at-first-promising maxim of self-expression and in favor of that of self-realization, the latter being the reconstructed view of self-expression so dominant in the first two decades of the period. The latter key phrase appears to have resulted in part at least from the tendency to overlook the consequences of a too chaotic practical interpretation of freedom, which in practice often amounted to letting children do as they pleased. Self-realization and the still newer conception of growth have represented efforts to revise the older view in the light of newer knowledge and these evil consequences. Accordingly, they have carried within themselves both a negative and a positive emphasis. They have recognized the dispersiveness and undirectedness of impulses left to their own un-

guided manifestation and have placed greater emphasis upon a systematic use of environmental energies as the means of assisting impulses in their blind efforts to gain axis of direction and convergence into purposes of recognized social value. But somehow the terms, though involving for the serious student all the more recent implications of scientific educational data, have retained too much of the connotation of their predecessors. The result has been a perpetuation of the abuses brought about by the earlier misconceptions, as well as a continuation of the misunderstandings in practice.

The time seems ripe, therefore, for a statement of these newer conceptions in terms of more unmistakable import. To look at education as a whole from the point of view of that factor about which so much present divergence of conception exists, namely, control, may well provide a basis both for conserving the emphasis which the newer attitudes place upon the child as the center of things educationally and for avoiding the practical neglect of the environmental function. Whereas self-realization and growth call attention mainly to the child's active part in his own education, the term *control* recognizes a certain immaturity of childhood and a need for help in utilizing environmental materials to give unity and directedness to activity. It emphasizes the engineering function of the teacher in manipulating environmental factors and the demand for persistent sensitivity to opportunities for intensifying the reflective quality of the child's doings. In

contrast with a certain educational sufficiency and completeness of child activity remaining in the terms *self-realization* and *growth*, the proposed term emphasizes environment not only as a stage in experience, but also as providing the sole leverage for improving the quality of experience. It emphasizes the indirect character of the teacher's relation to the child through environmental mediation and magnifies the problem of providing those instrumentalities which condition approved forms of social conduct.

The need appearing from the study for a philosophy of control represents, then, no essentially new need. It is but the expression of the ever recurring need for a different point of departure, from which defects may be noted and from which the factors in a common problem may be clarified. Moreover, there appears no demand that points of view attain theoretical identity, but rather that they reach the completeness which a fuller recognition of the various factors operative in each practical situation would allow. Neither is there a need for being able to apply any single view irrespective of the particular set of practical conditions already existing. Indeed the very notion of applying a conception seems to imply a certain externality in its origin — an aloofness or importation from without of a theory generated without conscious regard for the factors in practical situations. Such an assumption fails to note that valid points of view arise in connection with generalizations made from analysis of factors actually found

in practice. The thing most needed is that teachers shall have their attention called to factors of which they have previously been unconscious or upon which only partial emphasis has been placed. They will then be better able to see possibilities, things which they might do but which they have not previously thought of or regarded as necessary. Thus, their changed point of view is really only a revision of attitude with reference to the familiar because of newly seen possibilities in it.

(5) *The Social Criterion*

Stages in the evolution of the "social-moral" criterion in education indicate increasing attention to the social factors in control. Whereas, in the beginning, religious morality superseded articulate social considerations, social factors have counted increasingly until now the "social" and the "moral" are frequently used interchangeably. The failure and criticism of a variety of efforts to effect a social morality based on a limited political view of society, on an assumed opposition between personal and social interests, on a separateness of intellectual and moral behavior, and on the older idea of learning as an individual affair has been followed by proposals which seek to discover principles of unity and harmony where separateness and opposition have existed. Where an assumed opposition between personal and social interests was formerly reflected in antagonism between the teacher (representing the school or the community) and the pupils (regarded as indi-

viduals), there is a tendency to regard personal and social interests as identical and to consider control as a function of coöperative pursuits.

Where an authoritative social morality involving conformity to dictated requirements and limited participation in the political aspects of social life was reflected in a school procedure which sought control through habits of conformity to the managerial aspects of school organization and to the conditions of acquisition, there is now a tendency to identify the moral with the demands of concrete life situations and to effect a social reorganization of the school such that morality shall be inherent in the intellectual requirements of group activities having continuity with the activities of life itself. A synthesis of the intellectual and moral aspects of behavior is suggested in a proposed mechanism of instructional reorganization in which the principle of discipline is found in the inherent relations of members of society in the pursuit of common ends. The conclusion here reached is that any adequate view of control must take into account the possibilities of unification found in the conception of the school's organic relation to life and in the notion of discipline as relative to the aims of social enterprise.

(6) The Teacher and the Factor of Success in Control

Though the study as a whole indicates a fluctuation of attitude relative to the importance of the teacher in control, the more recent theoretical emphasis indicates

the need for more continuous teacher responsibility. In view of the more recently recognized experimental character of children's purposes and the consequent need for help in purposing, the place of the teacher is fundamental. Because the child has within himself no fixed body of purposes to which direct appeal can be made and which, left alone, flower full grown without direction from the environment, the teacher is in large degree responsible for providing conditions which turn dispersive action into positive achievement. From the point of view of the child, as member of a social group, there must be opportunity to employ habits or suggestions, objects or subject matter, in successful pursuit. Because the child's purpose is conceived as tentative, provisional, and inherent in the observed alternative possibilities, habits or suggestions, objects or ideas, and is not separately and intrinsically directive of present procedure, the teacher is continuously responsible for the reflective quality of the child's doings. The primary emphasis found in the more recent literature seems to be upon the patient provision of conditions which insure continuous success in situations involving proper regard for the demands and requirements of associates.

(B) FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

(1) The Changed Attitude toward Child Nature

The view that children are not as "bad" at present as in the past and that discipline in general is improved

has been confirmed. It is explained in several ways. In the first place, there appears a general acceptance of less fixed notions of "goodness" and "badness." Standards of right and wrong have changed from immutable entities to the rational demands of specific situations. In the earlier stages of the present system such matters as disobedience, badness, the disposition to whisper, and the like were regarded as objective character traits possessing a certain irrevokable finality like the red color of cloth. They were the inevitable manifestations of a fixed character, which had exclusive private ownership of inherently bad qualities, for which the child alone was regarded as wholly responsible. But the study has shown such qualities to be increasingly regarded as the expressions of interacting elements in specific situations. Their manifestation is symptomatic of specific conditioning factors, impulsive, habitual, and environmental, of which the pupil is only a stage or phase and for which he can only in part be held accountable. The shift is thus from complete personal accountability to a maximum of environmental complicity. Increasingly it seems to be held that it is only through the previously undiscovered coöperation of environmental and impulsive factors that specific acts characterized as good or bad manifest themselves.

In the second place, the literature examined indicates a decrease of attention to matters relating to the alleged perversity of children. Whereas a considerable

portion of earlier writings was given to methods and justifications of various forms of punishment, contemporary literature on control scarcely mentions the subject. For the earlier emphasis upon this direct, negative control there has been substituted the positive, indirect means of control through a richer curriculum. The change in both the quality and number of school activities has apparently lessened the earlier frequency of capricious activity and the consequent need for direct modes of control. Moreover, it seems accurate to conclude that children, having thus less occasion for capricious conduct, are actually less inclined than in the past toward intentional wrongdoing, if the frequency of reference to infractions of school regulations, school rebellions, teacher abandonments, mutilations of buildings, and the like is an index of perversity.

(2) Decreased Attention to the Question of Discipline

It appears that, with increased attention to the educational use of children's active tendencies, there is a corresponding decrease of emphasis upon the question of discipline or control. This is shown particularly in the shift of emphasis relative to the two phases of discipline that have been retained throughout the historical development. The term has retained theoretically and practically two meanings, which represent extreme but not opposed positions. First, discipline refers now, as in the past, to direct, authoritative methods employed by the teacher in maintaining conformity to

requirements, whether arbitrary or arising from the failure of pupils to proceed on the basis of reciprocal reference in coöperative pursuits. In this sense there remains the practical need, supported in theory, for "disciplining" children. As thus defined, discipline is now regarded as the exception, however, rather than the rule, as was the case in the past. This is due to the fact that indirect control through environmental mediation has in increasing degree replaced the more direct methods of reward, authority, and force.

Second, the meaning of the term is closely associated with the directive function of environment and is the exact correlative of the educational use of the active factors of behavior. It corresponds to "formal" discipline in that it refers to the formation of habitual modes of response. It is contrasted with this older view, however, in that trained "powers" or habits are regarded as the results rather than the direct aims of educational activities. The meaning is also contrasted with the "formative" connotation in that increased power is an incident or concomitant of personally chosen and conducted activity rather than the negative effect of imposed routine. A further contrast appears in the quality of habit sought. Whereas the older meaning signified habits having mainly the quality of repetition, there is at present the added element of inclination or disposition and foresight in the habitual reactions sought. And because habits having such qualities are regarded as the primary object of instruction, the

term *discipline* as here used appears to have been in large degree identified with the latter function. Relatively, therefore, discipline has received decreasing attention, while instruction and environmental factors have increased in importance.

(C) THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE

So far it appears certain that in some guise or other the factors of authority and freedom, external dictation and action based on impulse are to remain in education, as in life. Whether they shall function in harmonious continuity or in opposed juxtaposition seems to depend in large measure on the outlook upon life and the interpretation of child nature employed in the education of the future. To the extent that traditional beliefs and practices determine future attitudes toward moral control, as they have done so largely even to the present, it seems clear that fixed interpretations and applications will perpetuate the rigid dualisms of the past.

Just how far the opening wedge of articulation between authority and freedom, begun on a scientific basis only within the past generation, may be employed to produce further cleavage within traditional procedure seems to depend on the effects of at least three major influences. The first of these is the disintegrating effects upon a consistent employment of authoritarian control brought about by the accelerated transmission of the effects of change in local, personal, and group habits, attitudes, beliefs, and ideals. This larger life

influence, constituting as it does the major artery of the child's educational growth, is incidental and therefore largely blind in its operation. Consequently, methods of control change with the medium of social custom in which they operate. As an example, a diminished efficacy of direct, authoritarian discipline is at present obvious to both teacher and parent, but the fact usually eludes analysis or comprehension. It is so, and that usually ends the matter. Johnny just will not be the kind of boy his father was, diligent and patient efforts of parents to the contrary notwithstanding. And there seems some doubt that Mary is to be kept safely within the bounds of moral standards not yet a generation old, irrevokable as they seemed to be in their time.

Second, the subtle but pervasive and ameliorating effects of current, isolated instances of practice based on a conception of harmony between freedom and authority may, on the basis of the principle just stated, assist in improving the situation. Some influence upon customary methods of control has doubtless been exerted by the constant struggle of a few individuals who have tried conspicuously though single-handedly to institute change. Such changes seem, however, to have been more surreptitious than deliberate. The educational public, impatient at prolonged experimentation and anxious for objective evidence of progress, has usually been reluctant — and often wisely so — to adopt radically new ideals and practices. And where accomplishments of an advanced and funda-

mental character have been taken over, there has often been an unfortunate simulation of the external features of change without an appropriation of inner spirit and underlying motive. In the absence of the actuating spirit of intelligent articulation of procedure with the demands of social life, many of the changes have proved to be disappointing adoptions rather than fruitful re-adaptations. Changes in control, as in other aspects of teaching, have from this point of view been of a trial-and-error or trial-and-result character. If progress is a fact, it is in part obscured by the accompanying lack of a sense of values.

Third, reliance must be placed upon the more formal, if slower, educational means of reconstructing established attitudes toward control. On the surface it appears that a direct, frontal attack must be made upon certain notions which are taken for granted as being so obviously true as to be commonplace and, therefore, to defy question or revision. These, so it would seem, must be broken up, and from the chaos revised conceptions and extensions of meaning must appear in response to the changed social order and the implications of science. The pressing problem of the present, from the point of view of the study just completed, is to propose new interpretations or meanings in place of certain conceptions or notions which, because of the force of tradition, have become unduly fixed in present educational thought and practice.

A difficulty appears, however, in connection with the

method by which these revisions of interpretation are to be accomplished. Convictions that have been attained in the scientific spirit are flexible and require only to be given the necessary time in which to adapt themselves to the needs of change. Nothing need be done about such conceptions. But those of our notions about teaching methods or control which partake of the character of prejudice, opinion, or unrationalized belief most need revision because of the subtle blindness of their formation and the consequent inflexible method of their operation. They are at the same time the most difficult to attack. They rest in a complacent defiance of change. To attempt to weaken them by direct refutation is only to create for them a more tenacious hold and to make their future disturbance more difficult. And as frontal attacks are declared to be "more wasteful in peace than in war," some indirect approach must be made in order to establish a context of plausible grounds for revision.

Moreover, to insure perspective and a unitary outlook, the method employed must involve at the same time both analysis and synthesis. In the present problem it is really that of reanalysis and resynthesis looking toward a continued redintegration of conception. To revise particular concepts without deliberate regard for their inherent connections in a total view is not only to neglect the need for conscious unity and consistency of conception, but also to disregard the most fruitful method of concept formation. Particularization and

generalization must go hand in hand not only as exact counterparts but also as part and parcel of each other. Otherwise, there is the danger of perpetuating the fallacious assumption that an accumulation of parts necessarily makes a unitary whole. It seems necessary, then, to reinterpret the total educative function through a restatement of its essential phases regarded as pivotal points of reorganization. This has been done frequently in the past. Thus, self-expression, self-realization, and growth have represented in turn historical emphases in efforts to offer renewal and expansion of conception. Each such concept thus becomes an important approach or emphasis for expanding one's total outlook. It is at the same time a means of determining the place and importance of elements. The larger the number of such approaches, if diverse and indigenous in the educative process, the more meaningful does the whole become.

It is here contended that the concept of control offers a similarly profitable point of departure. As in the case of the earlier attempts, control thus becomes a new measure of the significance of such elements as freedom, authority, self-expression, self-realization, growth, and the like. These become stages or phases of the control function. Habit formation, learning, interest, method, subject matter — all attain renewed meaning in terms of control. Such an approach seems particularly important at the present time because of the recognized synthesis of the control and instructional

functions. Biology and psychology seem to attest increasingly to the primacy of mere directedness of activity as the primitive, elemental factor with which conscious educational procedure must deal. Such direction of movement is, natively, a function of personal and environmental influences. Decreasing attention seems to be given to original forces, such as instincts, inherited dispositions, and satisfactions. These are the products of action rather than their cause in the strictly primitive sense. Education, from this point of view, means the mastery through successful achievement of the direction of activity. The mastery of action in reciprocal relations with others also means control. Thus, education and control are synonymous. But from a more practical point of view there is also the need for viewing the whole educative function from the point of view of control. This has been mentioned earlier in the present chapter. (See *ante*, pp. 332 ff.)

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